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5Foreword
Jannie Malan
In this issue, the first two articles are about remembering, the next two 
about rethinking, and the last one about reconstructing. In different ways, 
all these articles are about redoing important things – and it is so that in 
some or other way, redoing can often be very necessary. I have found it 
interesting to note that the prefix ‘re-’ can function in nine semantic fields, 
and that in one or more of the senses of again, back and in a different way
it can be prefixed to almost any English verb or verbal derivative (Sykes 
1982:860). In different, but interrelated and integrated ways, these three 
meanings can indeed be found in the articles of this issue. 
The Mandela Centenary article is of special topical value in this year, but can 
be very relevant in every other year as well. It takes us back to our justifiably 
famous Madiba’s long life and the socio-political contexts of his time – on 
the one hand, the contemptible situation of contra-existential apartheid, 
and on the other hand the expedient emergence of a co-existential and 
ethical humanism. The article reminds us that such ethics had to prioritise 
justice and had to accommodate a spear-named strategy of confronting 
the relentless structural violence of apartheid with a daunting, though 
disciplined, forcefulness. It shows us a remarkable model of overcoming 
ethno-national ‘superiority’ and propagating democracy and inclusivity. 
It encourages us to be followers of such a ‘humble, honest and human’ 
leader, who was inspired by a politics of living together.
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The article highlighting the need for memorialisation to consolidate 
transitional justice in the Democratic Republic of the Congo takes us back 
to a devastated situation after decades of conf lict, where survivors cried 
‘Never again!’ and summoned co-survivors and perpetrators to commit 
themselves to such a vision. In this article the never-again-atrocities 
call does not only recur as a refrain, but is also elaborated to include the 
conf lict-preventing injunction never to hate the perpetrators. We can read 
how fieldwork informants emphasised the dual significance of memorials 
and memorial days: to remember and honour victims, and to prevent 
survivors from harbouring ongoing hatred of perpetrators. The informants 
further emphasised the value of apology, especially when offered by 
the State.
In the article on the causes, situation and solutions of the recent years of 
conf lict in South Sudan, the keyword is ‘rethink’. Here the ‘re-’ prefix 
functions in the sense of ‘in a different way’. The article was prompted by 
the fact that when peace ‘agreements’ keep failing, the self-evident inference 
is that the real causes of the recurring conf lict have not been addressed and 
that new approaches to the underlying problems and their possible solutions 
have to be urgently adopted. In this article ethnic animosity is identified 
as the root cause of the violent conf lict, and the author’s rethinking has 
led him to creative recommendations for counteracting such enmity and 
promoting amity.
The next article is also about South Sudan and also about different ways 
of thinking. It discusses a case where parties with conf licting thought 
patterns were trying to put together a peace agreement. It seems as if the 
general aim of the parties was to work towards transitional justice, but 
as if they (and/or the facilitators?) did not care to venture into a debate 
about prioritising retributive or restorative justice. What the Agreement 
contained, were sections on the ‘agreed transitional justice mechanisms’ 
(ARCSS 2015:40 [section 1.5]), in the following order: Commission 
for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing, Hybrid Court for South Sudan, 
and Compensation and Reparation Authority. The article focuses on 
overcoming the challenges and operationalising the envisaged Court as a 
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justice-delivering mechanism. But the implication is that the justice to be 
delivered is not only justice for the sake of justice, but also, and especially, 
justice for the sake of peace. The different ways of thinking should therefore 
reach further than the field of anti-impunity; it should transcend into the 
related and integrated fields of reparation and reconciliation. 
The last article is about post-conf lict recovery and reconstruction in Kenya, 
and community resilience. It discusses the different models the State used 
in implementing its recovery and reconstruction programme, and the 
various successes and shortcomings. But it focuses on findings about the 
remarkable resilience that may be revealed by internally displaced people – 
findings which show how social support can be regained and social capital 
recreated.
And the reviewed book is about rethinking the situation of religion between 
violence on one side and peacebuilding on the other. It frankly discusses 
religion’s deplorable links with violence and its commendable potential for 
contributing towards justice, peace and reconciliation. The book shows 
how, in this dual context, rethinking can be transformative and lead to 
far-reaching effects.
From the editorial desk, I therefore trust that the contents of this issue will 
inspire our readers to remember and rethink, and possibly to turn best 
practices and research into even better practices and research.
Sources
ARCSS (Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South 
Sudan) 2015. Addis Ababa, Intergovernmental Authority on Development.
Sykes, J.B. ed. 1982. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of current English. Seventh 
edition. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
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9Celebrating the centenary of Nelson 
Mandela’s birth and his nationalist 
humanist vision
Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Busani Ngcaweni*
Abstract
Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, charismatic and iconic, is a product of his time 
and can only be understood within the context of the social movements 
that he belonged to and led. Thus, this article locates Mandela within 
the local and global context in which he emerged while at the same time 
making sense of his instrumental interventions and nationalist humanist 
vision of life, peace and justice. This article situates Mandela’s political life 
within the broader context of the third humanist revolution, which was a 
response to the inimical processes of racism, enslavement and colonisation. 
In its centenary celebration of Mandela, the article re-articulates how he 
embodied alternative politics founded on the will to live as opposed to the 
will to power; the paradigm of peace as opposed to the paradigm of war; 
political justice as opposed to criminal justice; as well as pluriversality 
as opposed to tragic notions of racial separate development known as 
apartheid. What is f leshed out is a ‘Mandela phenomenon’ as founded 
on strong progressive politics albeit predicated on the unstable idea of 
the potential of advocates and victims of apartheid undergoing a radical 
metamorphosis amenable to the birth of a new pluriversal society.
*  Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni is Professor and Acting Executive Director of the Change 
Management Unit (CMU) in the Principal and Vice-Chancellor’s Office at the University 
of South Africa. Busani Ngcaweni is the Head of Policy and Research Services in the 
Presidency (RSA) and Non-Resident Research Fellow at the University of Johannesburg.
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Introduction
In his keynote address at the Centenary of Nelson Mandela’s birth in 2018, 
former United States President Barack Obama strove to situate Mandela 
within the global epochs and contexts in which he was born, persecuted, 
practised politics and led South Africa. This was done in the interest 
of understanding how Mandela attained such an iconic status in global 
politics. In his acclaimed Black Prophetic Fire (2014), the leading Black 
American philosopher Cornel West also underscored the link between 
charismatic leaders and social movements:
But I want to point out that any conception of the charismatic leader 
severed from social movements is false. I consider leaders and movements 
to be inseparable. There is no Frederick Douglas without the Abolitionist 
movement. There is no W.E.B. Du Bois without the Pan-Africanist, 
international workers’, and Black freedom movements. There is no Martin 
Luther King Jr. without the anti-imperialist, workers’, and civil rights 
movements. There is no Ella Baker without the anti-US-apartheid and 
Puerto Rican independence movements. There is no Malcolm X without 
the Black Nationalist and human rights movements. And there is no 
Ida B. Wells without the anti-US-terrorist and Black women’s movements 
(West 2014:2).    
Mandela is no exception; hence this article situates him within the third 
humanist revolution without ignoring the local African and South African 
contexts. We revisit the life of struggle and the legacy of Mandela mainly 
because this year (2018) marks one hundred years since Nelson Rolihlahla 
Mandela was born in Qunu, South Africa. Mandela was an embodiment 
of the politics of life, which privileges co-existence of human beings 
irrespective of their race. Mandela sought to lead both perpetrators 
and victims of apartheid colonialism as ‘survivors’ into a new political 
formation known as the ‘rainbow nation’ of equal and consenting citizens. 
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He became an active leader in the epic struggle for liberation, and endured 
27 years of imprisonment, 18 of which were spent at the notorious Robben 
Island. It was the violence and brutality of apartheid colonialism that 
forced Mandela and others in the African National Congress (ANC) and 
the South African Communist Party (SACP) to embrace violence as a 
tool of liberation. Mandela was so committed to opposing the injustice of 
apartheid, with its logic of racism and colonialism and its paradigm of war, 
that he was prepared to die for the cause of democracy and human rights 
long before these values were globally accepted as part of the post-Cold 
War international normative order. 
This set him apart as a leader who was fully committed to a decolonial 
ethical humanism that underpins the will to live. Even after enduring 
years of incarceration, Mandela avoided bitterness and preached a gospel of 
racial harmony, reconciliation and democracy. This character of Mandela 
emerges poignantly even within a context of a highly dynamic and 
ideologically eclectic environment of anti-colonial politics of the twentieth 
century. Mandela’s leadership role during the transition from apartheid to 
democracy inaugurated a paradigm shift towards political reform and social 
transformation. When he became the first black president of a democratic 
South Africa in May 1994, Mandela practically and symbolically made 
important overtures to the erstwhile white racists, aimed at including them 
in a new, inclusive, non-racial, democratic, and pluriversal society – a world 
in which many worlds fit (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2016:43; Mignolo 2011). 
This article celebrates Mandela’s centenary by analysing the ‘Mandela 
phenomenon’ as an encapsulation of humility, integrity, generosity of spirit, 
wisdom and servant leadership. This interpretation identifies Mandela as 
an advocate of decolonial humanism informed by what Dussel (2008: xvi) 
terms ‘obediential power’ to lead and command ‘by obeying’. While in 
prison Mandela linked his personal freedom with that of the oppressed 
people of South Africa and, until his death in 2013, he consistently 
expressed how obedient he was to the ANC.   
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Mandela as a visionary leader in a humanist revolution 
of decolonisation 
Mandela’s life of struggle and resulting legacy form part of what the 
philosopher and decolonial theorist Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2008a:115) 
termed ‘a third humanist revolution that has existed alongside the 
Renaissance and the Enlightenment, always pointing to their constitutive 
exclusions and aiming to provide a more consistent narrative of the 
affirmation of the value of the entire human species’.
In decolonial theory, the first humanist revolution was during the 
Renaissance where a ‘shift from a God-centred worldview to a Man-centred 
conception of selves, others, and world’ was initiated (Maldonado-
Torres 2008a:106). The second was the Enlightenment humanism, which 
Immanuel Kant (1996:58) celebrated as mankind’s emergence and 
liberation from ‘self-incurred immaturity’ which resulted in the creation of 
modern institutions. Of these modern institutions, nation-states became 
key examples (see also Maldonado-Torres 2008a:109). 
The third humanist revolution is driven by thinkers, activists and 
intellectuals from the Global South who have experienced the ‘dark side’ of 
modernity, which included enslavement and colonisation, and is therefore 
inevitably predicated on decolonising and deimperialising the world. Its 
horizon is the regaining of the ontological density by black people and a new 
post-racial pluriversality (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2016:42–44). By ontological 
density we mean black people reclaiming their being after centuries of 
dehumanising colonialism and apartheid.  
The ‘Mandela phenomenon’ is cast as a direct challenge to the paradigm 
of war that Friedrich Nietzsche in his The Will to Power (1968) articulated, 
insisting that war was the natural state of things and that human beings 
were destined to rarely want peace and, if they did so, it was only for brief 
periods of time. 
Broadly speaking, Mandela’s life of struggle, and his legacy, challenge the 
paradigm of war and its ability to turn those who were involved in the 
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liberation struggle against such monstrosities as imperialism, colonialism, 
apartheid, neo-colonialism, and coloniality to end up becoming monsters 
themselves. We deploy a critical decolonial ethics of liberation to propose 
a new understanding of the meaning of the Mandela phenomenon, and 
suggest that he stood for a paradigm of peace. In this account, his life 
of struggle became an embodiment of pluriversal humanism – which is 
opposed to the racial hatred that emerged at the dawn of a Euro-North 
American-centric modernity. 
The apartheid regime that came to power in South Africa in 1948 was a 
typical manifestation of this other side of modernity. It survived the early 
decolonisation processes of the 1960s and it continued to defy the global 
anti-apartheid onslaught until 1994. Apartheid existed as a constitutive 
element of the paradigm of war and coloniality (Maldonado-Torres 2007; 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013a; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013b). 
Mandela’s political struggles as encapsulated in his autobiography and as 
demonstrated in his actual leadership of the ANC during the Convention for 
a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) as well as his presidency collectively 
signify a consistent push for the decolonial turn that Maldonado-Torres 
(2008b:8) articulated as including ‘the definitive entry of enslaved and 
colonised subjectivities into the realm of thought at previously unknown 
institutional levels’. 
Mandela and the politics of life 
The will to live was at the centre of Mandela’s preparedness to walk through 
the shadow of death towards freedom. The will to live is the nerve centre of 
the paradigm that Mandela’s life of struggle and legacy embodied. Mandela 
was opposed to the paradigm of war even though the intransigency and 
brutality of the apartheid regime forced him to embrace violence and 
war as a protection for those who were victims of the apartheid system 
(Ngcaweni 2018). 
The rise of Euro-North American-centric modernity enabled the birth 
of a modern subjectivity mediated by race as an organising principle. 
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A unique modernist consciousness that manifested itself in terms of 
a radical ontological unevenness between Euro-North Americans and 
non-Europeans emerged. A world system that Ramon Grosfoguel (2007, 
2011) characterised as racially hierarchised, patriarchal, sexist, hetero-
normative, Euro-North American-centric, Christian-centric, capitalist, 
imperial, colonial and modern was also born. 
At the centre of this Euro-North American-centric world was what 
Maldonado-Torres (2007:245) described as the imperial Manichean 
Misanthropic Scepticism that was naturalised through the use of natural 
science to produce scientific racism. Constitutively, the paradigm of war is 
fed by racism and is inextricably tied to ‘a peculiar death ethic that renders 
massacre and different forms of genocide as natural’ (Maldonado-Torres 
2008a:xi). 
Mandela was not the first leader emerging from the Global South to embrace 
and articulate critical decolonial ethics of liberation as the foundation 
of a new politics of life as opposed to an imperial politics of death. Such 
previous decolonial humanists like Mahatma Gandhi, Aime Cesaire, 
William E.B. Du Bois, C.L.R. James, Albert Luthuli, Thomas Sankara, 
Kenneth Kaunda, and many others, were opposed to the paradigm of war 
(Cesaire 1955; James 1963; Du Bois 1965; Fanon 1968; Falola 2001; Rabaka 
2010). Decolonisation and deimperialisation were considered to be essential 
pre-requisites for a planetary paradigm of peace to prevail. It had to be 
followed by the return of humanism as a foundation of socialist society 
where there was no exploitation of human beings by others. 
Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, like Senghor, understood humanism in terms 
of African socialism, which he tried to implement in the form of Ujamaa 
villages (Nyerere 1968). Mandela understood humanism as ubuntu as a 
foundation for a rainbow nation (Mandela 1994). 
The paradigm of peace is therefore inextricably linked with decoloniality. 
It is made possible by the decolonial turn. Du Bois in 1903 announced 
the decolonial turn as a rebellion against what he termed the ‘colour 
line’ that was constitutive of the core problems of the twentieth century. 
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By the problem of the ‘colour line’, Du Bois was speaking of increasing racism 
and forms of resistance and opposition that it was provoking. Broadly, the 
decolonial turn embodies a critical decolonial ethics of liberation: 
It posits the primacy of ethics as an antidote to problems with Western 
conceptions of freedom, autonomy and equality, as well as the necessity 
of politics to forge a world where ethical relations become the norm 
rather than the exception. The de-colonial turn highlights the epistemic 
relevance of the enslaved and colonized search for humanity (Maldonado- 
Torres 2008b:7). 
Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o (1993) expressed the decolonial turn in terms of ‘moving 
the centre’ (from Eurocentrism-Europhonism to a plurality of cultures) 
towards ‘re-membering Africa’ – addressing Africa’s fragmentation and 
restoring African cultural identity. It therefore becomes clear that the 
decolonial turn is rooted in struggles against racism, the slave trade, 
imperialism, colonialism and apartheid. But as noted by Maldonado-Torres 
(2008b:7), the decolonial turn ‘began to take a definitive form after the end 
of the Second World War and the beginning of the wars for liberation of 
many colonised countries soon after’. 
Critical decolonial ethics of liberation differ from post-colonial approaches 
that became dominant in the 1990s in a number of ways. Genealogically, 
decoloniality and critical decolonial ethics of liberation are traceable to 
the anti-slave trade, anti-imperialist, anti-colonial and anti-apartheid 
thinkers originating from the Global South, whereas post-colonialism 
is traceable to thinkers from the Global North such as Michel Foucault, 
Jacques Derrida, and Antonio Gramsci among many others who were 
not necessarily post-colonial theorists. Decoloniality grapples with what 
Grosfoguel (2007) terms heterarchies of power, knowledge and being that 
sustained an asymmetrical modern global system.
In terms of horizon, decoloniality seeks to attain a decolonised and 
deimperialised world in which a new pluriversal humanity is possible. 
Post-colonialism is part of a ‘critique of modernity within modernity’, 
which is genealogically building on Marxism, post-structuralism, and 
post-modernism (Wallerstein 1997). These critical interventions do not 
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directly address what decolonial theorists termed coloniality as the dark 
side of Euro-North American-centric modernity. The coloniality of being 
that took the form of hierarchisation of human races and the questioning 
of the very humanity of black people is one of the major departure points 
of decolonial approaches. 
Mandela’s life of struggle, and his legacy, is an embodiment of a consistent 
and active search for peace and harmony. In his autobiography, Mandela 
stated that:
I always know that deep down in every human heart, there was mercy and 
generosity. No one is born hating another person because of the colour 
of his skin, or his background, or his religion. People must learn to hate, 
and if they can learn to hate, they can be taught love, for love comes more 
naturally to the human heart than its opposite. Even the grimmest times in 
prison, when my comrades and I were pushed to our limits, I would see a 
glimmer of humanity in one of the guards, perhaps just for a second, but it 
was enough to assure me and keep me going. Man’s goodness is a flame that 
can be hidden but never extinguished (Mandela 1994:609). 
Mandela, typical of the decolonial ethics of liberation, interpreted the anti-
colonial/anti-apartheid struggle as a humanistic movement for restoration 
of human life. This is how he put it:
This then is what the ANC is fighting for. Their struggle is a truly national 
one. It is a struggle of the African people, inspired by their own suffering 
and their own experience. It is a struggle for the right to live (my emphasis) 
(Mandela 1994:352).
This paradigm of peace marks a radical humanistic-oriented departure 
from the paradigm of war. It is premised on a radically humanistic 
phenomenology of liberation aimed at rescuing those reduced by racism 
to the category of the ‘wretched of the earth’ through recovery of their 
lost ontological density and epistemic virtues of intellectual integrity and 
freedom. Thus, what one gleans from Mandela’s Long Walk to Freedom 
is that, in the face of apartheid’s official and institutionalised racism as 
well as brutality and intolerance of dissent, he emerged as the advocate 
of decolonisation, a fighter for freedom, and the face of a new non-racial 
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inclusive humanism. It would seem that Mandela was ahead of his time. 
This is evident from his clear articulation of the discourse of democracy 
and human rights long before it became a major global normative issue. 
For many political actors and leaders, the discourse of democracy and 
human rights became a major issue at the end of the Cold War. But Mandela 
had already vowed to die for democracy and free society as long before as 
the 1960s. 
Interestingly, Mandela also credited his Xhosa traditional society’s mode 
of governance, which he described as ‘democracy in its purest form’ where 
everyone irrespective of societal rank was allowed space to ‘voice their 
opinions and were equal in their value as citizens’ (Mandela 1994:20). 
At the same time, Mandela described himself as ‘being something of an 
Anglophile’ and confessed that ‘While I abhorred the notion of British 
imperialism, I never rejected the trappings of British style and manners’ 
(Mandela 1994:48). Should we therefore not understand Mandela as a 
liberal-nationalist-decolonial humanist? Does Mandela fit into the line of 
Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King’s type who strongly believed in 
non-violent civil disobedience? 
The answer is both yes and no. Mandela was instrumental in the formation 
of uMkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) and became its commander-
in-chief. This was the armed wing of the African National Congress 
(ANC). The fighting forces had to adhere to a strict ethical conduct of only 
engaging in destabilisation and not in killing people. Even when Mandela 
was being tried for treason, he continued to tower above the apartheid 
system’s provocations, brutality and violence, and was able to invite the 
architects of apartheid to return to humanity in a moving speech delivered 
during the course of the Rivonia Trials (1963–1964):
During my lifetime, I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African 
people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against 
black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society 
in which all persons live together in harmony with equal opportunities. It is 
an ideal which I hope to live for and to see realised. But if needs be, it is an 
ideal for which I am prepared to die (Mandela 1994:352). 
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His liberation struggle was also aimed at the liberation of both the 
oppressed and the oppressors from the cul-de-sac of racialism in the truly 
Freireian resolution of the oppressor–oppressed contradiction created by 
colonialism and coloniality (Freire 1970). On this, Mandela wrote:
It was during those long and lonely years that my hunger for the freedom of 
my people became a hunger for the freedom of all people, white and black. 
I knew as well as I know anything that the oppressor must be liberated just 
as surely as the oppressed. A man who takes away another man’s freedom 
is a prisoner of hatred; he is locked behind the bars of prejudice and 
narrow-mindedness. I am not truly free if I am taking away someone else’s 
freedom, just as surely as I am not free when my freedom is taken from me. 
The oppressed and the oppressor alike are robbed of their humanity 
(Mandela 1994:611). 
This set him apart from other African nationalist liberators like President 
Robert Gabriel Mugabe of Zimbabwe who ended up frustrated by the policy 
of reconciliation and finally reproduced the colonial paradigm of war of 
conquest predicated on race. 
Mandela’s practising of the politics of coexistential life 
Various lives of Mandela are indeed discernible within which his political 
formation and making emerged and crystallised. Danny Schechter’s Madiba 
A to Z: The Many Faces of Nelson Mandela (2013) dramatises the various 
lives of Mandela. The historian Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (2013:10) posited 
that the political formation of Mandela and the meaning of his politics as 
well as legacy ‘cannot be fully understood through the psychologizing and 
symbolic discourses preferred in the popular media and hagiographies’. 
Zeleza emphasised that Mandela was a political actor within the broader 
drama of African nationalism and decolonial struggles and concluded that: 
Mandela embodied all the key phases, dynamics and ideologies of African 
nationalism from the period of elite nationalism before the Second World 
War when the nationalists made reformist demands on the colonial regimes, 
to the era of militant mass nationalism after the war when they demanded 
independence, to the phase of armed liberation (Zeleza 2013:10).
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Zeleza (2003) distilled five important humanistic objectives of African 
nationalism that are visible in Mandela’s life of struggle. These are: anti-
colonial decolonisation, nation-building, development, democracy, and 
pan-African integration and unity. In another publication he added that: 
Reconciliation was such a powerful motif in the political discourses of 
transition to independence among some African leaders of the imperatives 
of nation building, the second goal of African nationalism. It was also a 
rhetorical response to the irrational and self-serving fears of imperial racism 
that since Africans were supposedly eternal wards of whites and incapable 
of ruling themselves, independence would unleash the atavistic violence 
of ‘inter-tribal warfare’ from which colonialism had saved the benighted 
continent, and in the post-settler colonies, the retributive cataclysm of 
white massacres (Zeleza 2013:12). 
Mandela was, however, not the only African humanist who decried both 
racism and reverse racism. Mahmood Mamdani in his Define and Rule 
(2013c:112) documents how Julius Nyerere of Tanzania introduced an 
alternative model of statecraft that sought to dismantle both tribalism and 
racism in the same manner that Mandela sought to dismantle apartheid 
colonialism. Like Mandela, Nyerere in 1962 sought to create an inclusive 
citizenship. Nyerere even stated publicly that:
If we are going to base citizenship on colour we will commit a crime. 
Discrimination against human beings because of their colour is exactly 
what we have been fighting against […] They are preaching discrimination 
as a religion to us. And they stand like Hitlers and begin to glorify the race. 
We glorify human beings, not colour (quoted in Mamdani 2013c:112–113).
However what emerges poignantly about Mandela’s life of struggle are 
various challenges cascading from exigencies of navigating complex but 
fading African and strong racial colonial realities. The first issue facing 
Mandela during his political formative years was how to rise above his 
parochial cultural identity. Mandela was born into a Xhosa family in 
Eastern Cape. Therefore, Xhosa custom, ritual and taboo shaped his early 
life in a profound way. Inevitably his mentality was shaped in Eastern Cape 
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where he was born and grew up. Mandela’s formative political consciousness 
was inf luenced by what was happening at the ‘Great Place’ (royal place) 
of Chief Jongintaba Dalindyebo, the acting regent of the Thembu people. 
This is clearly articulated by him in his autobiography: ‘My later notions 
of leadership were profoundly inf luenced by observing the regent and his 
court. I watched and learned from the tribal meetings that were regularly 
held at the Great Place’ (Mandela 1994:19). 
Chief Jongintaba had become Mandela’s guardian after he lost his father. 
Mandela therefore grew up as part of a royal family, knowing that he was 
a Thembu first, and a Xhosa second. He did not know that he was a South 
African. It was only when he went to school that he felt a change: ‘I began 
to sense my identity as an African, not just a Thembu, or even Xhosa. 
But this was still a nascent feeling’ (Mandela 1994:36). 
Mandela admits that he had to learn through travel and exposure that 
he was a South African who was experiencing racial discrimination and 
domination. Mandela also mentioned in his autobiography that some 
prisoners criticised him of always keeping the company of Xhosa speaking 
prisoners. He had to grow from this ethnic parochialism. 
The second issue Mandela had to deal with was that of his political 
consciousness. Mahmood Mamdani once argued that ‘without the experience 
of sickness, there can be no idea of health. And without the fact of oppression, 
there can be no practice of resistance and no notion of rights’ (1991:236). 
Mandela’s explanation of his political formation and consciousness seems to 
confirm Mamdani’s argument. Mandela stated that:
I cannot pinpoint a moment when I became politicised, when I knew that 
I would spend my life in the liberation struggle. To be African in South 
Africa means that one is politicised from the moment of one’s birth, 
whether one acknowledges it or not. An African child is born in an Africans 
Only hospital, taken home in an Africans Only bus, lives in an African 
Only area and attends Africans Only schools, if he attends school at all 
(Mandela 1994:89). 
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However, Mandela admits that when he left the University of Fort Hare, 
he was advanced socially but not politically. He only developed politically 
when he reached Johannesburg, ‘a city of dreams, a place where one could 
transform oneself from a poor peasant into a wealthy sophisticate, a city of 
danger and opportunity’ (Mandela 1994:56). 
What is worth noting is that Mandela’s early political consciousness was 
deeply nationalistic. He rejected communism. He also rejected involvement 
of Indians and whites in African politics. As he puts it: ‘At the time, 
I was firmly opposed to allowing communists or whites to join the league’ 
(Mandela 1994:94). He elaborated that during the heyday of the ANC 
Youth League:
I was sympathetic to the ultra-revolutionary stream of African nationalism. 
I was angry at the white man, not at racism. While I was not prepared to 
hurl the white man into the sea, I would have been perfectly happy if he 
climbed aboard his steamship and left the continent on his own volition 
(Mandela 1994:106).
The third issue confronting Mandela was to decide what was entailed 
in being a freedom fighter. Besides his activism and leadership within 
the ANC Youth League, by 1952 Mandela had become part of the ANC 
leadership when he was appointed First Deputy President to Chief Albert 
Luthuli. It was also a time for Mandela to ref lect and revise some of his 
political convictions. He began to study works of Marxism and Leninism 
which resulted in him changing his opposition to communism without 
changing his nationalist bona fides.
His frontline leadership included the drawing up of the M-Plan, which 
would ensure the continued existence and operation of the ANC in the 
event it was banned. Part of the M-Plan included political lectures 
on ‘The World We Live In’, ‘How We are Governed’ and ‘The Need for 
Change’ (Mandela 1994:135). Mandela also took the initiative to critique 
the strategy of non-violence. His idea was that ‘non-violence was not a 
moral principle but a strategy; there was no moral goodness in using an 
ineffective weapon’ (Mandela 1994:147). Mandela strongly believed that 
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‘To overthrow oppression has been sanctioned by humanity and is the 
highest aspiration of every free man’ (Mandela 1994:151). It was the 
experience of how the apartheid government responded to the Defiance 
Campaign that prompted Mandela to see no alternative to armed and 
violent resistance. His conclusion:
A freedom fighter learns the hard way that it is the oppressor who defines 
the nature of the struggle, and the oppressed is often left no recourse but to 
use methods that mirror those of the oppressor. At a certain point, one can 
only fight fire with fire (Mandela 1994:155). 
Mandela was therefore not a typical Gandhi character, though his struggle 
had deep elements of Gandhism. The intransigence and violence of 
apartheid could not be dealt with using only Gandhian tools, which can 
be seen in Mandela’s role in the establishment of uMkhonto we Sizwe as a 
military wing of the ANC in the post-Sharpeville period. 
The fourth issue to deal with was the meaning of being a symbol of 
resistance. The long imprisonment of Mandela inadvertently contributed 
in a big way to the making of a global icon. Mandela became a microcosm 
of the anti-colonial and anti-racist struggle as a whole. In prison, he 
continued to play a leading role as the spokesperson for all the prisoners. 
Mandela spent 18 years on Robben Island and he used that time to develop 
an even deeper understanding of the problems facing South Africa and the 
possible resolutions. 
He entered prison as a radical nationalist and emerged from it as a radical 
humanist – a voice of reason and moderation. By the time of his release at 
the age of 71, Mandela had assumed a mythical stature within anti-colonial 
and anti-racist political formations. He became a ‘living’ martyr of the 
liberation struggle. On the impact of imprisonment on one’s character, he 
wrote that ‘Perhaps it requires such depths of oppression to create such 
heights of character’ (Mandela 1994:609). 
In justifying his individual initiative to initiate negotiations with the 
apartheid regime, Mandela stated that ‘There are times when a leader must 
move out ahead of the f lock, go off in a new direction, confident that he 
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is leading his people the right way’ (Mandela 1994:510–511). Opening up 
negotiations with the apartheid regime was very risky. Mandela risked 
being misunderstood by the ANC both inside and outside South Africa. 
The bigger risk was well captured by Schechter (2013:28): ‘He was one man 
up against an adversary with a whole bureaucracy behind it’. But by standing 
on a high moral and humanistic pedestal, Mandela managed to gradually 
gain the confidence of his adversaries and support of the progressive world. 
In initiating the negotiations, Mandela was in the process transforming his 
political identity from terrorist and prisoner to negotiator and facilitator of 
‘talks’ between the ANC and the apartheid regime. Through his initiative, 
Mandela managed to pull off one of the most challenging, significant and 
unexpected transitions from apartheid colonialism and authoritarianism to 
democracy. It is important to analyse and evaluate how the negotiations that 
produced the transition to democracy in South Africa were informed by a 
new logic of justice that was superior to the post-1945 Nuremberg template.
Mandela and the transition to democracy  
The paradigm of war gave birth to the Nuremberg trials as a template 
of justice. The paradigm of peace produces political justice. As argued 
by Mamdani (2013a; 2013b), the Nuremberg paradigm is predicated on 
the logic that violence should be ‘criminalized without exception, its 
perpetrators identified and tried in a court of law’. The Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA) paradigm of justice became predicated 
on a particular understanding of mass violence as political rather than 
criminal, which suggested a re-making of political society through political 
reform as a lasting solution (Mamdani 2013a; 2013b).
It would seem Mandela, working together with other stalwarts of the 
struggle like Joe Slovo, was fully committed to trying something new in the 
domain of transitional justice. In fact, the situation of a political stalemate 
needed political innovation and creativity to unblock. Mamdani (2013a:6) 
captured this situation as follows: ‘neither revolution (for liberation 
movements) nor military victory (for the apartheid regime) was on the 
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cards.’ Mandela led the ANC into CODESA fully aware that it was another 
‘theatre of struggle, subject to advances and reverses as any other struggle’ 
(Mandela 1994:577). 
History was not on the side of the apartheid regime. Apartheid had far 
outlived its life as a form of colonialism. If it survived the decolonial 
winds of change of the 1960s and 1970s, it could not survive the post-Cold 
War ‘Third Wave’ of democracy and human rights. One can even say the 
post-Cold War dispensation was more favourable to Mandela’s initiatives. 
But the ANC had also lost its major ally in the form of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union (Ramphela 2008:45). 
These points are reinforced by Frank B. Wilderson (2010) who has argued 
that it took major tectonic shifts in the global paradigmatic arrangement 
of white power such as the fall of the Soviet Union, which was the 
major backer of the ANC, the return of 40 000 black bourgeoisie exiles 
from Western capitals and a crumbling global economy, ‘for there to be 
synergistic meeting of Mandela’s moral fibre and the aspirations of white 
economic power’ (Wilderson 2010:8). Indeed, imperatives and interests 
of white capitalists who were experiencing the biting effects of sanctions 
and popular unrest at home played an important role in inf luencing 
the negotiators. 
But it is clear that what Mandela wanted and demanded from the apartheid 
regime was the dismantlement of apartheid and commitment to a non-
racial, democratic and free society. He sought to achieve this through the 
following strategy: ‘To make peace with an enemy, one must work with that 
enemy, and that enemy becomes your partner’ (Mandela 1994:598). 
Building on Mamdani’s argument (2013a) on how South Africa’s transition 
to democracy was predicated on a paradigmatic shift from the post-Second 
World War Nuremberg form of justice founded on criminal justice, one 
arrives at a favourable evaluation of CODESA. It was not merely a time of 
betrayal of decolonial liberation struggle through compromises; CODESA 
embodied another form of justice, a reality well captured by Mamdani, 
who wrote that:
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Whereas Nuremburg shaped a notion of justice as criminal justice, 
CODESA calls on us to think of justice as primarily political. Whereas 
Nuremberg has become the basis of a notion of victim’s justice – as a 
complement to victor’s justice than a contrast to it – CODESA provides 
the basis for an alternative notion of justice, which I call survivor’s justice 
(Mamdani 2013a:2).
Mamdani went on to elaborate on the differences between criminal justice 
and political justice in this way:
CODESA prioritized political justice over criminal justice. The difference 
is that criminal justice targets individuals whereas political justice affects 
entire groups. Whereas the object of criminal justice is punishment, that of 
political justice is political reform. The difference in consequence is equally 
dramatic (Mamdani 2013a:7). 
Indeed, the decolonial anti-apartheid struggle was not meant to punish the 
ideologues of apartheid but to destroy the edifice of apartheid itself. On the 
ashes of juridical apartheid, the ANC and Mandela envisaged a new post-
racial and pluriversal political community founded on new humanism and 
inclusive citizenship. The ghost of apartheid had to be laid to rest. The Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was the chosen mechanism for ‘laying 
ghosts of the dark past to rest with neither retributive justice nor promotion 
of a culture of impunity’ (Ramphela 2008:46). Mamdani (2013a:13) credited 
the TRC for transcending the Nuremberg trap ‘by displacing the logic of 
crime and punishment with that of crime and confession’. 
Netshitenzhe (2012) explained the logic of the negotiations and the 
settlement from the perspective of the ANC thus: ‘At the risk of over-
simplification, it can be argued that a critical element of that settlement, 
from the point of view of the ANC, was the logic of capturing a bridgehead: 
to codify basic rights and use these as the basis for more thoroughgoing 
transformation of South African society’ (Netshitenzhe 2012:16). 
Perhaps a strong confidence in the morality of decolonial humanism made 
the ANC and Mandela naïve, even to the extent of expecting those who 
benefitted economically from apartheid to be immediately reborn into 
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new compassionate human beings who would acknowledge the historical 
grievances of those who were abused and dispossessed by apartheid, and 
voluntarily commit themselves to play an active role in the equal sharing 
of resources. 
But Netshitenzhe reinforced the notion that decolonial humanism induced 
Mandela and the ANC to imagine a more inclusive post-apartheid South 
Africa. For him:
The articulation of the ANC mission by some of its more visionary leaders 
suggests an approach that, in time, should transcend the detail of statistical 
bean counting and emphasis on race and explicitly incorporate the desire 
to contribute to the evolution of human civilization. At the foundation of this 
should be democracy with a social content, excellence in the acquisition of 
knowledge and the utilization of science and a profound humanism (my 
emphasis) (Netshitenzhe 2012:27).
Mandela is a child of this ANC decolonial humanism. But concretely 
speaking, the year 1994 marked not only the end of administrative 
apartheid, but more importantly the beginning of a difficult process of 
nation-building, which was always tempered with a delicate balancing 
between allaying white fears and attending to black expectations and 
demands. This reality became a major test of Mandela’s politics of life. 
The Mandela presidency and the practice of politics of life 
At a practical level Mandela’s politics of life found expression in refusing 
to diminish one’s dignity through diminishing the dignity of others. Thus 
he avoided the humiliating of adversaries as he sought to create a new 
South Africa. When he became the first black president of South Africa in 
1994, Mandela implemented a decolonial humanist vision of a post-racial 
pluriversal society. At the core of this vision was a departure from racism 
towards a deeper appreciation of the importance of difference. 
In this vision, difference is not interpreted in terms of superior and 
inferior races. It is interpreted in terms of pluriversality. Maldonado-Torres 
(2008a:126) argued that the appreciation of human difference is informed 
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by a humanistic ‘interest in restoring authentic and critical sociality 
beyond the colour-line’. This point is also articulated by Lewis R. Gordon 
(1995:154) who posited that ‘the road out of misanthropy is a road that 
leads to the appreciation of the importance of difference’. Apartheid was a 
worse form of misanthropy founded on ‘bad faith’. It had to be transcended 
by all means, including symbolic ways.
This is why Mandela’s presidency was a terrain of the symbolic, which he 
used effectively to further welcome and entice the erstwhile racists into a 
new South Africa. Nation-building through use of symbolic gestures and 
other means, including sporting events, dominated Mandela’s presidency. 
These involved him visiting the 94-year-old widow of Hendrik Verwoerd, 
who was identified as the ideologue of apartheid and its architect. Mandela 
also agreed to the erection of a statue in remembrance of Verwoerd. 
He visited Percy Yutar, who played the role of prosecutor during the Rivonia 
Trial in which Mandela was sentenced to life imprisonment. He even 
visited ex-apartheid President P.W. Botha. While he was criticised in some 
quarters of bending too much to placate whites, his idea was to ensure that 
indeed the erstwhile ‘settlers’/‘citizens’ and the erstwhile ‘natives’/‘subjects’ 
were afforded enough room to be re-born politically into consenting 
citizens living in a new political society where racism was not tolerated 
(Mamdani 2001:63–70).
Conclusion and recommendations 
This article attempts to understand the Mandela phenomenon as 
founded on strong principles opposed to the persistent paradigm of war 
and its founding charter of the will to power. Mandela is analysed as an 
embodiment of the politics of life that emerged within a modern world 
that was bereft of humanness, goodness, love, peace, humility, forgiveness, 
trust and optimism. It was a world dominated by the paradigms of war 
and racism. 
Mandela provided an antidote to the paradigm of war. He introduced 
the paradigm of peace, reconciliation and racial harmony. He was 
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moved politically by profound humanism. He signified what Thandika 
Mkandawire (2013:3) has termed a ‘sane relationship to power’, a rare 
commitment to democracy and rule of law to the extent that ‘In a sense … 
normalized the idea of democracy in Africa’ (Mkandawire 2013:3). 
Wilderson (2010:11–13) accused Mandela of being a sell-out who squandered 
the revolutionary potential of the ANC and ignored the Freedom Charter 
as he compromised with white and global capital. In the year marking one 
hundred years since Mandela’s birth, 2018, we have seen this Mandela was 
a sell-out narrative being repeated in public discourse. 
The rebuttal is that the balance of forces did not allow Mandela enough 
room to manoeuvre because he was dealing with an undefeated enemy. 
Mandela had to inevitably pursue a middle of the road strategy in the hope 
that in future white privileges and hegemony would be diluted through 
structural reforms that would bring about prosperity for the black majority. 
He made compromises fully cognisant of the need to balance the outcomes of 
negotiations for a win-win situation. He wanted to re-member the oppressed 
without necessarily dis-membering the oppressor (Ngcaweni 2018). 
His vision of a post-racial pluriversal world remains powerful in a modern 
world that is trapped in a paradigm of war and the narrow Nuremberg 
paradigm of justice that is replicated by the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). Paul Maylam (2009:31) is correct to argue that Mandela ‘stands 
out among world leaders of the last century as a person not obsessed with 
power, not entangled in the politics of manipulation and spin, not enticed 
into conspicuous consumption, but forever humble, honest and human’.
The challenge for leadership today, in South Africa and beyond, is to recall 
the teachings of Mandela and seek practical ways of developing a social 
order that brings economic freedom to the poor and the marginalised, an 
order that negotiates conf lict and finds viable solutions, an arrangement 
that restores the dignity of the people, and societies that live in peace and 
justice. Further, the best tribute to Mandela would be responding to his call 
for the world’s people to show unity, service and sacrifice, for not so often 
does the death of one mortal mobilise the international community to join 
hands in the advancement of an all-inclusive civilisation (Ngcaweni 2018). 
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Memorialisation as an often neglected 
aspect in the consolidation of 
transitional justice: Case study of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Shirambere Philippe Tunamsifu*
Without a proper engagement with the past and the institutionalization 
of remembrance, societies are condemned to repeat, re-enact, and relive 
the horror. Forgetting is not a good strategy for societies transiting to a 
minimally decent condition (Bhargava 2000:54).
Abstract
For more than five decades after the Independence Day (1960–2018), the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has continued to witness large-
scale violations of human rights and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. Trying to deal with past abuses, the country twice 
experienced a process of transitional justice, in 1992 and in 2004, as the 
result of the Conférence Nationale Souveraine and the Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue, respectively. Both of these processes failed to achieve the desired 
result, and neither adopted any memorialisation process that honours the 
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memory of victims. In October 2013, however, delegates to the Concertation 
Nationale recommended the government to build monuments in memory of 
victims of the different armed conf licts. Unfortunately, five years later the 
government has not yet done anything to implement that recommendation. 
Based on the interrogation of stakeholders, this paper offers strategies on 
how to honour the memory of victims of the various armed conf licts in the 
DRC – in order to consolidate the degree of transitional justice that had 
been attained. 
To collect data, 32 key informants were interviewed and two focus group 
discussions were held in areas affected by armed conf licts. Findings 
included the recommendation that the State should apologise publicly for 
its failure to protect the civilian population. Thereafter, a commemorative 
day should be adopted to bring together victims and alleged perpetrators, 
and official monuments and memorials should be built in the most affected 
areas. Uncostly monuments, and aptly named schools, hospitals and 
public markets in memory of abuses should be built as symbolic collective 
reparation.
Keywords: commemoration of memories, concertation nationale, DRC, 
guarantee of non-repetition, healing process, symbolic reparation, tourism 
attraction, transitional justice
1. Introduction
1.1 Justification and rationality of the paper
The initial research project was entitled ‘Ways of restoring the dignity 
of victims of various armed conf licts in the DRC’. When the researcher 
started the fieldwork, a general report on Concertation Nationale was 
presented to President Joseph Kabila for consideration and implementation. 
Then, after the fieldwork, the researcher came to realise that among the 
recommendations suggested by delegates, the building of monuments in 
memory of victims of armed conf licts in the DRC was an important one. 
Given that in the opinions of almost all participants in the study there 
was a focus on memorialisation as a way of restoring victims’ dignity, 
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the researcher decided to entitle this paper: ‘Memorialisation as an often 
neglected aspect in the consolidation of transitional justice: Case study of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo’. 
What makes this paper relevant is the fact that the government has not 
done anything in accordance with what the delegates to the Concertation 
Nationale recommended back in October 2013. This paper offers strategies 
on what can be done to honour the memories of victims and prevent 
further violence in the DRC. In this regard, Tunamsifu (2016:78) states that 
‘institutional reforms aiming at preventing a recurrence of violations should 
be developed through a process of broad public consultations that include 
the participation of victims and other sectors of civil society’ (2016:78).
The paper contains various recommendations that may guide the government 
to implement the resolution adopted during the Concertation Nationale. 
1.2 Scope of the paper
The DRC together with its historical precursors has been an arena of 
conf lict since colonisation. During the almost five decades (1960–2018) 
following Independence Day, the country has continued to witness large-
scale violations of human rights and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law.
In dealing with widespread past violations, States transitioning from such 
horror are often in need of transitional justice, but they tend to neglect the 
restoration of dignity for the victims. Thus, in the last decade, according to 
Teitel, transitional justice has focused primarily on maintaining peace and 
stability (Verbeeck 2012:207; Teitel 2002:898). Borello notes that:
The term ‘transitional justice’ refers to the combination of policies that 
countries transitioning from authoritarian rule or conflict to democracy 
decide to implement in order to address past human rights violations. 
Transitional justice seeks to restore the dignity of victims and to establish 
trust among citizens and between citizens and the state (Borello 2004:13).
Therefore, it can be deduced that transitioning societies often decide how 
to bring to account those who bear the greatest responsibility and how to 
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compensate victims. Nevertheless, such societies usually pay less attention 
to memorialisation as a process after transitional justice to honour the 
memory of victims of past atrocities and thereby heal the wounds of 
survivors and pave the way towards reconciliation.
In 1991 and in 2002, the DRC convened two important events that adopted 
mechanisms of transitional justice. Thus the country, then the Republic of 
Zaïre under the military dictatorship of Mobutu, organised, in Kinshasa, 
the first inclusive political negotiation called the Conférence Nationale 
Souveraine. In 2002, during the series of internationalised armed conf licts 
backed by neighbouring countries after the Lusaka peace agreement in 
1999, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue was held in Sun City (near Pretoria, 
South Africa). Of all the resolutions adopted1 to deal with Mobutu’s rule 
and the crimes committed during different armed conf licts, however, none 
acknowledged the memorialisation initiative as a significant mechanism 
following the satisfactory implementation of transitional justice. 
After the contested presidential elections of 2011, President Joseph Kabila 
convened, in his December 2012 State of the Nation speech, a Concertation 
Nationale – which would start in September 2013 with the participation 
of some willing political parties and civil society organisations. 
The purpose of the Concertation Nationale was to bring together all the 
socio-political strata of the nation in order to ref lect, exchange and debate, 
freely and without constraint, all the ways and means of consolidating 
national cohesion, to put an end to the cycles of violence in the eastern 
part of the country, to ward off any attempt to destabilise the State 
institutions, and to accelerate the development of the country in peace and 
harmony (République Démocratique du Congo 2013:4).2 At the end of the
1 See Annexure 1 for a list of the Resolutions adopted by the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.
2 The original version in French is: ‘Les concertations nationales avaient pour objet la 
réunion de toutes les couches sociopolitiques de la nation afin de réfléchir, d’échanger et 
de débattre, en toute liberté et sans contrainte, de tous les voies et moyens susceptibles de 
consolider la cohésion nationale, de mettre fin aux cycles de violence à l’est du pays, de 
conjurer toute tentative de déstabilisation des institutions et d’accélérer le développement 
du pays dans la paix et la concorde’. 
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Concertation Nationale in October 2013, concerned by the vicious circle of 
internationalised armed conf licts that the country has been going through 
since 1996, parties agreed that victims should be honoured. Thus, they 
resolved that monuments should be built in memory of victims of various 
internationalised armed conf licts.
Indeed, such a memorialisation process intends to preserve memories 
of victims of past violations as part of a healing process, as symbolic 
reparation and as a mechanism of preventing further atrocities. It can 
satisfy the need for honouring individuals who suffered, disappeared, or 
were killed during widespread past violence. Accordingly, memorialisation 
can take a variety of forms, but serves as an umbrella concept encompassing 
a range of processes to restore contested memory, and to remember the 
wrongdoings of the previous regimes. Museums and commemorative 
libraries, monuments, walls of names of victims, and virtual memorials 
on the internet are major forms of memorial initiatives (Barsalou and 
Baxter 2007:4–5). Thus, when the tribunals and truth commissions have 
finished their work, the memorialisation can follow at the national level in 
order to help the public to understand better the aspects of conf lict that 
were previously hidden or not revealed during the truth-telling process. 
The educational programmes based on memorials and museums help the 
young generation to understand the history of conf lict that their parents 
and grandparents went through (Barsalou and Baxter 2007:9–10). After 
dealing with the past, the awareness process through education can create 
an attitude among the young generation to regret what happened in the 
past and to say ‘Never again!’
The transitional justice paradigm relies on the conviction that by dealing 
with the past on a national level, a better future is secured, because insights 
are provided on the ‘wrongfulness’ of the past atrocities. Therefore, the 
process is both backward-looking, as it contains an exploration of the 
past, and forward-looking, as it aims to securing a better future. It is often 
believed that processes of transitional justice contribute to societal repair 
and therefore peace (Impunity Watch 2013).
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Thus, the objectives of this research are to analyse the context of serious 
violations of armed conf licts and interrogate stakeholders in the quest of 
memorialisation that intend to preserve the memory, heal the wounds of 
victims and prevent further violations. Since the memorialisation initiative 
was adopted, but not yet implemented, the research intends to reveal the 
opinions of selected participants on memorialisation in the DRC as a 
neglected post-transitional justice mechanism.
The present research explores some available literature on memorialisation 
and uses a qualitative approach that takes into account the points of view 
of key informants selected by employing the purposive sample method. 
In qualitative research, according to Natasha Mack and others, only a 
sample of a population is selected for any given study. Thus, there was 
purposive selection of sample group participants according to preselected 
criteria relevant to a particular research question (Mack et al. 2005:5). 
In this study, the choice of the sample was based on a number of criteria 
which include the following: 
Firstly. the participant would be a representative of the ‘Coordination 
of Civil Society Organisations’ in the North and South Kivu provinces, 
the Ituri district3 and Kisangani. Secondly, the participant would be 
a representative of an association of victims of armed conf licts or of an 
association taking care of victims or advocating victims’ cases in the courts 
of law in the DRC. Thirdly, the participant would be a victim or survivor 
staying in one of the areas mostly affected by different armed conf licts such 
as North Kivu province (Goma); South Kivu province (Bukavu, Walungu 
and Uvira); Ituri (Bunia) and Oriental Province (Kisangani).
3 The field research was conducted when the DRC had 11 provinces. Currently, the country 
has 26 provinces in which Ituri (former a district in Province Oriental) has become one of 
the five provinces into which the Oriental province has been divided. 
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2. Context of serious violations in the DRC and mechanisms 
of transitional justice adopted to deal with them
This section presents a brief overview of the context in which untold crimes 
have been committed since the colonial period in the DRC. 
Since the period of colonisation, the DRC has witnessed difficult periods 
during which its name was changed several times.4 Emizet François 
Kisangani observes that ‘the DRC has undergone many changes in terms of 
players and goals, change and continuity have coexisted, and both forces 
have simultaneously exerted their inf luence on the political landscape of 
Congo’ (Kisangani 2012:11).
Located in Central Africa precisely at the heart of the African continent, 
the DRC is the second largest country in Africa by area, after Algeria. 
It is bordered by nine countries – in the west by the Republic of Congo, in 
the north by the Republic of Central Africa and South Sudan, in the east 
by Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania, and in the south by Zambia 
and Angola.
The DRC was colonised in two phases – by King Leopold II and by the 
State of Belgium.5 Both colonial administrations were brutal and various 
4 As his personal fiefdom, King Leopold II named what is now known as the DRC, Congo 
Free State (CFS) on 1 July 1885. After 75 years of horror, he was forced to hand over the 
colony to the State of Belgium which renamed it Congo Belge on 15 November 1908. 
After 52 years, on 30 June 1960, the country was granted independence and was renamed 
the Republic of Congo, but in August 1964 it became the DRC in accordance with the 
Luluabourg Constitution. During the reign of President Mobutu, it was renamed Republic 
of Zaïre on 27 October 1971, and when President Laurent Désiré Kabila came to power in 
May 1997, he changed the name back to the DRC, which is the country’s current name.
5 The first phase of the country’s colonisation occurred as a result of the Berlin Conference 
that ceded the Congo to King Leopold II from 1885 to 1908. His reign was characterised 
by widespread murder and unspeakable atrocities against the colonised people. After 
75 years of horror, which led to a huge international scandal, Leopold’s rule in the Congo 
had become such an embarrassment that the Belgian parliament was obliged to annex 
Congo in 1908 (see Turner 2013:1; Savage 2006:3). The second phase of the colonisation 
began on 15 November 1908. The Belgian State renamed the colony Congo Belge and 
dominated it for 52 years (from 1908 to 30 June 1960, the country’s Independence Day).
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violations of human rights were committed by colonisers. The list of 
known and documented massacres is endless, and the number of victims 
of slavery, forced labour, torture and mutilation is estimated at 10 million 
(Hochschild 2007:288–293). In the aftermath of the colonial era, the post-
colonial government did not deal with the human rights violations of the 
colonial era; neither did the 1960s roundtable conference, held in Belgium, 
provide any mechanisms to deal with perpetrators or to honour victims. 
Due to the poor preparation, the First Republic (1960–1965) faced various 
internal crises in which innumerable crimes were committed, including the 
assassination of the first Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, on 17 January 
1961. It was during that series of chaos that General Joseph Mobutu, then 
Chief Commander of the army, took political control of the country and 
declared himself president in a coup d’état on 24 November 1965. Belgium 
was continually being accused of the assassination of Lumumba, and forty 
years thereafter, the Belgian parliament admitted that ‘Belgium bears a 
moral responsibility for the killing of Lumumba’.6
Under the Mobutu presidency, 1965–1997, the country experienced a 
military and dictatorial regime in which various crimes were committed. 
In 1971, Mobutu renamed the country Republic of Zaïre (Tunamsifu 
2011:168; Mpongola 2010:181; Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy 
in Africa 2005:3). With one-party rule, he initiated a cult of a personality 
with absolute concentration of power and accumulated colossal personal 
fortunes (Borello 2004:vii). His regime was characterised by widespread 
corruption, violent suppression of dissent, including a massacre of students 
at the University of Lubumbashi in 1990.
In the quest for democratic governance, following domestic and inter-
national pressure, President Mobutu convened a Sovereign National 
6 In December 2001 a Belgian parliamentary commission of inquiry that was tasked to 
investigate the matter concluded that Belgium bears a moral responsibility for the killing 
of Lumumba. There was no documentary evidence that any member of the Belgian 
government gave orders to physically eliminate Lumumba. However, it did find that King 
Baudouin knew of plans by Lumumba’s opponents to assassinate him and that some 
Belgian officers had witnessed the killing (Villafaña 2012:28–29).
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Conference (CNS, Conférence Nationale Souveraine) in 1992 in order 
to discuss all the state’s issues and thereby establish a new political and 
constitutional order. Following various revelations against Mobutu and 
his relatives about crimes committed, mismanagement, and violations of 
human rights, Mobutu decided to terminate the operations of the CNS. 
Four years later (1996), the country entered into various armed conf licts 
backed by Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda.
A number of studies have shown that actors in all the conflicts were directly 
and indirectly responsible for millions of deaths (Nest, Grignon and 
Kisangani 2006:12; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
2010:§998–999; Binder, De Geoffroy and Sokpoh 2010:22). On 17 December 
2002, a Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC was 
signed and delegates opted to deal with the past through transitional justice 
mechanisms as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and requested 
the establishment of an international criminal tribunal for the DRC.
From the above, it can be deduced that none of the transitional justice 
mechanisms adopted by warring parties referred to memorialisation. 
Thus the purpose of this study is to demonstrate that beyond mechanisms 
adopted by warring parties to deal with past abuses, it is important for 
societies in political transition to take into account the points of view 
of survivors directly or through organisations taking care of victims. 
This study relied on literature and empirical fieldwork as its sources 
of information. 
3. Holistic approaches to memorialisation and results  
from fieldwork
With the aim to commemorate or enhance the understanding of a conflictive 
past, memorialisation initiatives include entities and activities such as 
public memorials (museums and monuments), various documentation 
activities (oral history collections and archives), works of art, and public 
performances.
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Memorialisation efforts can create many opportunities for survivors and 
societies, including: the recognition of survivors; becoming a location for 
mourning and healing; contributing to truth telling; representing a form 
of justice or reparation; contributing towards the construction of national 
identity and social reconstruction; creating a space for public education, 
dialogue and engaging second generations; providing a basis for dialogue 
and reconciliation between groups in conflict; serving as a basis for non-
recurrence, and preventing impunity (Impunity Watch 2015:17). 
It should be clear, therefore, that initiatives aiming at preserving the 
memory of the violations are not limited to costly museums and memorials 
serving as symbolic reparation, but include low-cost initiatives such as a 
Remembrance Day, which can effectively send out the message that past 
atrocities must never be repeated. 
Memorialisation in such a comprehensive sense was the participants’ 
recommendation to the Concertation Nationale. As a top-down memorial- 
isation approach, this study is the result of interviews and focus group 
discussions in areas affected by various armed conf licts. As a bottom-up 
initiative, participants were asked the key question: ‘What do you think 
could be done to restore the dignity of victims in the DRC?’ This inclusive 
and consultative approach is in the same vein as the important saying of 
Mahatma Gandhi: ‘Whatever you do for me but without me, you do against me’ 
(Miller, Latham and Cahill 2016:6). The results from the fieldwork 
indicate that the victims’ dignity can be restored through memorialisation 
as part of symbolic community reparation; through the adoption of a 
commemorative day in memory of victims; and through museums and 
monuments that can attract tourists. Thus, this section is designed around 
four subsections analysing memorialisation as part of reparation, as part 
of healing and remembrance, as guarantee of non-recurrence, and as a tool 
of attracting tourists. 
3.1 Memorialisation as part of reparation
Building museums, monuments or other memorials is part of the symbolic 
reparations which focus on citizens and victims. According to Gavin 
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Stamp, the idea behind it is that every single missing man or woman 
should receive a permanent memorial (Stamp 2006:101), but the initiative 
is also a potential tool of communication from one generation to another. 
Reparation can be granted individually or collectively, but in both cases 
reparation has strengths and weaknesses. 
Reparation is principally an individual right. The right to reparation is 
a fundamental right recognised for victims and their family members. 
This right is well guaranteed by international and regional instruments 
of human rights. For example, Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948) stipulates that ‘[e]veryone has the right to an 
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the 
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law’. However, 
in the DRC, where due to a vicious cycle of internationalised armed 
conf licts since 1996 millions of victims have been (and still are) harmed, 
a programme of individual reparations is very difficult to implement. 
That is why in the context of the DRC prioritising community reparation 
seems to be a suitable measure, especially in light of all the destruction 
of basic infrastructure after the vicious cycle of conf licts. The principle 
of collective reparation is highly controversial, however, because of the 
perception that the rebuilding of infrastructure may be regarded as a 
development programme. Measures of reparative nature that include 
building schools to guarantee the right to education or building hospitals 
to guarantee the right to health generally ref lect the economic and social 
rights of all citizens. In this regard, the researcher agrees with the Report 
Mapping of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights in the DRC, which acknowledges that ‘[i]n a context in 
which the vast majority of the country does not have basic infrastructures, 
sometimes precisely because of it having been destroyed during the 
conf licts, prioritising certain development projects for the benefit of the 
victims’ communities could be seen as a kind of reparation’ (Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights 2010:§1103). 
Individual reparations are often not substantial enough to make a meaningful 
change in victims’ circumstances. One danger is that collective reparations 
44
Shirambere Philippe Tunamsifu
programmes, which benefit an entire community, may be seen as a way 
for governments to carry out their existing development responsibilities 
to build schools and medical clinics, for example – and call this sufficient 
reparation. On the other hand, such development-oriented projects are 
often what people demand most when asked about reparations. As far 
as possible, states should seek to provide both individual and collective 
reparations, the former to address victims’ immediate needs and the latter 
in service of longer-term, structural reforms. Finally, while reparations are 
at times seen as restoring victims to their pre-violation state, the emphasis 
should be placed on the restoration of dignity and active citizenship rather 
than on the quantum for compensation (Roht-Arriaza 2012:4–6).
During the fieldwork, key informants #19, #20, and #22 of Bunia,7 and 
#28 of Kisangani8 estimated that there would be millions of direct and 
indirect victims as result of various armed conf licts. Thus, there would not 
be available funds for individual reparation. To this end, key informants 
recommended the symbolic community reparation in terms of building 
monuments, schools, hospitals and public markets in memory of abuses. 
Survivors will be satisfied with this kind of community reparation. 
However, key informant #23 of Bunia,9 noted that those buildings in 
memory of past abuses or built as collective memory should be named as 
follows ‘monuments of reconciliation’; ‘memorial of reconciliation’, and 
‘school for peace’. 
Participants in the focus group #FG2 in Kisangani10 estimated that since 
many residential houses of the survivors were destroyed completely by the 
bombing during the hostilities between the Rwandan and Ugandan armies 
in the town of Kisangani, building houses for them should be considered. 
7 Interview held in Bunia with key informants #19 and #20 on 21 January, and #22 
on 22 January 2014.
8 Interview held in Kisangani with key informant #28 on 31 January 2014.
9 Interview held in Bunia with key informant #23 on 22 January 2014.
10 Second Focus group discussion (#FG2), held in Kisangani on 30 January 2014.
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After two decades, Congolese people are still experiencing atrocities from 
State and non-State actors. It is estimated that between six and ten million 
people have been killed and unnumbered houses destroyed as consequences 
of conf licts. So, it is impossible for every single victim to receive reparation. 
That is why community reparation seems realistic. 
3.2 Memorialisation as part of the healing process 
Memorialisation efforts seek to preserve public memory of victims, 
usually through a yearly day of commemoration or through museums and 
monuments (African Union Panel of the Wise 2013:26). Paul Williams 
uses the term memorial as an umbrella term for anything that serves in 
remembrance of a person or event (Williams 2007:7). In the design of 
the memorial, according to Maya Lin, a fundamental goal should be to 
be honest about death, since we must accept the loss in order to begin to 
overcome it. It is true that people cannot forget their loved ones, and the 
pain of the loss will always be there, and will always hurt, but people must 
acknowledge the death in order to move on (Lin 2000:n.p.). In this regard, 
Nabudere and Velthuizen (2013:6) clarify’ that:
[M]emory and mutual supportive action belong together; one is a condition 
for the other. Memory creates the space in which social action can unfold, 
while forgetting is synonymous with inability to act, or in the Egyptian 
language, with ‘sloth/inertia’. Without the past there is no action. Without 
memory there can be no conscience, no responsibility, and no past.
On his part, Paul Williams distinguishes between the terms memorial 
museum and memorial site. A memorial museum is a specific kind of 
museum dedicated to commemorating a historic event that caused mass 
suffering of some kind, while a memorial site is used to indicate a physical 
location that serves a commemorative function, but is not necessarily 
dominated by a built structure (Williams 2007:8). 
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During the fieldwork, key informants #09 of Bukavu,11 #16 of Uvira12 
and #19 of Bunia said that there is a need to commemorate the 
unspeakable crimes committed against the Congolese population. Thus, 
a commemorative day should be declared so that victims may not be 
forgotten. The key informants #19 and #20 of Bunia stressed that ‘the crimes 
were due to the incapability (weaknesses and inactions) of the State (DRC) 
to protect its people. In this regard, the State must recognise that it has 
failed to protect the civilian population, apologise publicly, and dedicate a 
day in memory of the victims of the various armed conf licts in the DRC. 
In addition, it should take responsibility for building an official memorial 
for the victims.
According to key informant #16 of Uvira, a commemorative day should 
be adopted by the parliament, and the president of the Republic should 
sign a decree for remembering the victims of past atrocities. Or, as foreign 
actors from neighbouring countries have had hands in those atrocities, 
the government and civil society organisations could advocate that the 
African Union adopt a day to commemorate victims of armed conf licts in 
Africa. Such a commemorative day would communicate the necessity of 
bringing together survivors and perpetrators or their descendants, and of 
propagating a forward-looking orientation. 
To avoid forgetting past crimes and honour the memory of victims, key 
informants #09 and #14 of Bukavu, and #11, #15 and #16 of Uvira, as well 
as participants in the focus group #FG2 of Kisangani, suggested to build 
monuments for the benefit of both victims and perpetrators. Key informant 
#16 of Uvira emphasised that monuments can be very meaningful for all 
parties involved. On one hand, when perpetrators see those monuments, 
they could say we should never commit such acts again. On the other 
hand, when survivors see the monuments, they could say we should never 
hate perpetrators. 
11  Interview held in Bukavu with key informant #09 on 20 December 2013.
12  Interview held in Uvira with key informant #16 on 03 January 2014.
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Participants in the focus group #FG2 of Kisangani suggested that memorials 
should be built in the most affected areas, and that those honouring victims 
should have the actual names of victims engraved on their walls. Key 
informant #14 of Bukavu made the point that there is a ‘duty to preserve 
memory’ of past events. This participant also complained, however, that 
the government has done nothing about the massacres perpetrated in 
Kaniola – no judicial investigation against the alleged perpetrators has 
been undertaken, and no support has been provided to the Roman Catholic 
Church when it was building the memorial site in memory of the more than 
6 000 people killed. This lack of political will of the current regime does not 
console the survivors who are bearing their grief in silence. 
Key informant #15 of Uvira noted the importance of providing a cemetery 
where the victims’ bodies and the remains of others could be buried in 
dignity. Such a cemetery could become a place of worship and reconciliation 
where survivors or their descendants may experience a link between 
themselves and those who have been killed during the different armed 
conf licts. Cemeteries themselves provide information for those who were 
not informed. This should happen to keep alive the memories of victims, 
in spite of the unwillingness of the current regime. 
Visible and permanent monuments can regularly inform passers-by and 
help people not to repeat the crimes committed in the past. That is why key 
informant #14 of Bukavu argued that building memorials and monuments 
in memory of the victims is a kind of healing process to the survivors.
Regarding what the country went through, it is important to preserve the 
memories of the victims of these atrocities, and it can be done with uncostly 
monuments such as broken weapons and a dove of peace. Unfortunately, 
however, nothing has yet been built in most of the areas affected by the 
various armed conf licts.
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3.3 Memorialisation as guarantee of non-recurrence of atrocities, 
and future conflict prevention 
Memorial museums can help to educate future generations about past 
abuses, and help them to avoid their recurrence by saying, ‘Never again’. 
Thus, memorialisation initiatives, as recognised by Impunity Watch, are 
important as they offer insight into the root causes of violence, which can 
offer lessons that would hopefully guarantee non-recurrence (Impunity 
Watch 2015:17). In this regard, the African Union Panel of the Wise 
(2013:26) also realises that the idea of memorialisation is to keep the 
memory of past abuses alive to prevent recurrence of similar violence. 
In the foreword to his study, Ralph Sprenkels explains that memorialisation 
initiatives contribute to enhancing societal trust, respect and cohesion, and 
provide a widely applicable tool that helps to create societal foundations for 
transformative change in favour of human rights, which is essential for the 
democratisation process at large (Impunity Watch 2015:iv). 
In terms of the interview and focus group guide, key informants #16 of 
Uvira and #19 of Bunia, as well as participants in the focus groups #FG113 
of Bunia and #FG2 of Kisangani stressed the importance of memory as a 
guarantee of non-repetition of past abuses and the prevention of armed 
conf licts in the future. Key informant #16 of Uvira shared the opinion 
that meaningful monuments can promote insightful understanding by 
survivors and perpetrators as a guarantee of non-repetition of past abuses. 
Participants in the focus group discussion #FG1 in Bunia suggested that 
memorials and monuments should be built in areas ravaged by the various 
armed conf licts. By doing so, participants in the focus group discussion 
#FG2 in Kisangani argued that such an initiative would propagate the 
‘never again’ message and prevent future generations from repeating what 
happened in the past. In the same vein, key informant #19 of Bunia argued 
that building memorials and monuments in affected communities would 
prevent history from repeating itself. When, however, state authorities 
13  First Focus group discussion (#FG1) held in Bunia on 20 January 2014.
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fail to undertake measures or initiatives that prevent further atrocities it 
would mean that victims may have to endure a repetition of gross human 
rights violations. 
3.4 Memorialisation and tourism
Memorial museums can also bring about the further advantage of drawing 
foreigners’ attention to historical sites. Paul Williams agrees that they form 
key sites that can capitalise on the growth of ‘cultural tourism’. He adds 
that they may even have a double significance:
They are advantageous for visitors not only in the way they conveniently 
condense historical narratives within a single authentic site, but also in the 
way they impart moral rectitude to those who visit (Williams 2007:190). 
Participants in the focus group discussion #FG2 in Kisangani noted that 
the construction of memorials would attract tourism, and access fees or 
donations from visitors will help in the gathering of more evidence about 
past abuses.
4. Conclusion, and recommendations of fieldwork 
participants
The DRC, in more than five decades after its Independence Day (1960–
2018), has continued to witness large-scale violations of human rights and 
serious violations of international humanitarian law. In dealing with past 
abuses, the country convened two important inclusive political negotiations 
in 1991 and in 2002 during which transitional justice mechanisms were 
adopted. Both were unsatisfactory experiences however, and in both cases 
a memorialisation process which could have facilitated an atmosphere of 
reconciliation and coexistence was unfortunately neglected. 
It was only in 2013 that stakeholders at the Concertation Nationale for the 
very first time adopted a decision to build monuments in memory of the 
victims of armed conf licts in all areas where atrocities were committed. 
Since, five years later, there are not yet any official monuments built to 
honour victims of the different armed conf licts, or any measures to 
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implement such a recommendation, this study collected data from 32 key 
informants and two focus group discussions in areas affected in order to 
explore the point of view of the affected population. The researcher selected 
key informants from the ‘Coordination of Civil Society Organisations’, 
from victims of armed conf lict associations or of associations taking care of 
victims, and also from victims or survivors staying in areas mostly affected 
by different armed conf licts such as North Kivu province (Goma); South 
Kivu province (Bukavu, Walungu and Uvira); Ituri (Bunia) and Province 
Oriental (Kisangani).
In the light of the research findings, this study as a bottom-up initiative 
offers the following recommendations on a memorialisation process 
as a consolidating aspect of transitional justice in the DRC. The 
recommendations of the participants are grouped according to the four 
aspects of memorialisation discussed above: commemoration of memories, 
symbolic reparation, guarantee of non-repetition, and tourism attraction. 
4.1 Commemoration of memories of past abuses:
•	 The State must apologise publicly that is has failed to protect civilian 
population; 
•	 Adoption of a commemorative day to remember the victims of past 
atrocities in the DRC;
•	 The building of official monuments and memorials in memory of all 
victims of various armed conf licts in the most affected areas in the 
DRC;
•	 Advocate for an African Day to commemorate Congolese victims killed 
by African countries ;
•	 Involve all parties (victims and alleged perpetrators) in the building of 
monuments.
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4.2 Memorialisation as symbolic reparation:
•	 Monuments, schools, hospitals, public market in memory of past abuses 
should be built as symbolic community or collective reparation;
•	 Collective memories should be named as follows ‘monuments of 
reconciliation’; ‘memorial of reconciliation’, and ‘school for peace’. 
•	 The building of houses for the survivors of hostilities between the 
Rwandan and Ugandan armies in the town of Kisangani where both 
armies destroyed completely residential houses of civil population.
4.3 Guarantee of non-repetition and the prevention of  
future conflict:
•	 Monuments should be built by all parties because when alleged 
perpetrators would see them they will say never again we would commit 
such acts, and when survivors would see those monuments, they will say 
never we would hate perpetrators. 
•	 Building memorials and monuments in affected communities would 
prevent the history from repeating itself.
4.4 Tourism:
•	 Memorials attract tourism, and access fees or donations from visitors 
will help harvest testimony in light of past abuses.
The above recommendations from key participants represent the voice of 
survivors and victims of different internationalised armed conf licts since 
1996. The researcher is of the opinion that the government may be guided 
by these recommendations in order to implement what was decided during 
the Concertation Nationale and therefore honour the memories of victims 
of various armed conf licts in the DRC. 
The DRC has lost opportunities to deal with past abuses and therefore 
to prevent further violence. As a bottom-up initiative, this research 
recommends the government, with the support of all development partners, 
to implement all transitional justice mechanisms adopted. The subsequent 
resumption of armed conf licts is the result of failing to address the past. 
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Annexure 1
1.  Resolution No: DIC/CPJ/01. Relating to the endorsement of the Global and Inclusive 
Agreement.
2.  Resolution No: DIC/CPJ/02. Relating to the adoption of the Transitional Constitution.
3.  Resolution No: DIC/CPJ/03. Relating to the enshrinement of democratic principles. 
4.  Resolution No: DIC/CPJ/04. Relating to the effective and complete liberalisation of 
political life and association. 
5.  Resolution No: DIC/CPJ/05. Relating to the free movement of people and goods 
throughout the national territory of the DRC as well as the restoration of transport links. 
6.  Resolution No: DIC/CPJ/06. Relating to the abolition of special courts and the reform of 
military justice.
7.  Resolution No: DIC/CPJ/07. Relating to the reinstatement and rehabilitation of magistrates 
dismissed or forced into early retirement. 
8.  Resolution No: DIC/CPJ/08. Relating to the rehabilitation of workers arbitrarily dismissed. 
9.  Resolution No: DIC/CPJ/09. Relating to the Independent Electoral Commission. 
10.  Resolution No: DIC/CPJ/10. Relating to the support of the international community.
11.  Resolution No: DIC/CDS/01. Relating to mechanisms for the consolidation of peace.
12.  Resolution No: DIC/CDS/02. Relating to the disarmament of armed groups and the 
withdrawal of foreign forces. 
13.  Resolution No: DIC/CDS/03. Relating to the identification of nationals who shall 
constitute the Army; demobilisation and reintegration of child soldiers and vulnerable 
persons; recruitment with a view to integrating military and paramilitary groups into the 
National Army and Police. 
14.  Resolution No: DIC/CDS/04. Relating to the formation of the new restructured and 
integrated army.
15.  Resolution No: DIC/DSC/05. Relating to sanctions against parties acting in bad faith. 
16.  Resolution No: DIC/CEF/01. Relating to the costs of the two wars, 1996 and 1998.
17.  Resolution No: DIC/CEF/02. Resolution on the restitution of property taken and/or 
confiscated from individuals and of plundered state property.
18.  Resolution No: ICD/CEF/03. Relating to disputes over the reconstruction of the 
environment destroyed by war.
19.  Resolution No: ICD/CEF/04. Resolution calling for scrutiny to determine the validity of 
economic and financial agreements signed during the war.
20.  Resolution No: ICD/CEF/05. Relating to emergency economic and social programme.
21.  Resolution No: ICD/CHSC/01. Relating to the Emergency Programme in different 
social sectors.
22.  Resolution No: ICD/CHSC/02. Relating to the Emergency Humanitarian Programme for 
the DRC.
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23.  Resolution No: ICD/CHSC/03. Relating to the Emergency Programme for the environment 
in the DRC.
24.  Resolution No: ICD/CHSC/04. Relating to the reconstruction of Kisangani and all the 
other towns destroyed by the war.
25.  Resolution No: ICD/CHSC/05. Relating to the reconstruction of the town of Goma.
26.  Resolution No: ICD/CHSC/06. Relating to culture and inter-ethnic coexistence in 
the DRC.
27.  Resolution No: ICD/CHSC/07. Relating to the ethics and the fight against corruption.
28.  Resolution No: ICD/CHSC/08. Relating to the National Monitoring Body for Human Rights.
29.  Resolution No: ICD/CHSC/09. Relating to the media sector. 
30.  Resolution No: ICD/CPR/01. Relating to the restitution of property taken and/or 
confiscated from individuals and property stolen from the state.
31.  Resolution No: ICD/CPR/02. Relating to the protection of minorities.
32.  Resolution No: ICD/CPR/03. Relating to the problem of nationality with regard to 
national reconciliation.
33.  Resolution No: ICD/CPR/04. Relating to the institution of a Truth and Recon- 
ciliation Commission.
34.  Resolution No: ICD/CPR/05. Relating to the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court. 
35.  Resolution No: ICD/CPR/06. Relating to the peace and security in the DRC and in the 
Great Lakes region. 
36.  Resolution No: ICD/CPR/07. Relating to the organisation of an international conference 
on peace, security and development in the Great Lakes region and Central Africa.
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Interviewees 
1. Key informant #01DRC interviewed in Goma on 16 December 2013. Staff of Hôpital 
Heal Africa de Goma.
2. Key informant #02DRC interviewed in Goma on 17 December 2013. Victim found at 
Hôpital Heal Africa de Goma. 
3. Key informant #03DRC interviewed in Goma on 17 December 2013. Victim found at 
Hôpital Heal Africa de Goma. 
4. Key informant #04DRC interviewed in Goma on 17 December 2013. Staff of Association 
du Barreau Américain à Goma. 
5. Key informant #05DRC interviewed in Goma on 17 December 2013. Staff of Association 
du Barreau Américain à Goma. 
6. Key informant #06DRC interviewed in Goma on 18 December 2013. Member of the 
Coordination Provinciale de la société civile du Nord Kivu à Goma. 
7. Key informant #07DRC interviewed in Goma on 18 December 2013. Victim found at 
Hôpital Heal Africa de Goma.
8. Key informant #08DRC interviewed in Bukavu on 20 December 2013. Person at Hôpital 
Général de Panzi à Bukavu. 
9. Key informant #09DRC interviewed in Bukavu on 20 December 2013. Member of the 
Coordination Provinciale de la société civile du Sud-Kivu. 
10. Key informant #10DRC interviewed in Uvira on 21 December 2013. Staff of Genre actif 
pour un devenir meilleur de la femme (GAD) à Uvira. 
11. Key informant #11DRC interviewed in Uvira on 22 December 2013. Staff of the entity 
Village de Makobola à Uvira.
12. Key informant #12DRC interviewed in Kaniola on 23 December 2013. Staff of the 
Paroisse Reine de tous les Saints de Kaniola à Bukavu. 
13. Key informant #13DRC interviewed in Kaniola on 23 December 2013. Staff of the Bureau 
d’écoute Justice et Paix at the Paroisse Reine de tous les Saints de Kaniola à Bukavu. 
14. Key informant #14DRC interviewed in Burhale on 23 December 2013. Staff of the 
Paroisse Saint Jean Apôtre de Burhale à Bukavu. 
15. Key informant #15DRC interviewed in Uvira on 02 January 2014. Staff of the Cité 
d’Uvira in Uvira. 
16. Key informant #16DRC interviewed in Uvira on 03 January 2014. Staff of the Cadre de 
Concertation inter-ethnique de Uvira. 
17. Key informant #17DRC interviewed in Bunia on 20 January 2014. Staff of Caritas Bunia. 
18. Key informant #18DRC interviewed in Bunia on 21 January 2014. Staff of Association des 
Mamans Anti Bwaki de Bunia and former Commissioner of the Commission Vérité et 
Réconciliation in the DRC. 
19. Key informant #19DRC interviewed in Bunia on 21 January 2014. Staff of École de la Paix 
des Missionnaires d’Afrique in Bunia. 
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20. Key informant #20DRC interviewed in Bunia on 21 January 2014. Staff of Coopération 
Internationale in Bunia. 
21. Key informant #21DRC interviewed in Bunia on 22 January 2014. Staff of the Centre de 
recherche de l’Institut Supérieur Pédagogique de Bunia. 
22. Key informant #22DRC interviewed in Bunia on 22 January 2014. Staff of Justice Plus 
in Bunia. 
23. Key informant #23DRC interviewed in Bunia on 22 January 2014. Representative of the 
Hima community of Bunia. 
24. Key informant #24DRC interviewed in Bunia on 23 January 2014. Member of the 
Coordination de la Société civile de Bunia. 
25. Key informant #25DRC interviewed in Bunia on 24 January 2014. Person representing 
Lendu community of Bunia. 
26. Key informant #26DRC interviewed in Kisangani on 29 January 2014. Staff of Congo en 
Images in Kisangani. 
27. Key informant #27DRC interviewed in Kisangani on 30 January 2014. Staff of Actions et 
Réalisations pour le Développement de Kisangani. 
28. Key informant #28DRC interviewed in Kisangani on 31 January 2014. Member of the 
Coordination Provinciale de la société civile de Kisangani.
29. Key informant #29DRC interviewed in Kisangani on 30 January 2014. Staff of the 
Commission Justice et Paix de la Province Orientale. 
30. Key informant #30DRC interviewed in Kisangani on 01 February 2014. Staff of Union 
pour le développement de la Province Orientale. 
31. Key informant #31DRC interviewed in Kinshasa on 18 February 2014. Staff of the Bureau 
de la représentation de la CPI à Kinshasa. 
32. Key informant #32DRC interviewed in Kinshasa on 21 February 2014. Staff of Coalition 
pour la CPI à Kinshasa.
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South Sudan conflict from 2013 to 2018: 
Rethinking the causes, situation and 
solutions
Israel Nyaburi Nyadera*
Abstract
With the South Sudanese confl ict in its fi fth year in 2018, this paper seeks to 
not only examine the status of the civil war that has engulfed the youngest 
nation on earth but to also discuss the evolving narratives of its causes and 
provide policy recommendation to actors involved in the peace process. 
Having examined the continuously failing peace treaties between the 
warring parties, it is evident that the agreements have failed to unearth and 
provide solutions to the crisis and a new approach to examining the causes 
and solutions to the problem is therefore necessary. This paper argues 
that ethnic animosities and rivalry are a key underlying cause that has 
transformed political rivalry into a deadly ethnic dispute through vicious 
mobilisation and rhetoric. Therefore, it recommends a comprehensive 
peace approach that will address the political aspects of the conf lict and 
propose restructuring South Sudan’s administrative, economic and social 
spheres in order to curb further manipulation of the ethnic differences.
Keywords: South Sudan, civil war, transitional authority, conf lict 
resolution, ethnicity
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Introduction
South Sudan became the youngest nation in the world after splitting from 
the larger Sudan to become the Republic of South Sudan in 2011. However, 
their independence, like that of other countries in the world, came with 
a huge human cost following decades of intense conf lict between the 
Arab North and the non-Arab South. The intensity of the conf lict was so 
destructive that it caught the attention of the international community, 
who embarked on a series of mediation and negotiation processes between 
the North and the South. Following several protocols and agreements 
signed by representatives of the North and the South between 2002 and 
2004 (Jok 2015:1–5), these processes culminated in the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005. However, as the 
separation process was taking place, several key issues that were responsible 
for mistrust among groups in the non-Arab South were not addressed. 
The main focus was on the conf lict between the North and the South and 
not the ‘frozen’ and ‘cold’ relations among the different ethnicities in the 
South. The referendum was overwhelmingly in favour of separation, with 
99% of the votes cast approving the decision. For the North, however, this 
marked a major downgrade of their country’s land mass as one-third of the 
land and about three-quarters of its oil reserves went to the new Republic 
of South Sudan (Ottaway and El-Sadany 2012:3). 
The objective of this paper is to revisit the status of and events surrounding 
the South Sudan conf lict from a historical and contemporary perspective 
and assess the consequences after five years of continued fighting. It also 
seeks to emphasise the role of ethnic animosity as the main underlying 
cause of the transformation from political rivalry to violent conf lict 
and the way in which other causes are attached to the ethnicity factor. 
Recommendations will then be provided to address the political, economic 
and ethnic differences in the country. The paper recommends an exit 
strategy that will ensure the gaps that allowed previous peace agreements 
to collapse are sealed by involving local, regional and international actors. 
It proposes a transitional authority that will help deconstruct the myth 
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that ethnicity is the basis of survival and instead suggests the establishment 
of a government that will regain public trust and confidence through better 
management and distribution of resources, restructuring and retraining 
the country’s security forces – ensuring territorial integrity and a state 
monopoly on the use of force. All of these may be achieved through the 
adoption of an elaborate constitutional reform. 
The data used in this paper was obtained through rigorous thematic analysis 
of existing literature on the South Sudan conf lict. The author used the data 
to identify the present status of the conf lict, and examine the narratives on 
the causes of the conf lict and on the various peace agreements. This way, 
it becomes apparent that ethnicity was not given the attention it deserves, 
as the focus was on ending the violence through political power sharing 
rather than addressing the ethnic and economic grievances. Based on the 
findings, an elaborate peace approach has been recommended: one that 
will dilute the short and long term impacts of ethnicity and allow the 
young nation to benefit from the fruits of its independence.
Status of the conflict
The government of South Sudan is experiencing a struggle over legitimacy 
and monopoly on the use of force. Weber’s definition of the state is largely 
based on the state’s ability to have a monopoly of force. This argument 
is supported by several realist theorists like Waltz (1998:28–34), some of 
them pointing out that although such control will enable the state to have 
authority over other actors, this authority should not be abused (Thomson 
and Krasner 1989; Krasner 1999). The moment a state loses control of the 
monopoly over the use of force, be it through a union, revolution, collapse 
or conquest, then the state is dead (Adams 2000:2–5). In the case of South 
Sudan, the situation has remained alarming as legitimacy and monopoly 
over the use of force is not solely in the hands of the current government 
since the opposition has significant support, legitimacy and a strong army 
of fighters which has taken control of several parts of the country.
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Weeks into the fighting that began in 2013, the United Nations (UN) 
estimated that thousands had been killed, and around 120 000 others 
internally displaced – of whom around 63 000 were seeking shelter at the 
UN Peacekeeping Base (UNOCHA 2013). The UN Security Council was 
called into action rapidly with the unanimous adoption of Resolution 
2132 that required an increase of the number of troops serving under the 
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to 12 500 soldiers and 
immediate cessation of hostilities (UNSC 2013). To show the seriousness 
of the South Sudanese case, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon authorised 
the transfer of troops from other conf lict regions such as the African 
Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the 
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), the United Nations 
Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (MONUSCO) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). 
Such a drastic response can be explained by the fact that although it is not 
very clear how many people had been killed in the first three months, aid 
agencies put the figure at over 50 000 people, which is higher than those 
who had been killed in Syria at the time – and that while the population of 
South Sudan is only about half of that of Syria (Martell 2016.)
The conf lict continued with heavy casualties witnessed until 2015, when 
a temporary peace treaty was signed (Blackings 2016:7). Cessation of 
hostilities did not last long as both sides accused each other of violating 
the terms of the peace treaty. Episodic violence kept erupting as the 
country remained unstable. Even the Southern parts that were relatively 
peaceful and known for their high crop yields came under attack. This 
affected food production in the country and diminished supply quantities. 
The government lost monopoly over coercive power and was unable to 
administer justice, provide basic services to the citizens and guarantee 
their security. Domestic sovereignty and more particularly the legitimacy 
of the political elites were highly disputed as the country was staring into a 
possible genocide (African Union 2014:106, 276).
In 2017, four years into the war, the number of displaced persons had 
increased to over 2.3 million people, and renewed fighting was taking place 
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in the Equatorials, Western Bahr al Ghazal and the Greater Upper Nile, 
causing the death of thousands more (UNHCR 2018). The government was 
accused of illegal detentions, restriction of media freedom and suppression 
of critics. The number of people seeking shelter at UN peacekeepers’ bases 
had also increased to 230 000 from 63 000. The situation was made even 
worse with the outbreak of a severe famine, especially in the former Unity 
state, which lasted for more than six months. The unchecked violence 
has seen war crimes and crimes against humanity committed, according 
to the African Union Commission of Inquiry. In 2018, reports by the 
Mercy Corps indicate that 1 out of 3 people in South Sudan is a refugee, 
1.9 million people are internally displaced while more than 2.1 million have 
f led out of the country. This shows an increase in the number of internally 
and externally displaced persons from 2 million to 4 million (Mercy Corps 
2018). Already, approximately $20 billion has been spent by the UN on its 
peacekeeping missions in South Sudan since 2014 – with little results in 
terms of achieving sustainable peace (Rolandsen 2015:355–356).
Targeted attacks on civilians, gender-based violence including rape, burning 
of homes and livestock, murder and kidnapping continue to be widespread. 
Aid convoys continue to be attacked and relief food looted by different 
warring groups. According to the United Nations International Children’s 
Emergency Fund (UNICEF), almost 50% of all children eligible to be 
enrolled are out of school. The violence continues to affect not just school-
going children, but also farmers and other workers who have abandoned 
their duties to find other means of surviving. The situation in South Sudan 
is among the worst in the world. Understandably so because the region 
became independent after three decades of fierce fighting with the North. 
Before the dust of the independence celebrations even settled, the civil war 
erupted, and as a result there was no adequate time to establish institutions 
and response mechanisms that could have at least reduced the effects of 
the war. This has seen South Sudan ranked the highest on the world index 
of fragile states that can collapse anytime. Inadequate funding has been a 
big challenge, too, in facing the conf lict. For example, the budget needed 
to respond to the crisis in 2017 was $1.64 billion, which was expected to 
help 7.6 million beneficiaries. However, only 73% of the total budget was 
64
Israel Nyaburi Nyadera
financed. In 2018 the targeted budget by the UN is $1.8 billion to help the 
internally displaced and $1.7 billion to assist those who have f led out of the 
country (Reuters 2017b). Given the failure to meet the full budget in the 
previous years, aid agencies may need to look to the private sector among 
other options, for sufficient funding. Lack of funds is further worsened by 
the excess spending and extravagant lifestyle of the political class (Waal 
2014:362–364).
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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is warning that the prolonged war 
threatens a complete collapse of the South Sudanese economy if the large 
economic imbalances and exhausted economic buffers are not addressed 
(Sudan Tribune 2016). The economic situation in the country suffered a 
serious blow from the global oil price decline since 98% of the government 
revenue comes from oil exports. The South Sudanese Pound also lost 
around 90% of its value following the 2015 liberalisation of exchange rates 
that saw the country lose ground against other global currencies (Sudan 
Tribune 2017). In 2016 inf lation surpassed the 550% increase rate leaving 
the government with over $1.1 billion deficit in the 2016–2017 financial year 
(IMF 2017). Wages were significantly reduced while the prices of even the 
most basic products skyrocketed – inf licting more suffering on the people. 
For example, the price of sorghum had increased by 400%. (FEWSN 2016).
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Recent developments
The civil war has remained persistent since the collapse of the 2015 peace 
agreement that was mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) (Knopf 2016:12). During this time, several efforts 
have been made to attract the leaders back to the negotiating table, but 
all of them were in vain. In early May 2018, peace talks resumed in Addis 
Ababa, but by the end of the month the meetings ended without any formal 
agreements. Both parties rejected the proposal presented by IGAD on the 
sharing of government positions, the governance system of the country, 
and, most importantly, the security arrangements. 
On 25 June 2018, following intense pressure, President Salva Kiir and Riek 
Machar met in Khartoum for the first time in two years (The Star 2018). 
The meeting was concluded with the signing of a new peace agreement that 
called for a countrywide cease-fire as well as the sharing of government 
positions. The cease-fire was just hours later violated in the Northern 
part of the country with both parties accusing the other of the violation. 
The almost immediate violation of the agreement leaves analysts sceptical 
on whether this particular one will hold longer, given that previous 
agreements have not been honoured. Factors that threaten the new 
agreement are the creation of positions for four vice-presidents, and efforts 
to extend the presidential term again by three years – given that elections 
were supposed to be conducted in 2015 but were not. The resumption of 
oil exploration is another contentious point of the agreement about which 
the opposition are still expressing concerns. Apart from the cease-fire, 
the agreement package provides for a 120-day pre-transition period and 
a 36-month transition period that will be followed by a general election 
and the withdrawal of troops from urban areas, villages, schools, camps, 
and churches. Noteworthy, other groups have also found their way into the 
negotiations and will also have a share of the executive and parliamentary 
slots shared by the two main protagonists. Their presence when an 
agreement was signed in Kampala, Uganda on the 8th of July 2018 has earned 
them a slot among the proposed four positions of the vice-presidency. 
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While this peace agreement is a welcome move, it does not adequately deal 
with the reasons which had caused the collapse of previous agreements. 
We will later examine why these forms of power-sharing deals may not be 
sufficient to end the ongoing civil war.
Narratives on the causes of the conflict
The devastating consequences of the South Sudan conf lict have prompted 
several scholars to come up with narratives as to the circumstances that 
have led to the conf lict (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005, Doyle and Sambanis 
2000, O’Brien 2009). Some of these narratives touch on natural resources 
(especially oil), others on the access and availability of arms, or the role of 
Sudan in the conf lict. While these narratives may have merit, they fail to 
examine some of the most critical underlying causes of the conf lict. This is 
what necessitates the rethinking of the ways in which the conf lict has been 
presented academically. Below are some of the arguments and their gaps.
The narrative of oil fuelling the civil war in South Sudan has been highly 
favoured by various scholars who argue that the warring parties are keen 
on controlling oil and other natural resources (Ballentine and Nitzschke 
2005:6–7; Sachs and Warner 2001:827–838). Fearon and Laitin (2003:75–90) 
and De Soysa (2002:409) adopted different data sets, but also concluded that 
there is a causal relationship between oil resources and civil wars. Indeed, 
in the case of South Sudan, oil is the most important source of government 
revenue, and oil-producing states such as Unity, Jonglei, and Upper Nile 
have seen the worst of the civil war with some of the most intense combat 
operations reportedly happening in these areas. An investigative initiative 
conducted by Sentry, a US-based think-tank, gave a report alleging that 
oil revenues are used to finance and sustain the ongoing civil war and to 
enrich a small group of people in South Sudan (Bariyo 2014). This report 
was dismissed by the government spokesperson, Ateny Wek Ateny Sefa-
Nyarko, who during an interview with Reuters insisted that oil revenues 
are being used to pay civil servants, stating: ‘The oil money did not even 
buy a knife. It is being used for paying the salaries of the civil servants’ 
(Reuters 2014). There are also scholars, such as Sefa-Nyarko (2016:194), 
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Johnson (2014:167) and others, who contend that the civil war of South 
Sudan cannot be explained using the perspective that the natural resource 
curse is its primary cause.
There has already been much argument on the question of why and how 
income from natural resources, and not income from other sources – such 
as agriculture, would cause conflict. Often, however, the proponents of civil 
wars being caused by natural resources fall short of providing a convincing 
argument. The media tend to use expressions such as the war has been 
‘fuelled’ by the existence of natural resources but fail to explain how it 
happened. The literature concerned still needs to address three important 
aspects, the first of which is the possibility of spurious logic in regard to the 
place of endogeneity. That is, the potential that the correlation can actually 
be the opposite in the sense that natural resource dependency can be a 
product of civil war. Natural resources are in most cases location-specific, 
so even in times of war they remain constant while mobile sectors such 
as industries can f lee. South Sudan has been at war for more than half a 
century and it is only the oil sector that has been sustaining not simply 
the war but the economy. Secondly, the natural resource narrative needs 
to present, in a clear way, which conf licts are affected by which resources 
and how such resources affect the duration of a conf lict. In this regard the 
claims of Collier, Hoeff ler and Söderbom (2004:263) on the one hand, and 
of Doyle and Sambanis (2000:798) and Stedman and others (2002:12–18), 
on the other hand, can be compared. Thirdly, the argument that natural 
resources provide rebels with an opportunity to extort money from miners 
(Ross 2002:9–10) needs to explain why stricter mining security measures 
have not been put in place and why a group of rebels who is able to generate 
revenue by controlling natural resources would opt to engage in violence – 
unless there were an already existing problem.
The second narrative concerns the ease of access to arms enjoyed by the 
warring parties. This narrative has some merit and cannot be dismissed 
in its entirety. After successfully carrying out an armed resistance against 
the Arab North, the new nation was so overwhelmed by celebrations of 
their achievement that they failed to recognise the importance of complete 
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disarmament of the civilians at the very early stages of independence. 
These arms have no doubt played a crucial role in the continuation and 
escalation of the civil war, since not only the state security agencies had 
access to arms, but civilians were able to keep the arms they used to fight 
for independence and thus challenge the state’s monopoly on the use of 
force (O’Brien 2009:11). The critical role that access to arms has played in 
the civil war has been recognised by state and non-state actors who have 
continued to call on the UN and the Security Council to impose an arms 
embargo on South Sudan. The impact of such a move on the country has 
not been discussed in this forum, but it is important to note that the United 
States in February 2018 recognised the impact access to arms has on the 
current state of South Sudan, and imposed an arms embargo on South 
Sudan – a move that prevents American citizens and companies from 
providing defence services to South Sudan (Reuters 2018). This narrative, 
however, does not explain what motivates a South Sudanese citizen to point 
a gun and kill a fellow countryman/woman. It also does not explain why 
the gun is being pointed at very specific members of certain tribes and not 
the other. 
The third narrative is about the role of Sudan in the civil war. Proponents 
of this narrative are keen on referring to past efforts by Khartoum 
to destabilise the southern region and even provide support to South 
Sudanese to carry out attacks in the region. A case in point is the support 
of the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) by Khartoum between 1983 
and 2005 (Young 2006:17). This alliance saw the SSDF, headed by among 
others Riek Machar, supporting garrisons of the Sudanese Armed Forces 
and protecting oil fields in the Northern part of South Sudan on behalf 
of the Khartoum government. In exchange the SSDF received technical 
and military assistance from the Arab North, including arms believed to 
have been instrumental in the 1991 Bor Massacre (Canadian Department 
of Justice 2014). Sudan and South Sudan have also been caught up in a 
dispute over the oil-rich Abyei region which both parties insist belongs 
to their side of the border (Born and Ravivn 2017:178). Some may argue 
that this dispute proves an ‘intention’ by Sudan to support the instability 
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of South Sudan, but the counter-argument is that Sudan stands to benefit 
more from a peaceful South than from a South under civil war. One of the 
ways Sudan can benefit from the peace is that there will be good relations 
between the two countries, which in turn can lessen Juba’s support of rebel 
groups in Darfur and enable the three-year oil agreement between the two 
countries to proceed without any interference. Last but not least, Sudan’s 
involvement in the peace process can help rebuild the souring relations 
with international actors such as the European Union and the United States 
(Adam 2018).
In order to understand the South Sudan civil war, however, we need to look 
at more than just these three narratives. There are other relevant factors 
such as past events, ethnic identity and the role of individuals.
Manifestation of ethnicity in the South Sudan Conflict
At independence, South Sudan faced challenges similar to those faced 
by many other newly-independent countries of Africa. Competition 
for political power and differing ideologies among local leaders create 
a scenario where communities regroup within their ethnic cocoons in 
order to advance their cause (Cheeseman 2015:8–13). Such restructuring 
of communities have historical bases but are triggered by contemporary 
interests. Below we look at the nature in which ethnic rivalry manifests 
itself in the Sudan conf lict. 
Divisions within the SPLM
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement was established in 1983 under 
the charismatic guidance of the late John Garang. Guided by the aim of 
realising a New Sudan, the SPLM led a rebellion against Khartoum in a 
bid to realise a more secularised state (Warner 2016:6–13). The SPLM 
drew its initial members from the South, but as the liberation quest gained 
momentum it incorporated some members from the North under the 
banner of liberating marginalised groups in the North (Barltrop 2010:3–5). 
Ethnically, the SPLM was from its inception a diverse organisation, but 
within that diversity, the Nuer and the Dinka were the majority by virtue 
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of the sizes of their populations. They occupied polar positions within the 
organisation’s hierarchy – something that is still visible today (Kiranda et 
al. 2016:33).
As the liberation quest was on its course, the SPLM grappled with various 
challenges, ranging from organisational, internal and leadership to 
financial and ideological challenges (Janssen 2017:13). Finding solutions to 
these challenges became an uphill task for the SPLM leadership since these 
challenges were ethnicised – mainly as attempts by the dominant ethnic 
groups to find solutions that favoured their side. Thus, in the absence of a 
functioning united leadership, cracks emerged within the SPLM and signs 
of forthcoming splits began showing right from its inception. Along similar 
lines, Mamdani argues that cracks within SPLM provided a fertile ground 
for the continued conf lict as the antagonised parties were confronted by 
two main issues: one was the equal ethnic representation of ethnic groups 
in the struggle for power, and two, the path in which the power would follow 
(Mamdani 2014). These divisions paved the way towards the subsequent 
rivalries that rocked SPLM from within.
The first split that occurred at the nascent stages of the liberation struggle 
(1984–1985) was more ideological and was anchored on the determination 
of the path the liberation struggle was to take. On one side, Akuot Atem 
Mayem and Gai Tut Yang were calling for an independent South Sudan, and 
on the other John Garang, William Nyuon Banyi, and Kerubino Kuanyin 
Bol led the side that advocated for what they termed a New Sudan which 
would be a more democratic, secular and pluralistic country. Both sides 
received support from diverse ethnic groups but there were undertones 
that the quest for an independent South Sudan was an idea of the Nuer 
while calls for a New Sudan resonated well with the Dinka (Kiranda et al. 
2016). Although the claims and insinuations were muted, they triggered an 
unending slugfest between the two dominant ethnic groups and dimmed 
the possibilities of a peaceful South Sudan. 
The second split, which served as a litmus test on the leadership of the 
SPLM, occurred in 1991 after Riek Machar joined forces with Lam Akol, 
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a senior commander in the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), to 
trigger a change of SPLM leadership. The two, together with others, called 
for the replacement of John Garang as the leader of the SPLM (Sørbø 
2014:1). They accused Garang of establishing close ties with the Ethiopian 
government, which they regarded as a move that would stymie internal 
reforms within the SPLM (Johnson 2014). This attempt did not come to 
fruition, and Riek Machar led a splinter group in the formation of Sudan 
People's Liberation Movement/Army-Nasir which continued to support the 
independence of the South from the North even though it received military 
and financial support from the government in Khartoum. Noteworthy, 
the confrontation between Riek Machar and John Garang has been viewed 
through an ethnic lens that pitted the Nuers against the Dinkas in a duel 
that has transformed South Sudan into a crucible of war. 
The night of 15 December 2013 witnessed the 3rd split, which originated 
from the SPLM. Just after two years of independence the young nation 
was yet again embroiled in a conf lict, and that has continued to date. 
Forces loyal to the president and those loyal to the vice-president were 
engaged in confrontations following weeks of intense succession politics 
within the SPLM Political Bureau (Johnson 2014:168). This time around 
it was President Salva Kiir accusing Machar of plotting a coup against his 
government just as the party was preparing its May 2013 SPLM National 
Convention which was supposed to discuss, among other issues, the 
party’s f lag bearer in the 2015 presidential elections, the term limits of the 
chairperson of the SPLM, the Constitution and a code of conduct (Janssen 
2017:12). An order to disarm members of certain communities within the 
presidential guard led to a mutiny that triggered revenge attacks of Dinka 
in Akobo and of Nuer at Bor (Johnson 2014:170). Although the alleged 
coup plotters were arrested, Riek Machar managed to escape from the 
country. But troops loyal to him continued with the conf lict. 
Ethnicity has remained an important variable in South Sudan’s politics. 
The tyranny of numbers enjoyed by dominant ethnic groups has become an 
important instrument of ascending to power. Ethnic mobilisations based on 
historical rivalries and attachments explain the composition of the warring 
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parties in South Sudan. Strong ethnic loyalty combined with a political 
system that allows winners to dominate government positions and get a 
larger share of the national cake causes political stakes to be heightened 
to the extent of violence. It is also important to note that other factors like 
availability of arms amongst civilians, competition for available resources 
and the role of Sudan – underscored features in contemporary discourses – 
have aided the continuation of the conf lict, but have not explained why it 
must always be a Dinka aiming a cannon at the Nuer and vice versa as it 
occurred in the Bor Massacre and other subsequent confrontations. 
The Bor Massacre and its implications on the conflict
In 1991, two years after the fall of the Berlin wall, when the world was 
beginning to experience an aura of democratic peace after decades of 
intense rivalry between world powers, a massacre with devastating 
consequences occurred in Bor, the capital of Jonglei state (Wild, Jok and 
Ronak 2018:2–11). Located on the east of River Bahl al Jabal (White Nile), 
Bor was predominantly inhabited by pastoralist Nuers with pockets of 
Dinka communities. Years before the massacre, there had been a series of 
inter-ethnic cattle raiding episodes between the Nuers and the Dinkas in a 
bid to increase their herds. These raids were initially conducted by means 
of spears and well-orchestrated ambushes, but later, with an increase in 
the number of guns, firearms became the common tools of the trade. 
Regardless of the raiding methods, it is important to note that cattle 
are historical symbols of social status, and their products which are of 
high nutritional value are important sources of livelihood among South 
Sudanese communities (Glowacki and Wrangham 2015:349–350). 
Prior to the massacre, there was a proliferation of arms among the civilians 
who had formed well-organised groups. While the Dinkas had the Titweng 
(a local militia), the Nuers had the ‘White Army’ that was originally formed 
to protect the cattle but upon gaining widespread success in their raids 
became an important asset in the political sphere (Young 2016). This came 
against the backdrop of visible rifts in the SPLM leadership that provided 
the avenue for Riek Machar to incorporate the Nuer white army members 
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into SPLM-Nasir, and with the support of the Khartoum government in 
the North, SPLM-Nasir orchestrated one of the deadliest massacres in the 
history of South Sudan. According to Wild, Jok and Ronak (2018), Riek 
Machar who was then entangled in ideological differences with John 
Garang, mobilised over 20 000 members of the SPLM-Nasir to carry out 
an attack against the Dinkas in Bor in what came to be known as the Bor 
Massacre. It saw the death of over 2 000 people of Dinka origin and the 
destruction of properties as well as other atrocities (Wild, Jok and Ronak 
2018). Even though Riek Machar offered an apology to the Dinkas in 2011 
when he was the vice-president, it is without doubt that the massacre left 
an indelible footprint of loss on the lives of the Dinkas, and it has become a 
political tool that has been used against Riek Machar in his quest to ascend 
to the highest office in the land (Chol 2011:3).
It could be easy to argue that a focus on the historical rivalry between the 
dominant ethnic groups is simplistic and superficial and that this would 
reduce the ongoing feud solely into an ethnic conf lict, as it is had already 
been labelled by segments of the international media. However, efforts to 
sustain an ethnic conf lict narrative have been quickly countered by the 
argument that the South Sudan government was a representation of diverse 
ethnic groups and that even after the December 2013 crisis which saw a 
number of people arrested on the allegations of an attempted coup, the 
president did not spare those from his tribe (Pinaud 2014:192). Indeed, the 
ousted and the current vice-president belong to the Nuer and the president 
is from the Dinka, but the presence of people of diverse ethnic origins in 
the government cannot be construed to mean a representation of ethnic 
interests, since African societies have the propensity to bestow ethnic 
responsibilities on particular individuals whose voices not only become the 
voice of the ethnic groups but also symbols of ethnic unity. Therefore, any 
kind of humiliation that targets these ethnic kingpins becomes an outright 
humiliation to the ethnic groups they represent, who then, on behalf of 
their leaders, may endeavour to seek revenge.
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Previous peace efforts
The first effort towards peace was spearheaded by IGAD with the support 
of Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the course of 
2014 (Taulbee, Kelleher and Grosvenor 2014:78) The committee had set 
an ambitious target of 5 March 2015 as the final deadline for achieving a 
peace deal in the Sudan conf lict. However, the deadline passed without 
the target being realised. That same month sanctions were imposed on a 
number of individuals by the Security Council for their role in the conf lict. 
Interestingly the two main protagonists, Kiir and Machar, were not 
included in the list of six individuals that were sanctioned. More pressure 
from regional and international players demanding an end to the senseless 
killing led to a new draft in June 2015 that was followed by the threat of 
further sanctions by the Security Council if the parties involved did not 
sign the agreement by 17 August 2015 (Foreign Policy 2015). 
Two months after signing of the peace treaty the first obstacle emerged 
with the unilateral decision of President Kiir to establish 18 additional 
states above the then existing 10 states. This act was condemned, but a 
positive gesture from the President was made in December 2015 with the 
sharing of cabinet positions. By January 2016, the deadline for forming 
the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) had been missed, 
indicating the slow progress in the implementation of the peace accord. 
Finally, Riek Machar was appointed as the 1st Vice-President in February 
2016 although he was still in exile at the time. Further security agreements 
such as the demilitarisation of the capital city, Juba, were also made. Late 
July 2016, an attack by alleged government forces on a UN-protected civilian 
camp threatened to shatter the peace process (Blanchard 2016:2). In the 
following weeks, pockets of fighting across the country were witnessed, 
and the UN Human Rights Commission published a report on 11 March 
2016 asserting incidences of war crime that include sexual violence. 
The shaky agreement continued to hold, and Machar was able to return 
to Juba in April 2016 to take up the position of 1st Vice-President (Baker 
2016:20–27). However, fighting broke out between government forces and 
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those of Riek Machar, forcing him to f lee the city once again, and marking 
the final collapse of the Transitional Government of National Unity. 
De Vries and Schomerus (2017:333–340) explain that the collapse of the 
2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conf lict in the Republic of 
South Sudan (ARCSS) signed by the South Sudanese government, the 
international community and members of the opposition was a result of 
a lack of political goodwill by the government and the opposition, both of 
whom had more interest in the amount of power they would retain than in 
implementing the agreement (De Vries and Schomerus 2017:335). Indeed, 
the excessive attention given to the government and the opposition in the 
ongoing civil war has overshadowed genuine grievances that ordinary 
citizens of the country are facing and that can motivate them to take up 
arms and fight. This is further worsened by the perception that rebels are 
illegitimate groups challenging the sovereignty of the country and the 
opposition’s far-fetched claim that they represent genuine grievances of the 
citizens. De Vries and Schomerus do emphasise that unless there is a more 
comprehensive approach to peace in South Sudan, sharing of government 
slots may not offer a permanent solution.
The latest efforts to bring an end to the brutal conf lict in South Sudan 
culminated with the signing of a peace agreement on 12 September 2018 
in Addis Ababa. This marked the 12th time President Kiir and his fiercest 
rival Riek Machar have entered into a peace agreement since the conf lict 
began. The unique feature of this new agreement is the involvement of 
two new actors, namely the presidents Bashir of Sudan and Museveni of 
Uganda. This is interesting in the sense that the former had been previously 
seen as a cause of the conf lict, but under the new agreement he is seen 
as part of the solution. This new agreement, however, still failed to tackle 
the underlying cause of the conf lict, which is ethnicity, as it facilitated 
sharing of government positions among the Nuer and Dinkas, so that 
the two dominant tribes were given the lion’s share at the expense of the 
smaller tribes. Already the conf licting parties have violated the cease-
fire agreement with the most recent case taking place on 24 September 
2018 when opposition and government forces clashed in Koch County in 
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the Northern part of the Country. This appears to be a continued sign 
of dissatisfaction with the terms of the agreement – something that had 
earlier delayed the signing of the peace accord.
Findings
This paper has noted a number of issues that have either delayed peace 
or facilitated continued conf lict. Of these, the following are the most 
important.
There seems to be an attitude of treating South Sudan not as an independent 
country, but as an amalgamation of ethnic groups with the dominant 
groups having their way. This is evident from the manner in which the 
peace agreements have been handled, so that there can only be a cease-fire 
when the dominant tribes are satisfied with the positions its members have 
been awarded.
Despite several peace agreements being signed, there are still weak 
support systems. The institutional bodies established to ensure smooth 
implementation of the peace agreements have often fallen short of their 
mandate due to operational and institutional challenges that hinder 
them from operating efficiently. Some of these institutions are: the Joint 
Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), UNMISS, IGAD, the 
Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism 
(CTSAMM) and the Regional Protection Force (RPF). There have been 
concerns over, inter alia, insufficient funding of these institutions, lack of 
leverage, insufficient command and control structures, and parallelisms.
Constant violation of cease-fire agreements is also a consistent observation 
in the South Sudan conf lict. The key pillar of the peace agreements signed 
has been the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA), yet in all the cases 
either one party has or both parties have violated this important clause. 
In some cases, the government even tried to prevent the reaching of cease-
fire agreements. They refused to commit to a clause submitted during the 
second round of peace talks in September 2018 suggesting how those who 
violate peace would be punished, and they impeded the smooth operation 
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of relief agencies by prolonging relief workers’ work permit processes 
(Reuters 2017a).
There is an absence of a serious commitment to end the conf lict. Despite 
the devastating consequences of the South Sudan conf lict, political 
leaders have failed to show goodwill to end the crisis (Keitany 2016:50). 
The main antagonists in the conflict bear political and moral responsibility 
to ensure that the life and dignity of the people of South Sudan are 
defended. On this however, they have failed. This extends to the regional 
and international actors involved in the peace process. The August 2018 
peace agreement supported by IGAD has seen some of the countries lacking 
neutrality. Uganda and Sudan are said to be aligned with the interests of 
the government and opposition, respectively, while Ethiopia and Kenya are 
involved in diplomatic and economic rivalry which may play out in the 
peace process.
Complex military-politics relations in South Sudan are also visible and 
cause a hindrance to peace. There have been strong affiliations between 
soldiers and political elites, specifically from their ethnic groups, to 
whom they seem to pay more allegiance than to the state. This complex 
relationship is not new and began long ago, during and after the struggle 
for independence (Rolandsen and Kindersley 2017:9–12). The ever visible 
military inf luence in state affairs has been further supported by the laxity 
of previous peace agreements to accommodate non-state actors in the 
transition period, and to train ethnic militias adopted into the national 
army for their new role. More importantly, both government and opposition 
military forces hold extreme positions – the latter calling for the removal of 
the president and the opposing the inclusion of opposition political leaders 
in the government.
Recommended approach to peace
The findings of this paper indicate that sustainable peace in South Sudan 
cannot be realised until key factors are addressed. These include an 
inadequate sense of nationalism due to the presence of ethnic identities 
stronger than national identity; a lack of strong institutions to ensure full 
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implementation of peace agreements; a lack of neutral security forces that 
do not take sides in the conf lict; and a lack of political will to achieve peace. 
The recommendations below attempt to fill these gaps in the following ways:
1.	 Providing President Salva Kiir, Riek Machar and other key figures 
involved in the current conf lict a negotiated exit from the political 
sphere of South Sudan. This is because they hold the highest 
responsibility for the on-going conf lict since they are at the top 
of the command chain and have failed to ensure that their troops 
adhere to the International Law of Armed Conf lict. Their exit will 
have to be negotiated, with due consideration to procedure and 
timing. This will help overcome fears of a possible repeat of the 
crisis as happened in Iraq, Libya and Yemen. Parties to be involved 
in this process should include IGAD, the East African Community, 
the African Union, the United Nations General Assembly, and the 
Security Council.
2.	 Establishing a temporary Transitional Authority under a Security 
Council Resolution that will include nominees from the political, 
economic, professional, diaspora, religious and cultural spheres 
of South Sudan and the international community. This authority 
may adopt a three-organ structure as suggested in figure 3 below 
in order to cover the important dimensions of the society. First is 
a Hybrid Court, consisting of foreign and local judges as well as a 
prosecutor, acting as the judicial arm with a specific mandate to 
oversee the activities of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
and the local courts. Second is an Executive Committee that 
will oversee the day-to-day operations in the country. It will be 
comprised of a department of Homeland Security consisting 
of a strong peacekeeping force mandated to recruit, train and 
restructure the country's security organs: a department of Treasury 
that will deal with issues of financial management and acquisition; 
and a department of Social Services that will temporarily reform 
the health, education and basic infrastructure sectors. The third 
organ is an Advisory Council that will act as a legislative organ and 
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will be tasked with drafting a new constitution within a specified 
period, passing basic laws and approving government expenditure 
as well as conducting oversight.
Structure of the Proposed Transitional Authority
Judicial Organ Executive Organ Legislative Organ
Local Courts
Homeland Security 
(Peacekeeping)
Constitution
Truth and  
Reconciliation Commission
Treasury  
(Budget, Revenue, Taxes)
Legislation
Office of the Prosecutor
Basic Services  
(Health, Education)
Oversight
Hybrid Court Advisory Council
Executive
Committee
Source: Author
3.	 Initiating the cessation of hostilities and a disarmament process 
in order to end the widespread supply of arms to civilians. Any 
party involved in violence after the declaration of cessation of 
hostilities should face trial under existing laws before retaliation 
by the other parties takes place.
4.	 Drafting a new constitution for the country that will require the 
establishment of a political and economic system that guarantees 
each and every South Sudanese equity and equality. The politics 
of winner takes all should be ruled out, while the separation of 
powers between the executive, judiciary, legislature and the local 
government must be strengthened. Division of labour among 
the various security forces must be emphasised so that they are 
divorced from politics.
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Conclusion 
The recommended model of a transitional authority is not a new concept 
and it will not be the first time a country is put under international custody. 
Yossi Shain and Juan J. Linz have written extensively regarding provisional 
governments, and they divide them into three categories: Power-sharing 
provisional governments, Incumbent provisional governments, and 
International provisional governments. Our recommendation is a hybrid 
provisional government that will see more international actors and some 
locals involved in managing the country during the transition period. 
We hope for reasonable success, as witnessed in cases as the following: the 
Provisional Government of Spain (1868–1871), the Caretaker Government 
of Australia (1901), the Provisional Government of Ireland (1922), the 
Interim Government of India (1946–1947), the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (1969–1976), the Transitional 
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2003–2006), the 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (1992–1993), and 
provisional governments in several other countries .
These recommendations come against the backdrop of already failed 
attempts to bring peace to South Sudan through the sharing of government 
positions between the government and the opposition. This experience 
has in fact further worsened the situation, since new political players 
understand that in order to have a place at the negotiating table, one must 
first prove one’s worth through use of violence and blackmail. The new 
recommendations recognise that the conf lict in South Sudan is deeply 
rooted and cannot be solved overnight through a power-sharing agreement 
and a handshake. Such an approach may take longer but has a better 
chance for finding lasting solutions to the challenges in South Sudan. 
South Sudan’s independence came about under unique circumstances that 
differed from those in African countries with fair social, economic and 
education infrastructures. As a justification for the above-recommended 
approach, the following were taken into consideration.
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First, the recommended form of hybrid approach borrows from previously 
implemented strategies in post-conf lict countries such as Rwanda (post-
1994), South Africa (1994), Kenya (2007), Cambodia (1970–1973), and 
Namibia (1988–1990), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where 
the United Nations established a tutelage to prepare political leaders (2003). 
Some of these countries have been under international trusteeship; others 
have adopted either an international legal system to try perpetrators of past 
violence, or a truth justice and reconciliation commission. Secondly, there 
is the consideration that this proposal could help to address the peace vs 
justice dilemma that keeps resurfacing when discussing peace in South 
Sudan. The recommendation does offer a smooth transition after the exit 
of the current set of political elites. It proposes a negotiated agreement that 
should avoid a catastrophic outcome as was seen in Iraq during the exit of 
Saddam Hussein and in Libya with the violent death of Muammar Gaddafi. 
The truth, justice and reconciliation process will give South Sudanese 
a platform to dialogue openly about their grievances and come to a 
consensus on what needs to be done to achieve justice in a manner that 
does not elicit violence. A further merit of this approach is that it should 
tackle deep-rooted structural weaknesses of the state by recommending a 
new system of government, which is compatible with the social features 
of the country and not just a power-sharing deal between the warlords. 
If a proportional system of representation is adopted, it will get rid of the 
‘winner takes all’ mentality that affects not just South Sudan but also many 
African countries. The new constitution, implemented with the assistance 
of UN-deployed forces, should help restructure and give a new meaning 
and philosophy to the security organs of the country. When everything is 
considered, what the people of South Sudan need, is an inclusive, unbiased 
and honest approach to peace – an approach that is not surrounded by 
political and economic ambitions of the leaders, but one that uproots the 
grievances from the bottom.
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Abstract
The 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conf lict in the Republic 
of South Sudan provides quite ambitiously and laudably for the creation 
of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan under the auspices of the African 
Union. The article is an extract from the author’s 2016 LL.M. dissertation 
submitted to the University of Pretoria. It critically examines the salient 
features of the proposed court with the aim of testing the court’s ability 
to effectively address historical grievances and injustices in South Sudan. 
In so doing, the article draws lessons from similar mechanisms in Africa 
and beyond. It also interrogates the role of the African Union and South 
Sudan in operationalising this court. It reveals strengths as well as 
weaknesses in the proposed design of the court as well as in the ability 
of the African Union and South Sudan to fulfil their obligations. Despite 
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these weaknesses, the article argues that by harnessing the strengths 
identified and learning from lessons from across the continent, the African 
Union (AU) and South Sudan can overcome the anticipated challenges 
and operationalise a hybrid court which will effectively deliver sustainable 
justice to the victims of international crimes committed during the South 
Sudan civil war.
Keywords: South Sudan, African Union, Hybrid Court, international 
crimes, human rights, transitional justice
1. Introduction
After months of simmering political tensions, violence erupted in South 
Sudan on 15 December 2013 when President Salva Kiir attempted to arrest 
his former deputy Dr Riek Machar on allegations of an attempted coup 
d’état, an allegation that has since been discounted by the African Union 
Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan (AUCISS). The violence spread 
fast, resulting in international crimes being committed by forces loyal 
to Kiir and breakaway forces loyal to Machar (AUCISS 2014:1125–1137). 
Concerted efforts led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD) and supported by the African Union (AU) and other stakeholders 
resulted in the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conf lict in the Republic 
of South Sudan (ARCSS) on 17 August 2015 (Intergovernmental Authority 
on Development [IGAD] 2015).
The ARCSS provides for the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South 
Sudan (HCSS), as one among other transitional justice mechanisms, and 
envisions a major role for the AU in its establishment and operationalisation. 
This proposal buys into the liberal-prosecution model of transitional 
justice which emphasises the prosecution of the planners and organisers of 
international crimes. This article interrogates the capability of the HCSS 
to deliver sustainable transitional justice solutions to South Sudan and 
explores how the AU can contribute to its success. The article is primarily 
a qualitative desk-based research with primary data gathered from relevant 
instruments and policy documents and statutes and jurisprudence of 
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similar mechanisms. Secondary data from textbooks, journal articles, 
newspapers, commentaries and electronic sources are also relied on, with 
limited discussion interviews being used only to supplement the primary 
and secondary sources. Section one provides an introduction, methodology 
and outlay of the article. Section two lays a foundation for discussion of the 
current conf lict by providing a historical context. Section three assesses 
the potential of the proposed HCSS to learn from the failures of South 
Sudan’s past f lirtations with transitional justice and deliver sustainable 
solutions. Section four explores the potential of the AU to contribute to the 
success of the HCSS.
2. Historical context of the South Sudan crisis
After over five decades of armed resistance by the people of Southern 
Sudan against marginalisation and oppression by the government of Sudan 
(Garang 1992; Kebbede 1997; Deng 2005; Machar 1995), the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Government of the Republic of the 
Sudan. Consequently, Southern Sudan gained autonomy on 9 July 2005 
under Dr John Garang as president of Southern Sudan region and First 
Vice-President of Sudan. However, Garang died in a helicopter crash on 
30 July 2005 and was succeeded by his deputy Kiir with Machar as the 
new deputy. The pair led the South to independence as the Republic of 
South Sudan on 9 July 2011 following a referendum in line with the CPA. 
While the CPA symbolised the beginning of the South’s long-overdue 
journey to democratic and economic prosperity (Natsios 2005:89), the new 
state’s success depended a lot on how it addressed human rights violations 
committed during the conf lict. Eleven years into the CPA, however, the 
anticipated ‘peace dividends’ have not materialised and a civil war rages. 
The South Sudan crisis is complex and multidimensional and an exhaustive 
discussion is beyond the scope of this article. This section, however, 
explores some of the factors involved in as far as they have a bearing on 
the discussion of transitional justice, particularly criminal accountability.
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2.1 South-South violations of human rights during the Sudan 
civil war
While the Sudan civil war mainly pitted the South against Khartoum, the 
Southerners had unresolved internal issues. Significantly, the split in 1991 
within the SPLM/A (then known only as Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army 
[SPLA]) was a defining moment in intra-South relations. Machar, Lam Akol 
and others rebelled from the SPLA at Nasir in what came to be known as 
the Nasir rebellion (Akol 2003). The disagreement was initially a tussle 
between unitary ideologues who advocated for equality for Southerners but 
as part of Sudan, and separatist ideologues who advocated for complete 
independence of the South from Sudan (Malwal 2015:157; Garang 1992). 
However, the antagonists soon intensified ethnic passions along the lines of 
Machar’s Nuer ethnic group and Garang’s Dinka group (The Sudd Institute 
2014:2). The splinter group gruesomely killed Dinka combatants within 
their ranks before massacring the Dinka civilian populations in Twic East 
and Bor (Malwal 2015:159–160, 205; Crawford-Browne 2006:54; Johnson 
2016:6). Deadly confrontations between the SPLA and the splinter group 
continued for the greater part of the 1990s and Machar eventually aligned 
with Khartoum in 1997. Even though temporary peace, at least enough 
to allow refocus towards the common enemy in Khartoum, was achieved 
after the much-hailed Dinka-Nuer West Bank Peace and Reconciliation 
Conference in Wunlit (AUCISS 2014:922–951; Ashworth et al. 2014:151–167), 
this fateful event sowed deep distrust among Southern communities as 
Machar’s actions were considered a Nuer betrayal of the Southern cause.
Other conf licts before and after the events of 1991 equally resulted in 
destructive violence. These include the disagreements in the 1970s and 
early 1980s when the then rebel group known as Anyanya was transitioning 
from the First Civil War to the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement and 
to the beginning of the Second Civil War in 1983 (Malwal 2015), as well 
as later factional clashes in several areas in the South (Human Rights 
Watch/Africa 1994:19–21; AUCISS 2014:855–856). These too were ignored 
in the lead-up to the CPA with Garang championing a united Southern 
front and inviting Machar back to the SPLM in 2002 as it became clear 
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that the peace process had potential for success (Crawford-Browne 
2006:54). Unease and suspicion simmered within SPLM ranks especially 
after Garang’s death and elections in 2010 (The Sudd Institute 2014:3–4). 
The affected communities did not receive recompense or a genuine apology 
for the atrocities committed against them during these unfortunate events 
(Malwal 2015:160; Johnson 2016:151–152). 
Some Southerners were also caught in the cross-fire between the SPLA and 
the Sudanese army. Garrison towns under Sudanese army occupation, such 
as Malakal, Juba, Wau and Yei were frequently attacked by the SPLM and 
casualties often included the civilian residents who the SPLM considered as 
either loyal to or sympathetic to Khartoum (Crawford-Browne 2006:68). 
When the CPA was signed, these towns and their peoples became part of the 
South with no mention made of redress for the atrocities committed against 
them. SPLM and other Southerners who actively fought against Khartoum 
continued to treat them with suspicion (Zahar 2011:37) and perhaps even 
contempt. The unaddressed events and old rivalries highlighted above 
created room for resentment and distrust in the new state and within the 
SPLM government.
2.2 Criminal accountability under the CPA and the question of 
state succession
Justice and accountability were not exactly a priority in the CPA process 
(Basha 2006:28). While it did not expressly provide for amnesty, the CPA was 
unnervingly silent on the question of accountability for abuses committed 
during the Sudan civil war. This, Ibrahim (2007:491–492) concludes, was a 
deliberate de facto amnesty intended to ensure continued political goodwill 
for the CPA. This article, however, asserts that the government of national 
unity comprising the SPLM and the Khartoum-based National Congress Party 
(NCP) which governed Sudan during the interim period from 2005 to 2011 was 
bound under international human rights law to provide effective remedy for 
human rights violations committed during the war since Sudan was a party to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  
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However, the question of state succession arises in relation to human rights 
treaty obligations of the new Republic of South Sudan after independence 
in 2011. Article 16 of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in 
Respect of Treaties appears to endorse the ‘clean slate’ approach excusing 
newly-independent states from their predecessors’ treaty obligations. 
However, this article argues for automatic state succession to human rights 
treaties since they codify general principles of inherent human dignity and 
seek to avoid a gap in protection which would expose previously protected 
populations to potential violations (Weeramantry 1996:645–655). The UN 
Human Rights Committee later adopted this position in General Comment 
26 on continuity of obligations, particularly for ICCPR rights. Therefore, 
despite South Sudan not having formally acceded to ICCPR, it was obligated 
to provide effective remedy for the human rights abuses as it automatically 
assumed ICCPR obligations of Sudan upon its independence. Further, 
as a member of the UN it is bound by the Charter of the United Nations 
to act towards the UN’s common purpose of promoting and respecting 
human rights. The silence of the CPA could not reasonably be interpreted 
as absolving the government of South Sudan of its obligations under 
international law.
2.3 South Sudan’s approach to transitional justice after the 
Sudan civil war
The preceding sections have highlighted the fact that the new nation 
desperately required genuine accountability and reconciliation to provide 
closure and draw clear lines on impunity. However, the government of 
South Sudan failed to prioritise and initiate such processes. Instead, 
former fighters and militias were unconditionally integrated into the SPLA 
and the society regardless of their previous misdeeds against civilians 
(Zahar 2011:37).
Granted, the government launched the Presidential Committee for 
Community Peace, Reconciliation and Tolerance in Jonglei State in 2012 
(Ashworth 2015:177) as this was the area hit hardest by inter-ethnic conflicts. 
This committee’s recommendations are, however, yet to be implemented 
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(AUCISS 2014:920). Attempts by Machar’s wife, Angelina Teny, to launch 
a healing and reconciliation initiative also failed as it was not government-
driven, but rather a Machar family project widely suspected as political 
scheming (AUCISS 2014:914–915). Discomfort over Machar’s role in the 
events of 1991 that left some of the deepest scars in South Sudanese society 
could also have been a factor. Further, the first nationwide government 
initiative, National Reconciliation Committee for Healing, Peace and 
Reconciliation, created in 2013, was also unable to fully commence operations 
since the war broke out shortly after its creation (AUCISS 2014:920). 
2.4 Exclusionary governance and poor development record
The South Sudanese people expected their new government to forge a 
national identity through an inclusive and cohesive development agenda 
(Jok 2011). Marginalisation was, after all, one of the main reasons why the 
people of the South so resiliently fought Khartoum for years. Ironically 
therefore, Khartoum’s exploitative style served to set a high bar for the new 
government with statehood igniting hopes of better governance. However, 
the SPLM government seems to have done the opposite. The foundations 
for this lie in the design of the CPA.
Apart from its signatories, the CPA was largely negotiated without 
reasonable involvement of other Sudanese stakeholders (Ibrahim 2007:475) 
thereby failing to provide sufficient guarantees and safeguards for minority 
inclusion. Further, the CPA handed over near-total control of the South to 
SPLM by giving it 70% representation in the interim Southern parliament 
with only 15% each left for other Southern stakeholders and the NCP. This 
imbalance enabled the SPLM to dominate the Southern parliament well 
into independence. South Sudan comprises over 60 diverse ethnic groups 
with the Dinka and Nuer being the majority. However, far from the facile 
and Afro-pessimistic conclusion of commentators like Silva (2014:78–80), 
ethnic diversity is not in itself the cause of South Sudan’s problems. 
The concern rather is that power in the SPLM was not diversified among 
the various interest groups, but was instead concentrated around an elite 
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group (Jok 2011) leading to marginalisation, exclusion, unequal treatment 
and discontent within large sections of society (Zahar 2011:37). 
This exclusion enabled corruption and mismanagement to thrive in 
government, leading to weak national institutions and eventually crippling 
provision of basic services. This was compounded by the fact that the 
new nation had almost non-existent structures and very few qualified 
civil servants to take up the responsibility of policy development and 
implementation. These factors heightened public frustration which only 
required a political trigger that came in the form of the events of 15 
December 2013 and quickly spiralled into a civil war. 
2.5 National security as a challenge to peace and transitional justice
Despite the SPLM being quite organised in its struggle against Khartoum, 
it was in fact a ‘coalition’ of armed factions and ideologues (Deng 2005) 
over who the SPLM leadership did not always have total control. Further, 
the CPA required the SPLM to transform into a professional political 
movement and military force despite most SPLA fighters and commanders 
being once-regular country-folk hardened by years of bush war and who 
had probably grown accustomed to operating more as rebels than as 
professional soldiers or civilians (Guarak 2011:555). However, the much-
needed security sector reform, including disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration, was not effectively undertaken. Many ordinary civilians 
had also acquired undocumented firearms for civil defence which they 
were reluctant to surrender for a future that seemed uncertain at the time 
(Crawford-Browne 2006:61). South Sudan was therefore ushered into 
statehood with many undocumented weapons in the hands of civilians and 
militias and a ‘military’ that was more militia than national army.
The SPLA added to its military woes by massively recruiting over 7 500 new 
soldiers, inevitably from a population comprising many people who had 
had very little access to education (AUCISS 2014:53–54). While this in itself 
may not have been a problem, the process was skewed to favour those from 
groups loyal to Kiir, and to a small extent Machar. Further, the process 
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of recruitment, training and deployment was opaque and allowed for most 
recruits to operate outside of official military channels (AUCISS 2014:53–
54). A combination of these factors contributed greatly in compromising 
peace and security in South Sudan.
3. Criminal accountability under the ARCSS
As discussed in the preceding section, South Sudan failed to engage in a 
much-needed genuine transitional justice process for events during the 
Sudan civil war. This set the stage for a political conf lict to very quickly 
spiral into a full-blown civil war from 15 December 2013 – characterised 
by massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian 
law amounting to international crimes. The ARCSS of 17 August 2015 
unequivocally acknowledges the disharmony resulting from past human 
rights abuses and the need for accountability, and then provides for the 
establishment of the HCSS. This seems to adopt the recommendation of 
the AUCISS that accountability must be pursued as part of a wider process 
of societal reconciliation if sustainable peace is to be achieved in South 
Sudan. 
While individual criminal responsibility as a transitional justice mechanism 
is now well-established – dating back to the post-World War I aborted 
attempt to prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany and the shambolic 
Ottoman trials, and its successful affirmation at the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremburg in 1946 – criminal prosecutions in circumstances 
of mass violations are, according to Schabas (2002), generally time and 
resource intensive such that not all perpetrators can be prosecuted. It is 
for this reason that the International Criminal Court (ICC), for example, 
concentrates on individuals considered to bear the greatest responsibility 
for international crimes. Further, criminal accountability cannot single-
handedly ensure genuine transitional justice, but rather reconciliation 
and justice are both necessary as experiences from Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone have shown (Sooka et al. 2016). The ARCSS confronts these realities 
by providing for a Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing 
(CTRH) and a Compensation and Reparations Authority (CRA) to operate 
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simultaneously with the court. This article, however, only focuses on the 
HCSS by analysing and testing it against prevailing standards of transitional 
justice and human rights.
3.1 Establishment of the HCSS
The UN defines a hybrid court as one whose jurisdiction and composition 
is mixed, exhibits international and national aspects and is often located 
within the territory of the crime (Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR] 2008:1). As will be discussed 
below, the HCSS is indeed a hybrid court within this definition. The choice 
of a hybrid court as opposed to an international tribunal is ideal where 
national systems are either non-existent or incapable of addressing mass 
violations and where a purely internationalised mechanism would not 
earn local acceptance (Kaleck 2015:55; OHCHR 2008:3–4). South Sudan 
presents such a scenario; hence the proposed HCSS as a court superior to, 
and independent of, the South Sudan judiciary.
According to the ARCSS, the African Union Commission (AUC) is 
responsible for the establishment of the HCSS and in this regard, is required 
to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the government to 
operationalise the court. The AUC has the mandate of determining key 
aspects of the court such as location, funding, infrastructure, enforcement 
and personnel. This design gives the AU a role as prominent as, if not 
more prominent than, that of the government of South Sudan in relation 
to the HCSS. While this can potentially promote resistance and non-
cooperation from domestic authorities (Bell 2000:273), it is necessary 
where domestic mechanisms are incapable of conducting genuine 
investigations and prosecutions for reasons of incapacity or susceptibility 
to political manipulation. The AUC has since prepared and submitted a 
draft statute to the transitional government of South Sudan, which statute 
has been approved by the Council of Ministers (CoM) and is currently 
awaiting parliamentary approval (Commission on Human Rights in South 
Sudan 2017:115).
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Despite the above powers given to the AUC by the ARCSS, the ARCSS 
also empowers the government through the general powers of the CoM 
to initiate the legislation operationalising transitional justice mechanisms, 
including the HCSS. Parliament is then expected to enact this legislation 
by consensus or a two-thirds majority vote as a last resort, in an attempt 
to promote consensus and local ownership. The power bestowed upon the 
CoM in this regard is quite immense considering that the CoM was an 
uncomfortable compromise between warring parties (Johnson 2016:294), 
at least until Machar’s departure in July 2016 and the outbreak of renewed 
violence. As such there is the likelihood of deadlock in decision making 
at the CoM either due to factional differences, or outright lack of good 
faith due to the possibility that some members of the CoM are themselves 
likely to be subjected to the HCSS (Tiitmamer 2016:14). Expecting political 
goodwill on fundamental decisions on transitional justice from these 
individuals may be stretching the limits of expectation. 
Further to the above conf lation of responsibilities, the ARCSS gives the 
National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC) the general 
mandate of drafting new legislation required under the Agreement. The NCAC 
is an eight-member committee comprising representatives from government, 
Machar’s breakaway SPLM/A-In Opposition, former political detainees, 
other political parties and IGAD. Overall, the above powers raise the 
potential for conf lict of responsibilities between the AUC, the responsible 
ministry, the CoM and the NCAC thereby creating confusion as to who 
exactly between the AUC and the government (and within the government) 
is responsible for the creation of the court. The anticipated MoU between 
the AU and the government should either expressly oust the jurisdiction of 
one of the above organs over the HCSS legislation or clearly lay out how this 
responsibility is to be shared.
3.2 Jurisdiction of the HCSS
The HCSS has broad temporal jurisdiction over international crimes 
committed from 15 December 2013 to the end of the 30-month transition 
period. In hindsight, there was much wisdom in extending this jurisdiction 
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to beyond the signing of the Agreement, especially considering that more 
violations have since occurred after the formation of the transitional 
government when Kiir and Machar fell out once again. However, the periodic 
limitation of jurisdiction precludes the court from addressing widespread 
atrocities committed before 15 December 2013 particularly in Jonglei state 
where well-organised inter-communal violence was prevalent before and 
after independence (Johnson 2016). Some commentators, however, believe 
that this was a necessary political decision in order to avoid constraining 
the resources of the court and to also give domestic criminal courts the 
opportunity to complement the HCSS (Musila Interview 2016b). To cure 
the above temporal gap in the court’s mandate and to ensure that persons 
not prosecuted by the HCSS face domestic processes, the government needs 
to occasion legislative measures necessary to empower domestic courts to 
try international crimes in a manner complementary to and respectful of 
the supremacy of the HCSS.
The court’s subject matter jurisdiction encompasses genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, sexual crimes, gender-based crimes and other 
serious crimes under both international law and South Sudanese law. This 
expansive jurisdiction is designed to ensure that all possible serious crimes 
committed during this period are prosecuted. However, in relation to South 
Sudanese law the ARCSS (IGAD 2015: chap V, 3.1.1) simply says ‘and/or 
applicable South Sudanese law’ without elaborating the specific laws, be 
they substantive, procedural or evidentiary. The applicable domestic law 
should be clarified beforehand, preferably by the anticipated statute, in 
order to eliminate the possibility of applying laws that may be inconsistent 
with international standards (OHCHR 2008:12).
Notably, the HCSS has a wide personal jurisdiction over any individual 
allegedly responsible for international crimes in this context, regardless 
of nationality. This is necessary considering the complexity of the conf lict 
which raises the possibility of non-nationals also having been involved. 
Such wide personal jurisdiction was instrumental for the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (SCSL) which exercised its jurisdiction in Prosecutor v Charles 
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Ghankay Taylor and prosecuted and convicted Taylor in 2012 for his role in 
the conf lict in Sierra Leone despite him being a Liberian national.
Significantly, the ARCSS also advocates for restorative justice. The court is 
empowered to order forfeiture of property or proceeds of crime to the state 
or restoration to the rightful owners. This is in addition to the court’s power 
to order reparations. These powers are designed to ensure that beyond 
punitive justice, victims get some measure of tangible compensation for 
the crimes against them. 
Related to jurisdiction is the court’s mandate to leave a ‘permanent 
legacy’ in South Sudan, consistent with the position of the UN that the 
establishment of a hybrid court must consider what legacy it will leave in the 
country (United Nations 2004:46). Legacy in this context is the enduring 
impact the court has on improving the rule of law in the country (OHCHR 
2008:4). South Sudan ranks very low on the Rule of Law – being ranked 
by the 2018 Freedom House Index among the worst of the worst at 2/100 
(Freedom House 2018) – and as such, the HCSS is expected to set a lasting 
example for domestic institutions on accountability and the rule of law. 
However, the ARCSS is silent on who should have custody of the archival 
records of the HCSS. While the records are crucial for an impactful legacy 
and in creating a historical record, the need to protect some witnesses and 
victims is equally compelling (Nyagoah e-mail 2016). Custody has become 
a controversial issue between the UN and Rwanda over the archives of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The UN took custody 
of the archives after the ICTR wound up in 2015, but Rwanda continues to 
demand custody as it deems these to be crucial for its national memory of 
the 1994 genocide (United Nations Mechanism for International Criminal 
Tribunals 2015). To avoid a similar situation in future between South 
Sudan and the AU, the anticipated MoU and statute establishing the HCSS 
should clarify who has the responsibility of keeping the HCSS’s archival 
records upon its winding up.
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3.3 Membership and staff of the HCSS
The Agreement seeks impartiality and contextual sensitivity by providing 
for majority foreign judges from other African nations and minority South 
Sudanese judges. All prosecutors, the registrar and other staff, on the other 
hand, shall be foreign nationals from other African states. The ARCSS 
seems to have adopted a UN recommendation that hybrid courts for 
divided societies such as South Sudan should ideally be comprised of a 
majority of international judges in order to guarantee fairness, impartiality 
and objectivity (United Nations 2004:64). While the South Sudan judges 
bring deep understanding of the specific cultural and historical context, 
the other non-national African judges bring a general understanding of 
the African context and valuable experience. This composition guarantees 
local ownership, both by South Sudan specifically and Africa in general; 
ensures contextual sensitivity; and guarantees impartiality, fairness, 
efficiency and professionalism in accordance with established principles of 
international criminal justice.
However, the exclusion of South Sudan nationals from the prosecution team 
is worrying. A mix of majority non-nationals and minority nationals would 
have been ideal to further promote South Sudan ownership of the process, 
infuse contextual familiarity in the team while maintaining impartiality 
and objectivity, and promote capacity building of South Sudanese 
professionals (Musila Interview 2016b). The Central African Republic’s 
proposed Cour Pénal Spécial is instructive in this regard as it provides for 
an international prosecutor deputised by a national and assisted by a team 
of prosecutors comprising majority non-nationals and minority nationals 
(Musila 2016a:23). This provision ought to be reconsidered when drafting 
the anticipated statute of the HCSS to allow for a South Sudanese national 
to deputise the non-national chief prosecutor as well as have a reasonable 
number of South Sudanese prosecutors, investigators and assisting staff.
A poorly worded provision of the ARCSS (IGAD 2015: chap V, 3.3.3) 
further purports to restrict the right of accused persons to defence counsel 
of their choice by providing that, ‘… [duty] defence counsels of the HCSS 
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shall be composed of personnel from African states other than the Republic 
of South Sudan ...’ (emphasis added). It is a recognised international human 
rights principle that an accused person should not be denied the right to 
choose counsel of his or her choice. Purporting to preclude South Sudanese 
nationals from acting as duty defence counsels potentially violates this 
right (Nyagoah e-mail 2016). Similar concerns arose concerning the 
fairness of the decision of the Chambres Africaines Extraordinaires au 
Sénégal in Ministère Public v Hissèin Habré to appoint Senegalese lawyers 
for Habré, a former president of Chad, without his approval after he 
refused to cooperate with the court (Oyugi 2016). Best practice from the 
ICC, and other criminal courts/tribunals, requires the court to give the 
accused persons an opportunity to pick from a list of available counsels 
of any nationality where the court has to assign defence counsel, thereby 
ensuring the above right is upheld. The anticipated statute should clarify 
this position to expressly allow South Sudanese nationals to be listed as 
duty defence counsels.
Another concern is on the appointment of support staff for prosecutors and 
the defence. While the ARCSS is express on the AU being the appointing 
authority of judges, prosecutors, duty defence counsels and the registrar, 
it is silent on who should appoint the other staff and investigators. This 
potentially leaves room for the government to take the lead on these 
appointments and this could be exploited to compromise the court processes 
and jeopardise security of witnesses (Nyagoah e-mail 2016). The MoU and 
anticipated legislation should expressly make the AU responsible for these 
appointments.
3.4 The HCSS and the question of immunity
The ARCSS expressly precludes the possibility of immunity or amnesty 
from criminal responsibility. Non-immunity is long established in 
international criminal law judging by the constitutive instruments of past 
and current international criminal mechanisms. A recent UNDP survey 
also reveals significant support by South Sudanese for non-immunity as 
they attribute the intransigence of some of their leaders to the 2005 CPA’s 
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de facto immunities (UNDP 2015:23). Notably the Agreement departs from 
the AU’s apparent position on immunities as evidenced by the June 2014 
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights which seeks to add an international 
criminal chamber to the proposed court, but which expressly provides 
personal immunity from prosecution for heads of state and government 
and senior government officials. It is therefore laudable that slightly over 
a year after the protocol’s adoption, an AU-backed mechanism expressly 
precludes any immunities. This either indicates a change of tune by the AU 
on the issue of immunity or at the very least signifies hope for such change. 
The ARCSS further remarkably provides that persons indicted or convicted 
by the court are ineligible to participate in government for a period to 
be determined and further that any indicted person eventually ‘proven 
innocent’ will be entitled to compensation (IGAD 2015: chap V, 5). The first 
part of this provision is a legitimate endeavour aimed at giving the nation 
a chance to move forward under trustworthy and untainted leadership. 
However, two issues need to be clarified in this regard. First, it should 
be clarified whether this lustration takes effect upon indictment or upon 
conviction. The presumption of innocence principle swings in favour of 
this lustration taking effect upon conviction. Secondly, it would be prudent 
to clarify whether this period of exclusion will run concurrently with or 
subsequent to the sentence. Ideally, this period should run subsequent to 
serving sentence for it to have any meaningful effect. The exclusion will 
also inevitably require major shake-up of government which Tiitmamer 
(2016) argues is potentially destabilising. However, this article asserts that 
the exercise is necessary to purge the government of persons responsible 
for heinous crimes against the people. The second part of the provision is 
a misnomer, which is most likely the result of inattentive drafting, since 
criminal courts do not pronounce on the innocence of accused persons, 
but rather on whether a case has been proved to the required standard 
of proof. 
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3.5 The legal relationship between the HCSS and the CTRH 
The Agreement is rather vague on the legal relationship between the HCSS 
and the CTRH, a fact that potentially exposes the two mechanisms to an 
antagonistic relationship. Both mechanisms have concurrent jurisdiction 
over violations committed between 15 December 2013 and 17 August 2015. 
This in itself is not a problem since the CTRH is a political institution 
offering political solutions while the HCSS is a judicial institution offering 
legal solutions in accordance with international criminal law. In fact, 
experiences from Peru, Argentina and Timor-Leste have shown that with 
a well-defined framework, the two mechanisms can beneficially and 
complementarily work together (United Nations 2004:26).
The experience of Sierra Leone, however, shows the risks of not clarifying 
a framework for interaction from the onset (Murungu 2011:104–106). 
In 2003, the SCSL trial chamber asserted in Prosecutor v Samuel Hinga 
Norman and Prosecutor v Augustine Gbao that to allow persons charged 
before the court to testify before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
of Sierra Leone would undermine the court’s autonomy and jeopardise 
the accused’s right to presumption of innocence. The appeals chamber 
disagreed, holding that the existence of the two mechanisms was based on 
the principles of complementarity and harmonious and practical balance 
between criminal prosecution and the need for truth and reconciliation, 
and that as such the accused persons could testify before the commission 
as long as the procedure for taking testimony upholds the integrity of 
the court process. While the SCSL appeals chamber’s decision is the 
appropriate position, this may not always be obvious, especially if the 
enabling instrument does not clearly spell out this relationship as is the 
case with the ARCSS. It is therefore important that the anticipated statute 
clarifies this relationship. 
4. The African Union and transitional justice in South Sudan
The previous section discussed salient features of the HCSS and identified 
strengths which should be maximised and shortcomings which should be 
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addressed by the AU and the government as the two stakeholders with the 
greatest responsibilities in this regard. While the primary responsibility of 
forging a path to sustainable peace in South Sudan rests with its people, the 
AU has a legal, political and ‘moral’ obligation to complement the process 
(Sooka et al. 2016). The government of South Sudan being a negotiated 
power-sharing arrangement as opposed to a democratically elected 
government, it may be prudent to provide for some degree of external 
pressure and oversight in order to ensure that the government fulfils its 
obligations regarding the HCSS. This appreciation probably informed the 
prominent role bestowed by the Agreement upon the AU in relation to the 
HCSS. How the AU responds to these obligations could determine to a 
great extent the future of the HCSS. This section therefore examines how 
the AU, being the regional political organisation, and its various relevant 
organs can effectively perform this role.
4.2 The legal basis for the African Union’s transitional  
justice mandate
The fundamental objectives of the AU as entrenched in the Constitutive Act 
of the African Union include a people-centric approach to the promotion 
of human rights, peace, security and stability in Africa. The AU seeks 
to achieve these objectives through peace-building, reconstruction and 
restoration of the rule of law in post-conf lict states and conf lict resolution 
mechanisms at domestic and continental levels. This is recognition of the 
fact that peace and security are only achievable if governance structures of 
individual countries and of the AU are effective, stable and responsive to 
the people’s needs. As such, the security of individual African countries is 
both a domestic as well as a continental concern.
4.2 The African Union’s continental transitional justice efforts
While the AU has in the past had little success in conf lict resolution in 
Africa, it has recently stepped up its efforts. It adopted the Policy on Post-
Conf lict Reconstruction and Development in 2006, which emphasised the 
need for countries emerging from conf lict to institute transitional justice 
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processes in order to address past and current grievances. While this 
policy affirmed the AU’s resolve to address impunity, it merely stated these 
principles without providing much in the form of a structural roadmap for 
their actualisation. 
Bold movement towards direct AU involvement in post-conf lict processes 
was heralded by the 2009 report of the African Union High-Level Panel 
on Darfur which recommended the establishment of a hybrid court for 
Darfur, truth and reconciliation mechanisms, and an AU implementation 
and monitoring panel. While most of the recommendations of this report 
have not been implemented, it provided the first clear indication of the 
AU’s practical role in transitional justice in member states. 
Taking cue from the above report, the AU Panel of the Wise (PoW) 
attempted to codify a continental policy on transitional justice. The panel’s 
report, entitled ‘Peace, justice and reconciliation in Africa: Opportunities 
and challenges in the fight against impunity’, revealed that domestic 
approaches by individual countries have largely been haphazard. The report 
recommended that the AU takes a more active and direct role in transitional 
justice in Africa by consolidating lessons from across the continent and 
developing common principles and concepts to enable it to effectively balance 
peace and security with accountability and reconciliation (African Union 
Panel of the Wise 2013:65–66). The panel attached to the report a draft 
it called the African Union Draft Transitional Justice Policy Framework 
(Draft Policy).
The draft was presented to the AU’s Specialised Technical Committee 
on Justice and Legal Affairs in November 2015, but the committee raised 
concerns that it was not comprehensively ref lective of the input of 
governments (Permanent Mission of Ethiopia to the African Union and the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2016). The committee 
then engaged experts from member states to re-draft the document. This 
article argues that South Sudan presents an opportunity for the AU to test 
the Draft Policy including subsequent expert consultations on the draft 
in order to strengthen it for adoption as a benchmark for continental 
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transitional justice standards. This will afford the AU the opportunity to 
develop a responsive and practical policy borne out of wide consultations, 
experience from ad hoc domestic mechanisms and the AU’s own experience 
in South Sudan.
Another complementary process was launched in 2013 by another AU 
organ, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), 
which by a 2013 resolution on transitional justice in Africa commissioned 
a study to, among others, identify the specific role the ACHPR should play 
in supporting transitional justice mechanisms in Africa, possibly by means 
of a thematic special mechanism. The report of this study is due in May 
2018. Significantly, the government of South Sudan is expressly obliged 
by the Agreement to seek the ACHPR’s assistance in implementing the 
transitional justice mechanisms. The ACHPR’s work and experience thus 
far in this regard will be useful to the South Sudanese efforts while also 
affording the ACHPR the opportunity to develop and enrich its report with 
practical experience.
This article therefore argues that first the AU’s expert drafters and the 
ACHPR should harmonise their efforts in developing a continental 
transitional justice policy and then coordinate and direct these harmonised 
efforts towards facilitating the transitional justice process in South Sudan 
through sharing experiences, promoting capacity building and enriching 
the policy drafting effort. By harmonising inter-agency cooperation with 
the South Sudan process, the AU will ensure proper coordination, and 
hence efficiency, of its interventions. Further, this will ensure effective 
monitoring by the AU of the South Sudan process in order to f lag potential 
challenges and mobilise response.
4.3 The African Union and South Sudan before the Agreement
On 17 December 2013, two days after the civil war began, the AU expressed 
readiness to assist South Sudan find a peaceful solution, and soon thereafter 
directed the AUC Chairperson to consult the ACHPR and immediately 
establish a commission to investigate human rights and humanitarian law 
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violations in South Sudan during the war and make recommendations on 
accountability, reconciliation and healing. Significantly, this was the first 
time the AU acted so expeditiously to investigate human rights violations 
in a member state, and that while South Sudan was not at the time a state 
party to the African Charter which establishes the ACHPR.
The AUC Chairperson constituted the AUCISS comprising five eminent 
Africans – former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, Honourable 
Sophia Akuffo of Ghana, Ms Bineta Diop of Senegal, Prof Mahmood 
Mamdani of Uganda and Prof Pacifique Manirakiza of Burundi – in March 
2014 after consulting stakeholders including the warring parties, ostensibly 
to promote acceptance by all parties and dispel any perceptions of bias 
and impartiality. Its temporal mandate was capped at the date the civil 
war began, 15 December 2013. The AUCISS presented its final report to 
the AU on 15 October 2014, but the AU only released it a year later on 
27 October 2015. The report revealed widespread and systematic violations 
of human rights law and international humanitarian law amounting to 
international crimes, and recommended accountability, as well as healing 
and reconciliation processes. Having initiated and supported AUCISS, it is 
imperative that the AU follows up on its recommendations above in order 
to send a clear message against impunity and to affirm respect for its own 
processes (Sooka et al. 2016).
The African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(ACERWC), another AU organ, whose mandate is to protect and promote 
children’s rights and welfare in Africa, undertook a fact-finding mission to 
South Sudan in 2014 with the permission of the government and revealed 
grave violations of the rights of children during the civil war. Despite 
South Sudan not being a state party to the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child, the ACERWC interpreted its mandate broadly 
to allow it to conduct the mission. The ACERWC, like the AUCISS, drew 
attention to the need for accountability (African Committee of Experts on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child 2014:37). This contextual experience 
of the ACERWC coupled with its thematic expertise can collaboratively 
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be harnessed in order to ensure that the welfare of children prominently 
features in the South Sudan transitional justice process.
4.4 The transitional justice role of the African Union under 
the Agreement
The ARCSS envisions a very prominent role for the AU in operationalising 
the HCSS and obliges the government to work with the AU towards this 
end. As discussed in section three above, the ARCSS is ambiguous on 
who exactly should initiate the drafting of the court’s enabling statute. 
Nonetheless, the ARCSS expressly obliges the AU to establish the HCSS 
through an MoU with the government, and as mentioned above, the AUC 
Commission has already assumed a leading role and drafted a statute and 
submitted it to the government of South Sudan. Experts estimate that if the 
AU keeps up this pace, the court should be operational within three years 
(Musila Interview 2016b), which period this article argues is necessary to 
allow for a properly thought-out court structure and operational design. 
However, should the government unnecessarily delay the process, the AU 
should bypass it and establish the HCSS by invoking its powers under article 
4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU which mandates it to intervene in a 
member state in the event of international crimes.
The AU is required to appoint personnel of the court as well as determine 
the location of the court, its infrastructure, its funding and enforcement 
of its decisions. These responsibilities require the AU to mobilise the 
necessary financial resources preferably by developing a fundraising 
outreach framework for the HCSS (Nyagoah e-mail 2016). While targeting 
global and regional donors, the focus should be on mobilising funds from 
AU member states as a primary component, either through compulsory 
member state contributions or as a vote-head in the AU annual budget. 
This way, funding sustainability can be assured and the AU will maintain 
the HCSS’ identity as an Africa-owned and Africa-led and, for the most 
part, Africa-resourced initiative.
In deciding the court’s location, a balance should be struck between security 
of court personnel and witnesses and the court’s accessibility to the South 
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Sudanese people (Nyagoah e-mail 2016). Arguably therefore, it cannot be 
located in South Sudan due to prevailing insecurity. This article argues 
that Arusha, Tanzania would be ideal with the possibility of relocation to 
South Sudan if and when security conditions improve. Arusha is reasonably 
geographically close to South Sudan and has the infrastructural advantage 
having inherited the facilities of the ICTR that wound up its activities 
in 2015. Further, Tanzania is politically stable and offers security unlike 
South Sudan’s immediate neighbours Sudan, Central African Republic and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. Tanzania is also relatively politically 
neutral and impartial unlike Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia who besides 
hosting large South Sudanese refugee populations, have also been accused 
of providing a safe haven for resources plundered from South Sudan during 
the conf lict (The Sentry 2016).
Also relevant to the success of the HCSS is the AU’s consolidation of the 
political support of its members and other stakeholders. To avoid the pitfall 
of lack of political goodwill and cooperation that characterised the ICC’s 
relationship with Sudan and Kenya leading to the hibernation of Prosecutor 
v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, withdrawal of charges in Prosecutor v 
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and vacation of charges in Prosecutor v William 
Samoei Ruto & Joshua arap Sang, the AU must mobilise its members to 
unequivocally support the HCSS and collectively put pressure on South 
Sudan to cooperate with the HCSS. After securing this support, the AU 
should then embark on galvanising global support for the HCSS. However, 
the AU should not in the process shirk its responsibilities by delegating 
to global stakeholders. Rather, it should provide the necessary leadership 
in coordinating external support to achieve cohesiveness and efficiency 
(Sooka et al. 2016). This way the transitional justice process in South 
Sudan will not be dominated by donor interests, but will be Africa-driven 
with complementary assistance from global stakeholders. 
5. Conclusion
This article sought to examine the capability of the proposed HCSS to 
deliver sustainable transitional justice solutions to South Sudan, and 
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ways in which the AU can effectively contribute to its success. The article 
determined that South Sudan became independent against the backdrop of 
underlying internal grievances that were not subsequently addressed. This, 
coupled with insecurity, bad governance and political tensions within the 
ruling SPLM, culminated in the current civil war. The article concludes that 
the HCSS presents a timely opportunity for accountability. Shortcomings 
have, however, been identified, which prompted recommendations made 
to the government and the AU in relation to the HCSS, including limited 
temporal jurisdiction; exclusion of South Sudanese nationals from the 
staff of the court; lack of clarification on who between the government of 
South Sudan and the AU will have custody of archival records of the HCSS; 
unclear legal relationship between the HCSS and the CTRH; and ambiguity 
on who is responsible for initiating the HCSS’ enabling legislation. 
The study also determined that the ARCSS bestows significant 
responsibilities upon the AU in relation to the HCSS which include 
operationalising the HCSS in consultation with the government; 
determining the location of the HCSS; appointing court personnel; availing 
the necessary infrastructure and funding; providing an enforcement 
mechanism for HCSS decisions; and coordinating stakeholder support. 
The article has made recommendations on how the AU can effectively 
perform these obligations. The study concludes that the AU must take the 
lead in relation to the HCSS in order to guarantee focus and sustainability.
Finally, the article notes that as of the time of writing, Kiir and Machar 
had again fallen out with the latter leaving the country and controversially 
being replaced by Taban Deng Gai as First Vice-President of the transitional 
government. In response, IGAD launched a High Level Revitalisation 
Forum to get the process back on track, resulting in Kiir and Machar 
signing yet another deal in September 2018 for the reinstatement of Machar 
and recommitting to the ARCSS. While these recent developments have 
made the situation more fragile, they have also shown the urgency in 
implementing the ARCSS, particularly the HCSS.
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Community resilience and social 
capital in the reconstruction and 
recovery process for post-election 
violence victims in Kenya
Julius Kinyeki*
Abstract
This study addresses three questions: how Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) following the post-election violence of 2007/2008 in Kenya 
are recreating their community resilience capacities; how the Kenyan 
government and non-state interventions are inf luencing the victims’ 
livelihood strategies towards their reconstruction and recovery process and 
how social support and social capital have accelerated their reconstruction 
and recovery process. The study adopted qualitative research methodology, 
and primary data were collected since January 2015, continuously and 
concurrently with data analysis. The key finding was that ownership of land 
is identified and perceived as a milestone in the process of post-conf lict 
reconstruction and recovery, and as an avenue for community resilience. 
The study found that after the rather short-term programmes of the Kenyan 
government, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and
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Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), the main means of livelihood 
for IDPs still is casual labour and other menial jobs. However, many IDPs, 
especially those who were not placed in camps or resettled on farms, but 
integrated with host communities, developed new emergent norms to 
support each other. The key recommendations are that government should 
evaluate the economic loss of every integrated IDP, and that those resettled 
in government procured farms should be provided with legal ownership 
documents. There should be an urgent re-profiling of IDPs in camps and 
a definite commitment to follow the United Nations’ Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs 2004). The findings of this study bring to light new knowledge on 
the theory of social capital. It shows how victims of displacement develop 
new emergent norms, values and culture to support each other, which 
eventually creates a new society/community.
Keywords: Internally displaced persons, Kenya, post-conflict reconstruction 
and recovery, livelihood strategies, social capital, community resilience
1. Kenya’s genie of tribal politics
The post-election crisis of January 2008 brought Kenya close to collapse. 
The abrupt proclamation of Mwai Kibaki, the retired president, as victor 
in a highly contentious presidential election, led to either planned or 
spontaneous eruptions of ethnic violence (see Kagwanja 2009:365–387). 
According to an investigative report on 2007/2008 post-election violence, 
popularly referred to as the Waki Commission 2008 report, there are 
several deep-rooted causes of the post-election violence, such as poverty 
and unemployment, but ethnic disputes relating to land and dating back 
to colonial times (notably between Kalenjin and Kikuyu in the Rift Valley) 
and the formation of political parties around Kenya’s 42 ethnic groups 
were the immediate causes of the violence (Akiwumi Report 1999; Waki 
Commission 2008; Kagwanja 2009). 
Towards the election date, ethnic tension was further heightened by the 
opposition campaign, critically shaped by the rhetoric of ‘forty one against 
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one’ (the Kikuyu) and ‘Kenya against Kikuyu’. The message to the voters 
was to isolate one tribe (Kikuyu) against the other forty one tribes in 
Kenya by voting as a tribal bloc. This demonstrated that though multiparty 
elections in 1992, 1997 and 2002 were also conducted along ethnic lines, 
ethnic polarisation reached fever pitch in the 2007 elections. According to 
the Waki Commission (2008) and Adeagbo (2011:174–179), deep-rooted 
land disputes, economic and political inequality, impunity, the role of the 
media, and ethnic animosity played a key role in the post-election violence. 
At independence, Kenya had only two parties: Kenya African National 
Union (KANU) and Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KANU 
was dominated by the Kikuyu ethnic tribe and KADU by the Luo ethnic 
tribe. At Independence, the country still had adequate levels of economic 
resources, and the perception of ethnicity was not evident. Politicians 
conducted politics around national identity, and thus candidates were 
voted for regardless of ethnicity. However, from the 1990s multiparty 
period in Kenya, ambitious politicians discovered they could win votes by 
appealing for ethnic support and promising improved government services 
and projects in their areas. They created an ethnic solidarity, enhanced 
perceptions of ethnic favouritism, and to some extent caused increased 
post-election violence (see Kagwanja 2009; Kagwanja and Southall 2009; 
Kanyinga 2009; Waki Commission 2008; Akiwumi Report 1999; Kiliku 
Commission 1992; Kiai 2008:162–168).
Tribal identity, kinship, and clan or ethnic considerations largely 
determined how people voted henceforth, and especially in the 2007 
general elections (Waki Commission 2008). This means ethnicity has been 
one of the significant variables under Kenya’s multiparty democracy, since 
competition for state resources has made it hard for politicians to devise 
alternative bases for political organisation such as class (Kwatemba 2012). 
Hyden (2006) acknowledges this point when he argues that the inf luence 
of ‘community-centred networks’ in African politics has been due to the 
inability of class-based identity to dislodge kinship ties.
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At the continental level, the re-introduction of multiparty politics in the 
early 1990s led to a worrying trend of increasing election-related violent 
conf lict that threatens democracy, peace and stability. These threats are 
manifested through increased electoral violence with an ethnic dimension. 
According to Kagwanja (2009:365–387), the electoral violence in Kenya 
quickly metamorphosed into a deadly orgy of ‘ethnic’ slaughter, rape and 
plunder reminiscent of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, about which Wolff 
(2006:31) notes:
Ethnicity acquires enormous power to mobilize people when it becomes a 
predominant identity and means more than just a particular ethnic origin; 
it comes to define people as speakers of a certain language, belonging to 
a particular religion, being able to pursue some careers but not others, 
being able to preserve and express their cultural heritage, having access to 
positions of power and wealth or not. In short, when ethnicity becomes 
politically relevant and determines the life prospects of people belonging to 
distinct ethnic groups, it is possible to mobilize group members to change 
a situation of apparently perpetual discrimination and disadvantage or in 
defence of a valued status quo.
In Kenya today, ethnicity has become more than just an expression of 
cultural identity: it gets connected to social status; it determines people’s 
fortunes in life and becomes politicised. It makes it possible for those who 
feel aggrieved as a result of discrimination and those in power who want 
to protect their privileges, to invoke ethnicity (Kwatemba 2008; 2012). 
This elicits a sense of optimism due to wide participation, but increases 
cases of electoral violence in a country like Kenya with forty two ethnic 
groups. Indeed, the 2007/2008 post-election violence proved the weaknesses 
of many electoral institutions since independence (Khadiagala 2008:53–60; 
Waki Commission 2008; Abuya 2009:127–158).
With the ethnic and electoral institutional challenges during every election, 
Kenya’s political history has become very dynamic and unpredictable. 
For example, the country promulgated a new constitution in 2010 and 
conducted peaceful 2013 elections – although the presidential results were 
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contested at the Supreme Court. The court upheld the results in its 
30 March 2013 ruling. Though Raila Odinga and the elected opposition 
leaders criticised the casual way in which this ruling was made, they 
nevertheless accepted the outcome. The 2017 general election was peaceful, 
but the presidential election results were again contested at the Supreme 
Court. This time the court, in its 1 September 2017 ruling, annulled the 
results and ordered a second vote. This was conducted against the backdrop 
of a boycott by Raila Odinga (Daily Nation 2017d; Standard 2017).
To a large extent the opposition stronghold never participated, but only 
called for mass protests and economic boycotts. Indeed on 30 January 
2018, Odinga took an oath at a public rally in Uhuru Park and was ‘sworn 
in’ as the people’s president. But on 9 March 2018 he decided to support 
Kenyatta’s government leaving his supporters and government leadership 
surprised by the move popularly referred to as ‘handshake’. He termed 
the cross-over a Building Bridges Initiative. On 20 October 2018 he was 
appointed African Envoy for Infrastructure Development by the Chairman 
of the African Union. This adaptive transformation of Odinga has led 
political commentators to question if he will vie for the presidency in the 
2022 general election, with this new mandate and also his advancing age 
(Daily Nation 2018).
2. The scale and impact of internal displacement
The post-election violence led to the death of 1 133 people and the displace-
ment of over 600 000 (Waki Commission 2008). At the end, there were 118 
IDP camps across the country (Waki Commission 2008). According to 
the global survey of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2011), 
40.8 million people around the world have been forced by armed conflict 
and generalised violence to flee their homes, and were living in displacement 
within the borders of their own country at the end of 2015. This is the largest 
number in the last ten years. In 2014, there were 38 million people displaced, 
33.3 million in 2013, 28.8 million in 2012, 26.6 million in 2011, 27.5 million 
in 2010, 27 million in 2009 and 26 million in 2008. 
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In sub-Saharan Africa, there were 12 million IDPs across 22 countries, 
with Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Somalia and 
Nigeria being the most affected. By the end of 2015, Kenya accounted for 
309 200 people living in internal displacement. These statistics, and those 
of previous years, show that internal displacement is a problem which is 
increasing each year, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.
During the violence in Kenya, IDPs lost community support structures 
which members of the community had helped build in their lifetime. Many 
self-employed community members lost business income and livelihood, 
while those in gainful employment lost their jobs. Social networks such as 
families, neighbours, friends, co-workers as well as informal social support 
mechanisms were destroyed. Although some of the above community 
social structures were reconstructed, many were not, and others were 
entirely abandoned as community members became resettled in new areas.
Social capital, defined as the capacity of individuals to command scarce 
socio-economic and political resources by virtue of belonging to a social 
network (Portes 1998; 2000; Nakagawa and Shaw 2004) was disrupted 
or destroyed. Many families remained separated, and informal support 
systems such as women credit systems, record keeping and micro-finance 
banking structures were disorganised and damaged. This has prevented 
social capital from playing its crucial role in the process of reconstruction 
and recovery. Research in social psychology has revealed that the primary 
source of help and social support for IDPs is their own informal social 
support networks (Hernandez-Plaza et al. 2006:1151–1169). 
Although some of the IDPs have been resettled in new areas by the 
government, it has been difficult for them to recover their socio-economic 
livelihood, which had been previously achieved through applying the 
unique adaptation, absorption or transformation coping strategies of social 
support (Alvarez-Castillo et al. 2006:78–87). The process of reconstruction 
and recovery spearheaded by the Kenyan government and non-state actors 
is on-going, but many IDPs are yet to bounce back resiliently to their pre-
conf lict situation. The government’s approach is costly, but merely ad hoc 
and ineffective (Daily Nation 2017c). 
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The hope that IDPs were to receive reparation and either restorative or 
retributive justice, in order to bounce back by adapting, being absorbed or 
transforming, was short-lived as the Kenyan parliament referred the post-
election violence cases to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC 
commenced pre-trial hearings for crimes against humanity by six Kenyans – 
Uhuru Kenyatta, Francis Muthaura, Hussein Ali, William Ruto, Henry 
Kosgey and Joshua Sang – and recommended prosecution for being most 
culpable for the violence. By 2016, however, all the cases had collapsed. 
Successful prosecution would have paved way for secondary cases with 
regard to compensation for the IDPs.
The ICC pre-trial hearings became complicated when in 2013 two of the 
suspects, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto were elected president and 
deputy president respectively, which brought to light the question of the 
Kenyan government’s degree of co-operation with the ICC. To date, Kenya 
has not established any internationally recognised justice system to try any 
emerging cases related to the post-election violence, and nobody has been 
successfully tried and convicted of such crimes (ICC 2009; 2015).
While various processes have been applied in the management of the 
post-election violence, such as national intelligence gathering, security 
mapping, early warning and response, preparedness, prevention and 
mitigation (Kumar 1997; Krisch and Flint 2011; Alexander 2002; Coppola 
2007), the resettlement of IDPs, part of the reconstruction and recovery 
process, stopped in 2012 (Daily Nation 2015b; 2016b; 2015c; Standard 2015). 
This was the period coinciding with the end of the term of the 
coalition government and the ushering in of campaigns for another 
general election in March 2013. But during the 2017 general election 
campaigns, President Kenyatta allocated an amount of Kenyan Shillings 
(Kshs.) 358 million as compensation to Integrated IDPs in Kisii, Nyamira 
(Daily Nation 2017b; 2017a). Still, when it was stopped in 2012, the 
reconstruction and recovery process of IDPs was yet to be fully completed.
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3. Research design and methodology
To understand how the various interventions assisted or limited community 
resilience of IDPs, the researcher used Interview-Guides, Focus Group 
Discussions, Key Informant interviews and Review of secondary data as 
tools to collect data.
Interviews for camp-based IDPs were limited to Kamara IDPs camp in 
Kuresoi North District, Nakuru County, and Mumoi IDPs camp in Subukia 
District, Nakuru County. These two camps were picked as they are the 
oldest and hence have a rich history of IDPs issues and also hold the largest 
number of IDPs. Ten respondents were picked – five from each of the two 
camps. The first five adult IDPs were picked from the Ministry of State for 
Special Programmes lists of the two camps.
Interviews for government-resettled IDPs were limited to five areas: Muhu 
Farm in Mirangini District, Nyandarua County; Ngiwa Farm in Rongai 
District, Nakuru County; Kabia/Asanyo Farm, in Kuresoi North District, 
Nakuru County; Gakonya Farm in Molo District, Nakuru County; Haji 
Farm in Subukia District, Nakuru County. These five out of the current 
eighteen farms for government-resettled IDPs (part of about 28 government-
procured farms) were picked deliberately because of their large numbers 
and long histories.
From each farm’s list, as maintained by the Ministry of State for Special 
Programmes, the researcher picked three respondents, taking every fifth 
name. In this category there were therefore fifteen respondents.
Interviews for integrated IDPs were conducted in Ndunduri in Mirangini 
District, Nyandarua County, Bahati Centre in Nakuru District, Nakuru 
County, and in Nakuru Township in Nakuru District, Nakuru County. 
These are the areas with the largest number of integrated IDPs country-
wide. Nine respondents were picked in the same way as in the previous 
case.
To check on the validity and reliability of data from the primary respondents, 
key informant interviews and focused group discussions were conducted, 
and relevant reports and documents were reviewed. The key informants 
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included: the programme co-coordinator for IDPs resettlement in the 
Ministry of State for Special Programmes; the programme co-coordinator 
for IDPs affairs in the Integration and Cohesion Commission; the 2007/2008 
post-election violence IDP Network Leader; the programme co-ordinator 
for Kenya Red Cross Society, IDPs reconstruction and recovery programme; 
one local chief each within the two main IDP camps; and one Member of 
Country Assembly representatives from each of the two main IDP camps.
Six IDPs were considered for the focus group discussion in each of the 
three categories of IDPs. Individuals for the focus group discussions were 
picked through purposive sampling based on their perceived knowledge 
of the themes under discussion. Three focus group discussions were 
conducted with, in each case, two men, two women and two youths picked 
from the relevant list of the Ministry of State for Special Programmes 
– camp-based IDPs, government-resettled IDPs and integrated IDPs. 
The researcher created groups that were balanced according to age and 
gender. The discussions were scheduled for about forty-five to sixty 
minutes. The researcher used personal and professional attributes to create 
a conducive environment for optimum input on topics under discussion.
Additionally, to cross-check for details given in other techniques, this 
research reviewed: school admission/enrolment registers for the two main 
schools concerned; programme budgets from local NGOs implementing 
post-election violence projects; progress reports from Kenya Red Cross 
Society; progress reports from the Ministry of State for Special Programmes; 
and progress reports from the Cohesion and Integration Commission. 
Such records are presumed to be as objective and unaffected by emotions 
as possible.
The fieldwork provided answers on livelihood capacities and on the role 
of land in community resilience, as well as on the roles of social support, 
the ICC, and the Kenyan State and other actors. The purpose was to 
reveal ‘what works and what does not work’. Together with the fieldwork 
component, however, the study intended to unpack the empirical, 
theoretical and conceptual contributions of new knowledge to the post-
conf lict reconstruction and recovery discourse.
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4. The findings
It became clear that means of livelihood and ownership of resources, especially 
land, played a key role in the reconstruction and recovery of the IDPs.
4.1 Land ownership
Legal ownership of land is identified and perceived by IDPs as a socio-
economic asset to their reconstruction and recovery, making it the 
backbone of community resilience. Land ownership was linked throughout 
by respondents as the avenue for more successful recovery. Government 
made an effort towards the resettlement of IDPs on parcels of land, but 
never provided legal titles. These parcels can therefore not serve as a safety 
net (absorptive capacities), and the IDPs cannot actively engage in changing 
land policies (transformative capacities). Lack of legal ownership denies 
IDPs an asset and a means of long-term recovery. This was explained thus:
We are told the land is ours, the house is ours … but we don’t have the title. 
We are not 100% sure of tomorrow in case of violence. But at least we have 
something. If it was possible we would borrow money with these (land and 
house) as surety, but no bank or co-surety would agree an arrangement 
without legal documents (Male, Kabia/Asanyo farm).
IDPs have no capacity for credit systems and cannot make alternative 
investment options, such as selling the land or building rental structures. 
IDPs continue to suffer the loss of economic growth, stable means 
of livelihood and equitable distribution of income and assets within 
populations. Land, raw materials, physical capital and accessible housing 
create the essential resource base for a resilient community. Land is so 
significant that even IDPs who never owned land before the violence 
looked forward to owning a piece by courtesy of the ad hoc and ineffective 
resettlement process. It would help the victims to rebuild a base for their 
socio-economic lives by building up income and assets. Also, if the land 
is fertile, and there are houses, water, roads, electricity and other physical 
infrastructure, its market value would increase further. As a community 
asset it can help creating diverse kinds of socio-economic livelihood for 
legal owners.
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After the violence, the government developed a resettlement framework 
such that an IDP was to be allocated 2¼ hectares of land, of which the ¼ 
hectare was to be used for building a house, while the 2 hectares were to 
be used for farming. Seeds and fertilizer for the first planting season were 
also provided. Such a piece of land, barely equivalent to the land individual 
IDPs had lost, is not adequate for profitable farming. The resettled have 
to depend on seasonal rain for cultivating maize and beans, but the rain 
is unpredictable in volumes and patterns. Season by season, the harvests 
continue to be poor as the IDPs have no capacity to invest in modern 
farming technologies or budget for fertilizer or manure. And without 
enough food, IDPs cannot be resilient. They explained:
Each one of us was allocated 2¼ hectares, each house is built on a ¼ hectare 
while each household farms the remaining 2 hectares (Female, Ngiwa farm).
We owned big chunks of land back at home, here we were allocated 2 
hectares each … how much food can one grow in that piece? It cannot 
even feed the entire family. One must look for other means of sustaining 
the family, hence casual labour to the host community (Male, Ngiwa farm).
By the end of this study, it was not possible to establish the actual number 
of IDPs resettled as there was no clear data on how many IDPs have been 
allocated farms. After allocations, the government discontinued any socio-
economic or political support. The argument has been that once resettled, 
victims cease being IDPs. However, the resettled continue to perceive 
themselves as IDPs and are identified as such by the host communities. 
This has hindered reconstruction and recovery as they continue to look 
forward for economic and social support from government and NGOs. 
In fact, they lament over how the government has not been visiting them 
in the resettlement. A key finding among camp-based IDPs is that due to 
the long stay in the camps, they have developed a ‘beggar culture’, which 
has continued to limit their view of opportunities. But in reality this study 
has found that these IDPs do not fit the definition of beggars. One of them 
captured their situation as follows:
… just idle around in the camp. There is nothing to do. We just sit talk 
whole day, waiting if one can get some casual labour in the field ... can wait 
for weeks or months (Male, Kamara camp).
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We have hope that one day we get paid what we lost. But for now we are at 
zero. I came here with nothing, having lost everything. When government 
gives us land and build houses for us like it has done to some other IDPs, 
is when we can look forward for a new beginning (Male, Kamara camp).
When they were asked about their means of livelihood and occupation, the 
majority gave the following kind of response:
 ... Casual labour … could be farming in the host community farms, 
domestic work in their houses, fetching water, washing clothes … any 
‘kibarua’ (casual labour) available. When you have nothing you cannot 
choose ... It is also not available all the time. For example, I have been out of 
any ‘kibarua’ for the last two weeks. If I am lucky I can be on ‘kibarua’ for a 
month, and also can be without for as long (Female, Kamara camp).
There were no adequate consultations between the IDPs and Government 
before resettlement. This is against the UN guiding principles on 
resettlement (Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement 2006; 
Brookings Institution 2008; 2011). Government presumed that all IDPs were 
farmers or could be farmers even when they had previously been business 
people. This is manifested in the allocated farms where the idea of farming 
is abandoned and IDPs rent out part or all of the 2 hectares provided by the 
Government. They use the money for other socio-economic business ideas 
which they think may bring about resiliency. 
An interesting finding has been the claim that weather and climate in these 
farms are too extreme for any profitable livelihood. As such IDPs spend a 
lot of time hoping for alternatives which are unlikely to come. The land 
allocated is in isolated locations and in harsh climatic and environmental 
areas. IDPs perceive direct allocation of land by government or provision 
of cash to buy land on their own as the only avenue towards adaptation, 
absorption or transformation pathways. On weather an IDP said:
Here the weather is very harsh ... in the morning it is fog ... one old man 
died here because of the weather (Female, Muhu farm).
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4.2 Means of livelihood and external effort
Before the violence, IDPs’ assets included animals such as cows, sheep, 
goats, pigs and donkeys. They cultivated foodstuff such as maize, beans 
and peas for family consumption and sold the surplus, and they also had 
small businesses in townships. The pool of assets (animals, money saved, 
land, foodstuff, home structures etc.) acted as safety net for emergencies. 
They were able to acquire credit for emergencies from friends and structured 
financial institutions. They lived in a family set-up (wife/husband and 
children) and in community (neighbours, friends, co-workers).
Now, however, they are faced with limited opportunities and options for 
any economic livelihoods, which are also unsustainable – especially in the 
case of, for instance, casual labour (Jacobsen 2002). The social support 
system network of IDPs operates only amongst themselves, hence is 
economically weak. This is an emergent norm, similar to that of Colombian 
IDPs who relied on each other for social support (Zora 2009:133–151; 
Tardy 1985:187–202). Without external livelihood assistance, IDPs remain 
vulnerable for a long period of time – having lost their entire social support 
system provided by family, friends, neighbours, co-workers, professionals, 
norms, culture, values, institutions and more. 
Some IDPs have been able to create new social support through emergent 
norms, cultures and values. But these new social support systems have not 
helped to accelerate their reconstruction and recovery processes, especially 
among camp-based IDPs, as they are mostly concerned with voicing 
their vulnerability. They are mainly for emotional and informational 
purposes. They lack financial ability to support each other. For example, 
IDPs responded:
My brothers and sisters are struggling like me … they have their own 
families. It will even be a bother to ask for help from them. Our neighbours 
are also IDPs. It’s only government which can help us by giving us some 
land (Female, Mumoi IDP camp).
… even if they (family) wanted, maybe they send airtime. They cannot afford 
any other help. They are as needy as I am … (Female, Mumoi IDP camp).
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In the pyramid of social support, family, neighbours and colleagues are 
placed at the core (Tardy 1985). Support is either received (enacted) or 
perceived (expected). Various forms of social capital include bonding, 
bridging and linking, but for IDPs with their common vulnerability 
these are weak. To overcome this vulnerability they have developed a 
strong emergent norm, value and culture of assisting each other. They are 
continuously securing casual labour through referrals, they share common 
meals and sleep in one tent if need arises. This is regardless of ethnic 
affiliation or gender. They forget their ethnic affiliations, hence draw 
strength in their diversity. They are a close-knit community, which is a 
social support mechanism and a survival strategy. 
Social support helps IDPs to build adaptive capacities, create alternative 
livelihood strategies as well as absorptive capacity, and minimise shocks 
and stress. Portes (1998; 2000) has noted that dependency and reliance 
on other people is an advantage, hence the emergent norm of referral for 
opportunities among social network of IDPs.
There are cases where IDPs have cordial relationships with the host 
community, who are receptive to and supportive of their socio-economic 
needs. Because camp-based IDPs and Government resettled IDPs live in 
secluded IDPs-only areas, they have less contact with host communities 
than integrated IDPs who live together with host communities. All IDPs 
have access to National Government leadership, but through their elected 
leaders, such as Members of Parliament, Members of County Assemblies 
and Local Administration such as Chiefs. Additionally they have formed 
IDP leadership structures.
In addition to IDPs’ own efforts, agencies other than the State have 
also attempted to restore livelihood for the IDPs. The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) implemented a livelihood project 
worth US$1 666 700. The aim of this project was to re-equip IDPs with 
lost livelihood assets, skills and micro-enterprise opportunities, as well 
as credit and entrepreneurial opportunities. This was done through 
establishing business solution centres in the major hubs, providing access 
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to women’s development funds and youth business funds, restoring and 
improving access to markets, rehabilitating small-scale public works 
through intensive labour, and mainstreaming livelihoods recovery in the 
national economic agenda (UNDP 2009; 2011a; 2011b; 2011c).
The UNDP project was not able to reach out to all IDPs, however, and other 
non-state actors such as the Kenya Red Cross, only offered humanitarian 
assistance. Their projects ended after the humanitarian crisis, and civil 
society was left with the accountability of remaining interested in advocacy 
and human rights issues. During the course of this study the Government 
announced a new initiative to resettle IDPs through a Kshs. 10 billion fund, 
thereby acknowledging that at that stage the process was still incomplete. 
By 2012 the Government had spent Kshs. 4 billion and NGOs 16 billion 
on post-conf lict reconstruction and recovery of the IDPs (Daily Nation 
2016a; 2017b; 2016c; Standard 2018; 2016). But eventually, apparently due 
to fatigue, the Government announced the closure of all IDP camps. 
NGOs shortly thereafter also closed down all their IDPs projects – perhaps 
because there was no more donor appeal. Currently NGOs are active in 
research, human rights and advocacy. The large amounts of money spent 
are not ref lective of the livelihood reconstruction and recovery of the IDPs 
(Kanyinga 2014).
By the end of this study there were 46 IDP camps, 28 government procured 
farms – of which only 18 were fully operational. The government was not 
able to provide the accurate number of integrated IDPs. However, 170 000 
integrated IDPs were each given Kshs. 10 000 as start-up capital. In the 
combined area of this study, covering Bahati, Ndunduri and Nakuru towns, 
there were 8 250 integrated IDPs (Ministry of State for Special Programmes 
2010; 2011; 2012).
Government paid Kshs. 25 000 to every returning IDP to reconstruct their 
houses and another Kshs. 10 000 as start-up capital. In this intervention, 
38 145 IDP households received payment. The target was to construct 
43 792 houses but Government managed to construct only 26 589. There 
were 817 individual IDPs who received Kshs. 400 000 to rebuild their own 
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houses without government logistical support and Kshs. 10 000 as start-up 
capital. A total of 617 primary schools were constructed in the affected 
areas (Ministry of State for Special Programmes 2010; 2011; 2012).
In addition to direct Government support, there was resource and monetary 
support from external actors. For example, the Government of China 
donated 105 000 iron sheets worth Kshs. 200 million, the government of 
Morocco donated US$1 million and Africa Development Bank (ADB) 
donated Kshs. 1.5 billion for farm infrastructure. When IDPs who f led 
to Uganda returned in 2015, UNHCR paid each IDP US$50. This was an 
indication of the recognition of these IDPs.
4.3 Unfulfilled expectations of a judicial solution
Kenya is part of the international community and a signatory of ICC 
Rome Statute, and as such the post-election violence cases were referred 
to the ICC through a formal and a systematic process (ICC 2009; 2015). 
However, the previous Government and the 2013–2017 Government were 
very pre-occupied fighting off the ICC to the detriment of the IDPs’ plight. 
The Government’s failure to establish a local tribunal and its opting for the 
Hague-based ICC demonstrated its unwillingness to engage in a process 
towards a permanent judicial solution for the victims (Daily Nation 2009; 
Daily Nation 2013a; Daily Nation 2013b). However, acquittals in the 
Kenyatta and Ruto ICC cases, in 2014 and 2016 respectively, re-programmed 
the vision and mission of the IDPs reconstruction and recovery agenda by 
the Government (Daily Nation 2015a).
The IDPs expected justice to be administered to the perpetrators of the 
violence. They were to be held accountable for the IDPs’ loss of their property, 
relatives and friends. A Post-Conf lict Reconstruction and Development 
(PCRD) programme could have provided for this, and victims expected to 
achieve restorative, reparative and retributive justice, but Kenya’s judicial 
system was unwilling and incapable (Khadiagala 2008:53–60; 2009:4–33; 
African Union 2006; 2009). 
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4.4 The expected role of the African Union
Although the African Union has the primary responsibility for peace 
and security (Murithi 2006; Nkhuhlu 2005), it failed to anticipate the 
magnitude of the violence in Kenya. It thus arrived on the ground late. 
Perhaps if Kofi Annan, the Panel of Eminent Persons’ chairman, had 
arrived earlier, the number of deaths and the amount of destruction and 
displacement would have been less and the reconstruction and recovery 
process would have been manageable (Khadiagala 2008:53–60; 2009:4–33). 
Western countries, such as the US, Germany, UK, France, and Switzerland, 
funded the mediation process through the African Union, and hence the 
peace process was neither African-based nor Kenyan-based despite the 
Panel of Eminent Persons being African. 
The African Union relied on the traditional approach of peace negotiations, 
ceasefire, transitional government, demilitarisation, constitutional 
reforms and democratic elections. The peace negotiations, however, 
through the AU approach were short-term – just to end the crisis. A long-
term post-conf lict reconstruction and recovery agenda was recommended, 
but enforcement mechanisms were not established. The agenda points 
developed by the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation body 
remained as such and at the mercy of political leadership to implement. 
Indeed, to end the crisis, the African Union did establish the Grand 
Coalition government of 2007–2013. This Government, for purposes of 
inclusivity was the largest since independence and had two centres of 
power, each faction answerable to either Kibaki or Odinga (Kenya National 
Dialogue and Reconciliation 2009).
A Special Session of the Assembly of the AU eventually, on 31 August 2009, 
passed action plans on the consideration and resolution of conf licts in 
Africa. At that stage, Kenya had just emerged from the violence, and was 
not among the thirteen countries in the action plans. What should have 
happened in Kenya, however, was to set up country offices such as in the 
Quick Impact Projects (QUIPS) approach as well as to provide funds to 
implement the reconstruction and recovery of socio-economic capacities 
of IDPs (Daley 2006:303–319; African Union 2009). 
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5. Recommended model for post-conflict reconstruction 
and recovery of IDPs
From the above findings, this study recommends an IDP post-election 
reconstruction and recovery approach. The approach suggests five 
coordinated steps:
First, it should be recognised that where democracy is mature, it is unlikely 
to have incidences of post-election violence in which the community 
experiences a crisis, people are displaced, killed and property destroyed, 
and the displaced seek shelter in camps, and become IDPs.
Secondly, the government department in charge of internal affairs should 
consult or cooperate with a lead non-state actor such as the UNDP who 
has experience and capacity to coordinate the humanitarian affairs of the 
displaced population. This lead agency should coordinate all other non-
state actors in the management of various IDP camps. Humanitarian 
resources should be distributed to the IDPs through the various non-state 
agencies with roles assigned by the appointed non-state actor. The core 
competencies and functions of these agencies should be established before 
assignment. The main activities of these non-state actors should include the 
supply of resources and essentials such as – food, clothes, tents, transport, 
counselling, medicines and tracing. 
Third, the Government should take the responsibility of profiling the IDPs 
in terms of socio-economic losses and capacities. This profiling should 
ultimately lead to comprehensive databases and databanks of genuine IDPs. 
The information on the databases can be verified against the documentation 
from the departments dealing with immigration, registration of persons, 
and issuance of identity documents. Government security agencies should 
also collect crucial information from IDPs regarding alleged perpetrators 
of the post-election violence. This information should be verified with 
information collected outside the camps.
The Government should be guided by the UN guiding principles for 
purposes of classifying IDPs in terms of returning home, re-integration 
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or resettlement options. Social support abilities of IDPs may be identified 
through interviews with IDPs to establish their primary social network, 
and their adaptation, absorption and transformation capacities according 
to an assessment of the skills, assets, information and communication, 
vision and mission of each IDP household.
Fourth, when a PCRD process is underway, the Government should attend 
to the implementation of the various legal frameworks such as the UN 
Guiding Principles, Kampala Convention, Great Lakes Convention and 
Kenya IDP Bill when IDPs are returned to their original homes, resettled 
elsewhere or helped to re-integrate within the communities. The most 
viable option would be to return IDPs to their original homes. Where this 
is impossible, however, the best would be to re-integrate them in the host 
communities.
The last step is to ensure that perpetrators of the post-election violence 
face the justice system. IDPs should receive compensation in the form of 
reparation, and should observe the administering of justice in the form 
of retribution or restitution. A trusted judicial system is able to hold the 
perpetrators of the post-election violence to account and make them pay 
for properties destroyed and deaths caused.
6. What works: Integrating IDPs as the better option
The integrated category of IDPs is able to recover from the violence and 
reconstruct their situation much faster than the other categories of IDPs. 
They are able to adapt, absorb and transform their IDP status and return to 
their businesses, hence becoming more resilient than camp and government-
resettled IDPs. They are able to go back to the host community or relocate 
to other parts of the country and re-start with their new lifestyles. 
The host communities are generally receptive and cordial to post-conf lict 
victims. There are strong social support systems within this integration of 
IDPs with the host communities as compared with the other IDPs. These 
support systems have played a key role in the post-conf lict reconstruction 
and recovery process.
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Portes’ (1998; 2000) definition of social capital emphasises that a person 
must be related to others, and it is those others, not him-/herself, who are 
the actual source of his or her advantage. In this regard, integrated IDPs 
were able to re-establish their old social network. The primary source 
of help and social support for IDPs is their own informal social groups. 
This experience is similar to that of IDP victims elsewhere – for instance, 
Japan (after the Kobe earthquake), Azerbaijan, South-Western highlands 
of Uganda, Liberia, South Sudan (due to the 2013 ethnic violence) – and 
that of IDP-women in Bogota, Colombia (Brookings-Bern Project on 
Internal Displacement 2006; Brookings Institution 2008; 2011; Zora 2009). 
This demonstrates that social support provides an informal boost to the 
community resilience of IDPs. 
Integrated IDPs’ adaptive, absorptive and transformative capacities are 
strong because they do not only have their own IDP-based social support 
system; they have managed to integrate with the host community and have 
hence secured a broad social network for recovery and reconstruction. They 
have established cordial relationships with the landlords, who allowed 
them delayed rent re-payments of loans made in difficult circumstances. 
They have been able to integrate and conduct businesses with those who were 
not affected by the violence as well as to re-establish social networking with 
former business clients. The integrated nature of their resettled situation 
means they attend the same markets, churches and clinics as their host 
communities, and their children are in the same public schools. This study 
concludes that this is a valuable asset in their reconstruction and recovery. 
In addition to the social networks of their new environments, they have 
a type of leadership structure comprised of a chairperson, secretary and 
members. This social network helps them access information and also 
links them to the National Government. They have bonding, linking 
and bridging social capital, which is positively helping them accelerate 
their reconstruction and recovery. This empowers them for collective 
decision-making.
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7. Conclusions
The analysis on ‘what works and what does not work’ provides a lens for this 
study to offer four critical conclusions for policy makers in post-conf lict 
reconstruction and recovery. On the basis of the findings, the following 
conclusions and recommendations are presented: 
7.1 Land-based resettlement approach
Land-based post-conf lict reconstruction and recovery approaches on 
their own are not a sustainable solution for IDP community resiliency. 
IDPs require a guaranteed socio-economic livelihood. Post-electoral 
conf lict victims should be integrated back into communities and offered 
some socio-economic livelihood they can rely on (Brookings-Bern Project 
on Internal Displacement 2006; Brookings Institution 2008; 2011). 
To facilitate this approach, a multi-sectorial and multi-agency team should 
determine each individual victim’s economic loss in the electoral crisis 
and carry out an evaluation for purposes of compensation (restitution, 
retribution or restoration). Governments, NGOs and other stakeholders 
need to initiate peace, cohesion and integration projects in the host 
communities. This approach ensures community resilience and a faster 
recovery and reconstruction process for the victims.
In situations where the Government has resettled IDPs on farms, there 
should be an accelerated plan to re-engage and provide them with capacity 
and empowerment for a sustainable livelihood. This may include providing 
them with tools, credit and new options of crop cultivation, poultry 
rearing and marketing. In the long run, they should provide them with 
legal documents for ownership of the houses and pieces of land allocated. 
Cohesion and integration agenda should be rolled out to ensure host 
communities do not label the resettled as IDPs.
7.2 Social support in reconstruction and recovery
Social support is an important aspect in IDPs’ reconstruction and recovery. 
In absence of external support from host communities or government, IDPs 
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form their own support system. Where IDPs make a decision to integrate 
with the host communities, they are able to adapt, absorb or transform 
much more quickly. The pyramid of social support affords many forms of 
social support such as providing direction, disposition, description, content 
and network (Tardy 1985:187–202). The foundation of social support is the 
social network: comprising immediate family, close friends, neighbours, 
co-workers, community and professionals.
In displacement, IDPs are able to create new social support mechanisms 
among themselves for the purpose of livelihood. These social support 
structures are closely knit as they have a clear understanding of each other. 
They have common values, mission and vision, and eventually they even 
create new norms.   
7.3 External actors’ support
In this study, non-state actors are stakeholders in the post-conf lict 
reconstruction and recovery. At the micro-level reconstruction and recovery 
processes, they need to actively involve communities in the design and the 
implementation of the projects. UNDP Kenya had a well programmed 
livelihood project (2009–2011). The activities within this project aimed to 
improve livelihood capacities and empower the IDPs (UNDP 2009; 2011c). 
To achieve progress, donors should consider more proposals from NGOs 
similar to the approach of the UNDP Kenya. The projects should run for a 
longer period of about five years or more to achieve effective impact. 
The peace process was driven by the AU with continual instruction and 
advice from western countries such as the US, UK, Germany and France. 
Because these countries were instrumental in peace negotiations, they 
must also appraise, evaluate and monitor the impact of the resettlement 
projects and, if necessary, fund the process to ensure an accelerated search 
of durable solutions for the IDPs.
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7.4 African Union mandate
The AU’s PCRD should continue with its current mandate, but enforcement 
mechanisms should be put in place to prevent post-election violence. 
The AU is a key stakeholder in Africa’s conf lict prevention and peace 
promotion. Although a mechanism for peer-review is in place, there has 
been no tangible impact on the way in which the system has managed to 
prevent violence (Khadiagala 2008; 2009; African Union 2009; 2010).
In the case of Kenya, the AU belatedly anticipated the post-election 
violence and at any rate failed to enforce systems to prevent it. Therefore 
the AU should consider expert missions – emplaced about two years to 
general elections – to study and make recommendations to countries going 
to elections. This would help in timeously monitoring and evaluating 
electoral systems and structures in the countries concerned, and in advising 
and enforcing where necessary. This would avoid a merely one-day event 
of monitoring general elections by AU observers, as currently is the case.
7.5 The empirical, theoretical and conceptual contribution
This study has attempted to focus on empirical, theoretical and conceptual 
aspects of reconstruction and recovery processes for IDPs after a post-
electoral conf lict.
In the fieldwork, post-election violence victims shared details about the 
loss of their economic (livelihood), physical (land), natural (heritage, 
culture) and social (friendship, neighbours) assets during the violence. The 
study shows how the concept of social support and community resilience 
has informed the post-conf lict reconstruction and recovery discourse, 
particularly in multi-ethnic communities. It shows that co-workers are the 
first call for social support during and after a crisis, and that IDPs have 
intentionally created IDP-based social support structures and systems to 
overcome their common adversity. 
The general expectation that IDPs are socio-economic vagrants due to 
the losses suffered has been found to be merely a perception, since it is 
clear that the victims have been making proactive and informed choices 
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about alternative sources of livelihood, based on the changing conditions 
to which they were adapting. The study finds reliance of casual labour 
and other menial jobs as the primary source of livelihood among IDPs. 
The IDPs are determined to overcome adversity.
Adaptive aspects of social capital are internally controlled by IDPs, while 
Government and non-state actors control absorptive and transformative 
aspects. As such, IDP communities rich in the three different aspects of 
social capital are able to regain functionality (bounce back) faster. This 
study may provide a baseline for future researchers interrogating how IDP 
communities could share their experiences in regard to aspects of social 
capital with other post-conf lict displaced communities located in many 
parts of the world.
With regard to the bouncing back of displaced communities, this study 
underscores the importance of such livelihood assets as land, food, security, 
jobs, businesses and household properties as enabling a community to 
transform, adapt or absorb new ways of life. Additionally, however, the 
capacity for more or less successful recovery is determined by the way 
in which the hosting community enables or constrains victims to adapt, 
absorb or transform during and after a crisis. On the one hand, an IDP 
community needs ownership of livelihood resource (land) and on the other 
hand, they need social support systems advancing the vision, mission, goals 
and objectives of becoming resilient. What this study found, is that the 
bigger the pool of livelihood assets and the faster the re-acquisition of lost 
assets or the acquisition of new assets, the further the post-conf lict victims 
stand on the pathway back to functionality.
There is a strong argument regarding the relationship between post-election 
violence and ethnicity. The summary of this argument is that post-election 
violence breaks down the community into closed hostile ethnically 
determined units. This study has found, however, that IDPs develop strong 
emergent norms, values and culture (bonding social capital) which become 
dominant among themselves and are not determined by ethnic affiliation. 
By sharing common problems in displacement, IDPs disregarded ethnic 
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affiliations and created unique forms of bonding social capital among 
themselves. The process of more successful recovery is determined by 
in-group solidarity, mobilisation and reciprocity supports. This creates 
strong in-group loyalty and comradeship and out-group antagonism. There 
is closure and density within the displaced population which ensures active 
resistance to infiltration by host communities. 
The important finding of this study is the possibility of IDPs mobilising 
new social networks based on the socio-economic and livelihood resources 
they have among themselves. This could eventually create a new society 
(community) complete with new traditions, culture, systems and 
structures. The opinion that the foundation of social support originates 
solely from victims’ social network, such as family and neighbours, is 
apparently not accurate. 
Indeed, the primary sources of social support among the displaced are 
the victims themselves. They share the pains of displacement, they share 
common characteristics, attitudes and behaviour; they develop new values 
and norms among themselves, based on their displaced world view. This 
new culture creates a new community distinct from the host community 
and different from the community as it might have previously existed. 
The new society/community emerging from displacement develops 
new forms of social capital. These communities/societies have different 
socio-economic and political attributes and characteristics from their 
pre-conf lict communities. Experiences in displacement shape their rules, 
values, norms, behaviour, attitudes and world view. I therefore submit that 
a new community created out of displacement is more resilient, and more 
connected by social support systems and structures which enable them to 
deal with future post-electoral conf licts. 
This emergent culture has unique community capacities – adaptive, 
absorptive and transformative – based on previous experiences. The 
community develops areas of collective action independent of the host 
communities: such as conf lict and risk reduction and management, 
community protection (food, money services, etc.), resource management 
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(water, land, etc.) and management of community goods and services 
(schools, health, etc.). These capacities evolve to become pervasive and 
even dominant in the geographic area occupied by the IDP community.
Additionally, this community/society has the capacity to inf luence host 
communities to adopt their new culture, values order, social systems, 
social structures and social networks. This study refers to this possibility 
as creating new social capital. Therefore, the longer IDPs occupy certain 
geographic areas, the greater the likelihood for them to inf luence 
the culture, social network, social values and interactions of the host 
community. The new community/society is devoid of ethnicity. Indeed, 
in the Kenyan context new worship systems, new agricultural practices, 
new market systems and micro-finance systems are taking shape in areas 
dominated by IDP resettlement. This concept is comparable with the 
structural and cultural inf luence an immigrant Muslim/Asian community 
can create whenever they settle in a new area. They develop strong loyalty, 
solidarity and comradeship bonds among themselves. They inf luence the 
language and economic systems of that geographic area. They are able in 
time to dominate existing social systems, structures and institutions.
7.6 Further research
The empirical, theoretical and conceptual issues, as well as the conclusions 
above, may provide scholars with new horizons of knowledge concerning 
social capital and community resilience as potent factors in the 
reconstruction and recovery processes of IDPs.
Based on the above conclusions, scholars need to investigate further the 
relationships between IDPs and refugees’ reconstruction and recovery 
processes. Additionally, future scholars should examine case studies of 
IDPs in non-war situations.
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Violence, Religion, Peacemaking
Irvin-Erickson, Douglas and Peter C. Phan editors 2016
New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 205 pp. 
ISBN 978-1-137-56850-2 (hard cover printed copy); 
978-1-137-56851-9 (eBook)
Reviewed by Jannie Malan*
The title of this book announces three topics, one after the other, with 
commas separating the three keywords. In addition to the title, the cover 
of the printed book also provides us with a sub-title, a contextual reference 
and a symbolic picture. The sub-title is: ‘Contributions of Interreligious 
Dialogue’. The reference is to the series of which the book forms part: 
Interreligious Studies in Theory and Practice. Next to the name of the 
series, there is a logo of a circle of five overlapping circles. And the picture 
shows a dark sky above a moonlit cloud.
This meaningful book has developed out of a 2013 conference in New York on 
the theme ‘Nurturing Cultures of Peace in Contexts of Global Violence’ (p. 3). 
*  Jannie Malan is a Senior researcher at ACCORD.
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The goal of this conference was ‘to strengthen relationships between 
religious leaders, peace practitioners, and scholars, and to create a forum 
for a free exchange of ideas at the nexus of theory, practice, and faith’ (p. ix). 
The three-day conference and workshops proved to be a ‘transformative’ 
event, and reading of the resulting publication may surely also lead to 
transformative experiences.
In a context of global violence, much, if not most, of which is to some 
extent religion-related, a free exchange of ideas is very relevant and 
required. Such dialogic, or multilogic, exercises are not uncomplicated or 
unchallenging, however. In the fields of violence, religion and peacemaking, 
we have (almost?) no provabilities or certainties, but mainly debatabilities, 
believabilities and expectabilities. The commas in the title of this book 
may therefore be regarded as indicators of open-ended relatedness, and 
as prompts to revisit one’s opinions about the relations concerned. Each 
chapter separately, and the whole book as well, certainly challenge its 
readers to rethink their conceptions, and perhaps even convictions, and to 
play their constructive roles in nurturing cultures of peace.
In the Introduction, orientating questions are asked and discussed: What is 
religion? What is peace? What is interreligious peacemaking? Such ‘What?’ 
questions may of course be answered partly or wholly theoretically, and 
the discussions in the introductory pages are indeed on a theoretical 
wavelength. (From some religious perspectives, there may be objections 
to using the terms ‘theory’ and ‘theoretical’ with regard to convictions 
of faith, but for our present purpose we will have to ignore such debate. 
After all, the title of the series in which this book has been published, is 
‘Interreligious Studies in Theory and Practice’.)
In addition to the ‘What?’ questions, however, the Introduction also poses 
the very practical ‘How?’ question: How can religious leaders contribute to 
cultures of peace in the contemporary world? (p. 3). In my opinion, this is 
the core question of the book, and it identifies religious leaders as crucially 
important readers, and, hopefully, receptive and responsive readers. After 
all, most of the committed followers of religions usually do not have the 
opportunities and/or facilities to undertake open-minded and deeply 
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penetrating research into the convictions and traditions of their faith. 
With well-intentioned but naïve trust, they simply follow the guidance of 
their religious leaders. And when their leaders, albeit with good intentions, 
still happen to adhere to ancient but outdated persuasions and practices, 
the followers do the same. Even more deplorable and disastrous are the 
cases where a religious group has been diverted into a socio-political and/
or ethno-national direction and the religious leaders compliantly adopt the 
slogans but fail to blow any whistles. 
I have to add the obvious fact, however, that when the conference papers 
were written, and also when, after the conference, they were edited into the 
chapters of this book, the authors did not have the introductory chapter 
with its essential ‘How?’ question at their disposal. Nevertheless, there 
are many and valuable practical recommendations, and also between-the-
lines suggestions. There are country-specific details – from, alphabetically, 
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Canada, Colombia, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria 
and Sudan – which should be of special interest to readers from the 
countries and/or religions concerned, but which may also point to lessons 
that can be implemented in other geographic and/or religious contexts, 
with modifications where needed. Among the approaches and methods 
described and discussed, there are, for instance, the following: 
Counteracting environment-degrading resource extraction
Practising nonviolent resistance against landgrabs, structural inequality, 
and structural violence
Religious leaders remaining politically non-aligned 
Promoting environment-restoring tree planting
Promoting not only coexistence, but also pro-existence
Recognising and rectifying misapplication of religious elements
Recognising religion as part of a solution
Repairing individual relationships
Rescuing a religion from destructive politicisation
Reviving and promoting a vision of harmony
Tourists befriending vulnerable locals
Understanding each other’s religion and culture
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The emphasis on understanding explicitly occurs in four of the chapters, and 
in two of these, understanding is repeatedly mentioned. In chapter 9 (Armed 
Peacebuilding: The Peacebuilding aspects of the Counterinsurgency in 
Afghanistan), for instance, the importance of understanding is discussed, 
firstly with regard to the education of women on their rights within 
Islam. An existing programme is mentioned which was founded by an 
insider who realised the need. Secondly, it is explained ‘how an effective 
counterinsurgency policy is based on engaging the local populations and 
winning their support, not merely defeating the enemy with superior 
firepower’ (p. 158). In this regard, it was an outsider military general who 
took important initiatives. He allowed himself to be guided by ‘paradoxical 
understandings’ and he promoted the development of understanding 
and relationship-building between the military and the religious leaders 
(pp. 163–165). And in chapter 10 (Religion as a Catalyst for Peacebuilding 
in Jos, Plateau State North Central Nigeria), it is emphatically stated that 
‘Christians and Muslims in Jos, Nigeria need to understand that both 
religions preach peace’ (p. 177). This is followed by clear examples of what 
each group should understand about their own religion, and of how such 
understandings could pave the way towards forgiveness and reconciliation 
(pp. 177–179).
After my comments on the country-related chapters, I wish to underline 
the meanings and messages of the first two chapters, which make up almost 
a third of the book. In chapter 1 (Introduction: Interfaith Contributions 
to Nurturing Cultures of Peace), concepts and theories are brief ly 
but meaningfully discussed. Chapter 2 (Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, 
Peacebuilding: An Interreligious Spirituality for Just Peace), the longest 
in the book, ‘attemts to expound the teachings of various religions on 
peace and just peacebuiling, and to elaborate an interreligioius spirituality, 
that is, a way of living that promotes peacekeeping, peacemaking, and 
peacebuilding’ (p. 22). Near the end of this chapter, it is stated ‘that all 
world religions recommend such a spirituality of knowing the truth, 
doing justice, forgiveness and social reconstruction’ (p. 48). I am inclined, 
however, to criticise this as an unreferenced sweeping statement, and also 
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as a partial statement. The inner and attitudinal nature of this spirituality 
is suggested by the mention of forgiveness, but the way in which such a 
spirituality deviates from outward religiosity is not emphasised. And, since 
it is usually the externalities found in creeds, codes and cults that cause 
and/or exacerbate conf lict, I reckon that the making of this point, here and 
elsewhere, could have significantly increased the impact of the book. But I 
immediately have to add that in my opinion this crucial insight is missing 
from many books in the field of religion.
In spite of this (debatable?) shortcoming, however, Violence, Religion, 
Peacemaking does communicate and disseminate very meaningful 
contributions to the interreligious dialogue. It warns against the destructive 
role religion can play in the ‘deadly mix’ of ‘ethnicity, nationalism, land, 
and religion … fueling most armed conf licts’ (p. 23), and it strongly 
recommends ways in which religion can be ‘a catalyst for peacebuilding’ 
(p. 181) – in a particular area and globally.
Technically, this book has been produced very professionally. I have 
noticed 24 typing errors, but as an editor I know very well how easily minor 
mistakes can slip through.
I can highly recommend this book to religious leaders, polititians, peace 
practitioners and scholars, and to all who are interested in religion and 
conf lict. The more we think and rethink around the nexus of theory, 
practice and faith, the more our moon-lit clouds might become directly 
sun-lit. Or evaporate.
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